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ABSTRACT 	
Cognitive processes, such as memory, are accompanied by metacognitive states of awareness 
that allow for evaluation of their function. Across seven experiments we employed the 
delayed judgment-of-learning (JOL) paradigm with healthy young adults to examine 
metacognitive monitoring of learning. After studying cue-target word-pairs, participants were 
presented with the studied cues and predicted their ability to retrieve the target on a 
subsequent memory test. The key question of interest was the nature of the underlying 
processes guiding such judgments with a focus on how they relate to memory. The delayed 
JOL literature has assumed that it is an absolute judgment, based on the ease of access to the 
target item. Chapters 2 and 3 manipulated target- and cue-related variables and investigated 
their influence on memory and metamemory. The results showed delayed JOLs are also 
sensitive to memory for contextual information about the target (Chapter 2) and the level of 
familiarity with the cue term (Chapter 3). This is strengthened by results from Chapter 4 in 
which participants provided written justifications of their JOL responses without any 
experimental manipulations of the learned material. Analysis of these responses confirmed 
that both cue- and target-related information influences delayed JOLs. Lastly, we showed that 
delayed JOLs are not sensitive to whether they are predicting recognition or recall (so called 
theory-based influences) unless participants make a different prediction on each trial (i.e. 
trial-level design, Chapter 5). Overall, delayed JOLs are shown to vary with variables that 
fluctuate on a trial level, which can but do not necessarily need to map onto memory. The 
results suggest that delayed JOLs are primarily comparative judgments, involving the 
evaluation of the quantity and quality of evidence on any given trial in the context of the task 
at hand (e.g. by comparison to preceding trials). This is contrary to how it is often treated in 
the delayed JOL literature but is consistent with other metacognitive paradigms.  
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CHAPTER 1 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
“The person is not a mere medium through which information flows” (Koriat, 2007)  
“The universal conscious fact is not “feelings and thoughts exist”, but rather ‘I think’ and ‘I 
feel’” (James, 1890). 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The question of consciousness and self-awareness has a long history in both philosophy and 
psychology. The central questions revolve around the feasibility of studying self-reflective 
processes and the implications of such study. When Descartes asserted ‘I think therefore I 
am’ (1641/1911), he claimed in essence that his subjective awareness of his cognition was the 
sole certainty in which he could ground his belief in his self-hood and existence. Some have 
suggested that the ability to evaluate cognitive processes might even be uniquely human 
although that view has now been questioned (for review and further discussion see Metcalfe 
& Son, 2012). Either way, cognition about cognition (thinking about thinking), or 
metacognition, is the field that has emerged from these types of concerns and questions. 
Metacognition is generally defined as any judgment made about a mental event (rather than 
about a stimulus present in the environment). Broadly, this thesis examines how 
metacognitive judgments relate to the underlying cognitive processes, with a focus on 
memory. 
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At the core of metacognition is the acknowledgement that we are not merely processing 
machines. We do not just think or remember or imagine or perceive but we are also aware 
that we are engaging in these cognitive processes. As a consequence, we, for example, easily 
make the distinction between forgetting and not knowing in our daily lives (Glucksberg & 
McCloskey, 1981) and can distinguish a range of epistemic states (see Arango-Muñoz, 2013; 
de Sousa, 2009). This has important implications for our optimal cognitive function. For 
example, the inability to separate imagining from remembering leads to confabulations and 
delusions; similarly, the awareness of which of these processes we are engaging protects us 
from falsely concluding we are remembering when in fact experiencing novel situations (see 
for example Moulin, Conway, Thompson, James, & Jones, 2005). This can be seen 
particularly in patients with cognitive deficits who also present with anasognosia, which 
corresponds to a lack of awareness concerning loss of function (cognitive or otherwise; see 
Ernst et al., 2016; McGlynn & Schacter, 1989). Lack of awareness leads to inability to adopt 
appropriate compensating strategies and contributes to suboptimal (cognitive) function.  
Correspondingly, cognition and awareness of cognition (metacognition) are thought to be 
distinct but closely related processes that depend on each other (see Nelson & Narens, 1990). 
That they are distinct capacities is supported by research which shows there are instances 
when the two can be differentially affected or even stand in opposition to each other. For 
example, research with clinical populations has demonstrated that it is possible to have 
impaired cognitive abilities and preserved metacognitive abilities (see for example Howard et 
al., 2010; Illman, Kemp, Souchay, Morris, & Moulin, 2016; Shimamura & Squire, 1986; 
Souchay, Bacon, & Danion, 2006). Every-day examples of dissociations between 
metacognition and cognition are déjà vu and tip-of-the-tongue (TOT) experiences. Déjà vu is 
the experience of familiarity combined with the awareness that the experience is misplaced 
and that the item or situation eliciting it are in fact novel (for a review see Brown, 2004). 
		 3	
TOT on the other hand is the failure to remember something from memory coupled with the 
knowledge that the sought-after-information is known (for a review see Brown, 2012). As 
such both experiences can be seen both as a failure of memory as well as a metacognitive 
success in that one is aware they are experiencing a memory error.  
Despite these dissociations, in most instances metacognition and cognition are closely 
associated. Metacognition has been closely related to executive functions (e.g., attention, 
error correction, planning) in the literature (see Shimamura, 2000). Nevertheless, Souchay, 
Isingrini, and Gil (2002) observed that accuracy of metacognitive judgments about memory 
in Alzheimer’s patients was correlated to memory performance rather than executive function 
scores. Further, a range of studies have shown that variables known to influence memory 
performance (e.g., dividing attention at study leading to shallower encoding and worse 
memory performance) similarly impact accuracy of metacognitive judgments about memory 
(Sacher, Taconnat, & Souchay, 2009). 
Overall, metacognition has developed from and retains close links to memory research. To 
give a few examples; the distinction between memory for events (episodic memory) and 
memory for general knowledge information (semantic memory; Tulving, 1972, 1973) has 
been echoed in research on metacognitive judgments pertaining to memory (Reggev, 
Zuckerman, & Maril, 2011; Souchay, Moulin, Clarys, Taconnat, & Isingrini, 2007). Evidence 
from fMRI research has demonstrated dissociable neural substrates supporting metacognition 
of semantic as compared to episodic material (Reggev, Zuckerman & Maril, 2011; Elman, 
Klosterman, Marian, Verstaen & Shimamura, 2012). Similarly, in ageing there is evidence 
for preserved semantic metacognitive monitoring in instances where episodic monitoring is 
impaired (Morson, Moulin, & Souchay, 2015). Additionally, memory is accompanied by 
subjective feelings such as familiarity and some have suggested that these experiences are 
inferred from cues in the environment (e.g., fluency of processing; Jacoby & Whitehouse, 
		4	
1989) and interpreted in the present context (Whittlesea, 1997). The same has been proposed 
about metacognition, which is seen primarily as an inferential process (see Koriat, 2000; 
Metcalfe & Dunlosky, 2008).  
The central theme of this thesis is the link between memory and metamemory judgments. The 
focus is particularly on judgments made just after learning during consolidation, predicting 
future retrieval (delayed judgment-of-learning or JOL). The experimental chapters further 
touch on secondary questions regarding metacognitive theory and methods. The aims 
throughout are to (i) broaden our understanding of the processes underlying metacognitive 
judgments as well as (ii) to shed light on some of the methodological assumptions in the 
current literature and discuss their validity. This chapter introduces the background literature, 
starting with a general overview of research on metacognition of memory. After covering the 
theoretical background, the main paradigm used throughout the thesis (the delayed JOL task) 
is introduced and contrasted with other, similar paradigms. The rest of the chapter then 
focuses on issues relevant throughout the thesis, laying the groundwork and background for 
the different strands explored along with methodological and analytical concerns. The chapter 
ends with an overview of the aims of each subsequent chapter in the thesis. 
1.2 Metamemory paradigms 
Metacognitive research developed from and is firmly rooted in memory research and it is 
only more recently that it has extended to other domains. Examples of these include 
perception (Fleming et al., 2015; Rahnev, Koizumi, McCurdy, D’Esposito, & Lau, 2015), 
reasoning and decision making (Ackerman & Thompson, 2014; Fletcher & Carruthers, 2012) 
and agency or judgments about the sense of being in control of one’s own actions (Metcalfe, 
Eich, & Miele, 2013; Sidarus & Haggard, 2016). Metacognitive judgments about memory are 
also refereed to as metamemory, a term originally introduced by Flavell (1971).  
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The general framework for metacognition that has prevailed to this day was introduced by 
Nelson and Narens (1990). It distinguishes between an object-level that represents the 
particular cognition under consideration and a meta-level which represents the higher-order 
evaluation of cognition (see Figure 1.1). As is clear from the model, the two levels are 
connected by two distinct processes; monitoring and control. While most early research has 
focused on the idea that monitoring influences control, more recent results have shown that 
the influence is bi-directional (Koriat, Ma’ayan, & Nussinson, 2006). This means that while 
control can be and often is a result of monitoring (e.g., if I feel that I have not learned 
something well enough I may choose to spend more time studying it), it is also possible for 
monitoring to result from feedback provided by control processes (e.g., if I find something 
difficult to process and require to increase the effort employed in studying it, I may judge that 
I am unlikely to remember it on some future memory test). The advantage of the Nelson and 
Narens model is that it provides a framework within which to study metacognitive processes 
that to date remains relevant. Further, it highlights both the close relationship between 
cognition and metacognition and their status as separate processes. This thesis focuses on 
monitoring exclusively and asks how participants construct judgments about memory. 
 
Figure 1.1: Nelson and Narens’s (1990) model of metacognition. 
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Metamemory judgments can be made at any point in the memory process from prior to 
encoding (i.e. ease of learning judgments, assessing how easy it will be to learn the material 
at hand) to post-retrieval (i.e. retrospective confidence in the accuracy of what has been 
retrieved). From a clinical perspective, it is common to ask for a self-report of general 
cognitive function, either informally or through using a range of standardized cognitive 
questionnaires (e.g., Broadbent, Cooper, FitzGerald, & Parker, 1982; Dixon, Hultsch, & 
Hertzog, 1988). One can then compare the self-report to standardized tests of memory 
performance to assess its accuracy. However, a more sensitive approach to studying 
metamemory, particularly with the aim of advancing our theoretical understanding, is to ask 
for judgments about learning and retrieval for a particular set of items. Such an approach 
allows the teasing apart of specific variables that influence metacognition, variables that 
influence memory and variables that influence both. 
As can be seen in Figure 1.2 there is a wide range of paradigms that have been employed in 
the metamemory literature, each tapping into different aspect of the memory process (see 
Nelson & Narens, 1990). While some of these judgments predict future memory 
performance, others retrospectively assess its accuracy. Altogether these differences mean 
that each judgment has a different basis and is subject to different influences. Monitoring 
tasks most commonly ask for judgments on an item-by-item basis (as explored in this thesis) 
but can also be made in aggregate, global terms (e.g., Moulin, Perfect, & Jones, 2000). The 
item-by-item judgment is in many ways preferable as it is easier to tease out factors that 
influence metacognition. 
 
		 7	
 
Figure 1.2: Nelson and Narens’s (1990) schematic of different types of metamemory 
judgments and the related memory processes. 
 
This thesis focuses on judgments made just after learning, during retention or consolidation. 
In the original classification of metamemory judgments depicted in Figure 1.2, these were 
called judgments of knowing but now the common term is judgment of learning (JOL; e.g., 
Nelson & Dunlosky, 1991). As is clear from the diagram, there is also some overlap between 
JOL and the feeling-of-knowing (FOK) task (Hart, 1965). The key difference is that whereas 
JOL tracks the acquisition and retention of information, the FOK is primarily a retrieval-
oriented judgment. This means that the FOK task can be used on both material learned by 
participants prior to taking part in the experiment (e.g., general knowledge information) and 
material learned during the experiment, introduced by the experimenter (e.g., novel word-
pairs such as OCEAN-TRUTH). JOLs on the other hand are studied exclusively in the 
context of material learned during the experiment. The most common FOK and JOL 
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paradigms use cue-target word pairs although some studies have also used images as cues 
and/or targets (e.g., Chua, Hannula, & Ranganath, 2012; Metcalfe & Finn, 2008b). All 
experiments reported in the present thesis employed cue-target word-pairs.   
1.2.1 The delayed JOL 
The JOL task has a number of strikingly different formats in the literature. The greatest 
difference is between the immediate and delayed JOL paradigm (Nelson & Dunlosky, 1991). 
In immediate JOLs, participants study the cue-target pairs one at a time and after the study of 
each pair, they make a judgment about whether they will retrieve the target when presented 
with the cue on a memory test which is administered after all items have been studied and 
judged (e.g., Hanczakowski, Zawadzka, Pasek, & Higham, 2013; Koriat, 1997; Rhodes & 
Castel, 2008). In this form it is very much a judgment tracking acquisition. In the delayed 
JOL paradigm, there is a delay between when each pair is studied and when a JOL for that 
pair is given. In the most common form of the delayed JOL, participants first study all cue-
target pairs without making any judgments. Only after all items have been studied are 
participants presented with all the studied cues, one at a time, and are asked to make a 
prediction about their confidence in their ability to retrieve the target on the subsequent 
memory test (e.g., Metcalfe & Finn, 2008b). Delayed JOLs are usually significantly more 
accurate at predicting performance than immediate JOLs although this difference disappears 
if the delayed JOL format employs both the cue and the target at judgment (Dunlosky & 
Nelson, 1997). Much research has focused on trying to understand the difference in accuracy 
between the two judgments. While a consensus hasn’t been reached yet, all the existing 
theories focus on differences in the basis of the two judgments, arguing the cues informing 
delayed JOLs are more indicative of future memory performance than those informing 
immediate JOLs (for a review see Rhodes & Tauber, 2011). As such the two judgments are 
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considered very different in terms of the influences they are sensitive to and their underlying 
processes (see also Koriat, 1997). 
In contrast, there are clear similarities between the delayed JOL and the FOK task. 
Classically, the FOK requires participants to first attempt recall of the target item and only in 
instances when they cannot retrieve it, are participants asked to judge whether they feel they 
know the target enough to recognise it on a subsequent recognition test (e.g., Hart, 1965; 
Jersakova, Souchay, & Allen, 2015; Souchay & Isingrini, 2012). While traditionally only 
trials on which the target was not retrieved were considered, more recently it became 
common to ask for an FOK judgment for all items irrespective of whether the target was 
retrieved. The latter, while now usually called FOK, has also been termed a prediction of 
knowing (POK; Schreiber & Nelson, 1998). 
In many ways then the delayed JOL, FOK and POK are very closely related judgments. In 
particular, the recent extension of FOK to all trials rather than just failed recall trials increases 
its similarity to a delayed JOL. As a result the difference between a delayed JOL and an FOK 
is primarily in that the latter requires an overt target retrieval attempt whereas in the delayed 
JOL it is implicitly assumed participants attempt retrieval in making the judgment but it is not 
explicitly required of them. Nevertheless, a study has shown that response latencies for JOLs 
given without first attempting to retrieve the target (overtly or covertly) are different to 
response latencies for JOLs where participants were not explicitly instructed to retrieve the 
target (Son & Metcalfe, 2000). More specifically, in the first case JOL magnitude was 
inversely correlated with response latencies whereas in the latter case the relationship 
between JOL magnitude and response times was a U-shaped function. Further, it was 
observed that judgment accuracy on episodic delayed JOL and FOK tasks was not correlated 
and that whereas FOK accuracy correlated with executive function measures, JOL accuracy 
did not (Souchay, Insingrini, Clarys, Taconnat, & Eustache, 2004). Further, older adults were 
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shown to be impaired on FOK accuracy but not on delayed JOL accuracy (Souchay & 
Isingrini, 2012). This means that findings from the FOK literature do not necessarily 
generalise to delayed JOLs and despite their clear similarities, the two tasks need to be 
considered separately. 
Whether researchers have employed FOK or delayed JOL has often been guided by the key 
questions of interest. The FOK literature is primarily concerned with the type of information 
and manipulations that influence the judgment (e.g., Koriat & Levy-Sadot, 2001; Koriat, 
1993; Metcalfe, Schwartz, & Joaquim, 1993). This has likewise been the primary focus of 
immediate JOLs (e.g., Rhodes & Castel, 2008). The delayed JOL literature on the other hand 
has primarily focused on JOL accuracy with a particular focus on attempting to answer why 
delayed JOLs are more accurate than immediate JOLs (for reviews see for example Metcalfe 
& Dunlosky, 2008; Rhodes & Tauber, 2011). By focusing on the delayed JOL as a special 
case of the immediate JOL, the understanding of the underlying processes guiding the 
delayed JOL are somewhat limited. There have been only a few studies that have attempted 
to understand the basis of the delayed JOL in more detail and in its own right (e.g., Metcalfe 
& Finn, 2008b) and the delayed JOL literature is in this aspect less rich than the work 
pertaining to the other paradigms. The primary goal of this thesis is to add to this sparser 
literature by investigating the underlying mechanisms that drive delayed JOLs. 
1.2.2 Overview of experimental paradigm 
The focus of this thesis is on the underlying processes of delayed JOLs.  More specifically, 
our focus is on how participants generally assess access to recently learned information and 
predict the likelihood of future retrieval for that information. In this thesis we employed a 
classic delayed JOL task throughout with only the cue presented at the Judgment Phase, 
which was administered only once all items have been studied. The criterion memory task for 
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JOLs is usually cued recall (e.g., Benjamin, 2005; Metcalfe & Finn, 2008a, 2008b) but can 
also be recognition (e.g., Dunlosky & Nelson, 1997). Majority of the chapters here used 
recognition as the criterion task but we also used in recall in Chapter 5. 
To give an overview of the basic paradigm used throughout the thesis (see Figure 1.3), it 
consists of three distinct phases (with modifications or additions of further phases in some 
chapters). Firstly, the Study Phase presents participants with a list of cue-target word pairs, 
one at a time.  This is followed by a Judgement Phase where participants are presented with 
the cue of each studied pair one at a time. They are asked to indicate whether they will 
retrieve the target on the subsequent memory test. These judgments are either made on a 
confidence scale (0%, 20%, 40%, 60%, 80%, 100%) or as a binary (yes/no) judgment. Lastly, 
in the Memory Phase participants are presented with all studied cues along with a number of 
options from which to choose the target corresponding to the presented cue. All options are 
targets that have been studied. Overall, delayed JOLs have been shown to accurately map 
onto memory performance with higher JOLs given for remembered as compared to not 
remember targets (for review on delayed JOL accuracy see Rhodes & Tauber, 2011). 
 
  
Figure 1.3: Schematic of general procedure. 
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1.3 Metamemory theories 
One of the biggest questions in metacognitive research is how metacognitive judgments are 
constructed. What are the types of influences and information that participants incorporate 
into the judgments they make and which of these influences lead to optimal judgments and 
which distort them? Broadly, a common factor underlying all metamemory theories is that 
they describe metamemory judgments in relation to the underlying memory processes, 
although the view of the precise link has changed over time.  
1.3.1 Early metamemory theories 
The first account of metamemory, primarily stemming from FOK and TOT research, was that 
of direct partial access to the target item (Eysenck, 1979). This presupposed that even in 
instances when the target could not be fully retrieved, one had access to the target features 
and the target trace was at least partially activated; the stronger the partial access the higher 
the feeling that one knows the sought after information and that it would subsequently be 
retrieved in the near future. This is based on a wealth of research which has demonstrated that 
when people cannot fully recall the target item, they can still recall partial information about 
it such as the first letter and other orthographic information or semantic content (for review 
see Brown, 2012). When participants can access this partial information they also give higher 
FOK ratings and are more likely to report being in a TOT state, indicating they are on the 
verge of target recall. Similarly, when they report a TOT state or a high FOK, participants are 
also more likely to retrieve the target item (Gardiner, Craik, & Bleasdale, 1973). The notable 
aspect of this theory is that of a privileged access to the memory trace of the sought-after 
information. However, it was also noticed when participants remembered incorrect partial 
information, they likewise reported higher FOKs (Koriat, 1993; Thomas, Bulevich, & 
Dubois, 2012). This undermined the idea of privileged access to the target trace and rather 
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suggested that the judgments might be inferred from any partial information coming to mind 
(irrespective of accuracy). 
From these observations the target accessibility account developed. This states that 
participants monitor the level of perceived access to the target item through cues such as 
retrieval of partial information or ease of target retrieval at time of judgment. It is then the 
quantity as well as the intensity of the retrieved information that informs the metacognitive 
judgment. This account is different to the one mentioned above in that it is not assumed that 
participants have privileged, direct access to the target item. Because the information that 
comes to mind is usually mostly relevant and target related, judgments are overall fairly 
accurate (Koriat, 2000). Nevertheless, any information that comes to mind and that appears 
relevant at the time of judgment can inform that judgment.  
Another early account focused on the cue rather than the target. More specifically, it has been 
observed that metacognitive judgments increase with experimentally manipulated familiarity 
with the cue term (Metcalfe, Schwartz, & Joaquim, 1993; Reder & Ritter, 1992; Reder, 
1987). The most common method of manipulating cue familiarity is to expose participants to 
some items in a seemingly unrelated task prior to the Study Phase (e.g., Liu, Su, Xu, & Chan, 
2007). An example would be a pleasantness-rating task where participants are presented with 
one item at a time and asked to rate its pleasantness on a scale. Following this they would 
complete a standard Study-Judgment-Memory Test paradigm with the cue of half of the 
studied cue-target pairs having been seen in the rating task. Participants give higher i.e. more 
confident metacognitive judgments when presented with a familiar cue across a range of 
paradigms. Some studies have found that manipulating cue familiarity increases access to the 
target, indexed by increased likelihood of retrieval (Liu et al., 2007; Metcalfe & Finn, 2008b) 
while other studies have not observed this (Benjamin, 2005). It makes sense that familiar 
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information should also be better known, but the varied memory results mean the debate 
continues as to whether cue familiarity is a diagnostic cue.  
1.3.2 Modern metamemory theories 
Current models of metamemory highlight the combined contributions of cue familiarity and 
target accessibility to metacognitive judgments as opposed to focusing on only one source of 
influence on metacognitive judgments. The first to propose this view were Koriat & Levy-
Sadot (2001) who outlined a two-stage model of FOK judgments. This was later also 
extended to delayed JOLs (Benjamin, 2005; Metcalfe & Finn, 2008b). The combined view 
not only reconciles cue familiarity and target accessibility as both contributing to 
metacognitive judgments but also suggests how the two effects interact. In this view, 
metamemory judgments are described as a two-stage process. The first stage is fast acting 
and driven by cue familiarity; if the cue does not feel familiar, then a negative or a low 
confidence judgment is made outright without engaging stage two. If the cue feels familiar 
then stage two, which comprises of a target accessibility assessment, is initiated. It makes 
sense that if the cue does not feel familiar there is no point in searching for its associated 
target, a process which is slow and effortful. The cue thus provides a quick signalling system 
for deciding when and how to engage target retrieval mechanisms.  
An important shift in the literature from the original, direct access view is that these models 
are inferential in nature. In other words, the general idea is that when making a metacognitive 
judgment, such as whether a target is or will be accessible, a range of subjective cues and 
feelings are considered (Koriat, 2000). The strength of the experiences that arise (e.g., the 
experience of familiarity with the cue, or ease of access to the target) are used to infer the 
metacognitive judgment given. This is also why cue familiarity and target accessibility are 
sometimes also referred to as experience-based influences. The inferential view of 
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metacognition remains the most prominent and generalizes across metacognitive paradigms. 
For example, fluency of stimulus processing has been shown to influence judgments made 
about memory (Rhodes & Castel, 2008) as well as judgments made about agency (Sidarus & 
Haggard, 2016) and reasoning (Thompson et al., 2013).  
Within this framework, the metamemory literature has also recently begun to examine what 
other sources of information, beyond that of cue familiarity and target accessibility, influence 
metacognitive judgments. The noncriterial recollection hypothesis stems from results 
showing that memory for one source dimension influenced judgments made about access to 
another source dimension (Brewer, Marsh, Clark-Foos, & Meeks, 2010). Further, access to 
encoding strategies, namely what link was made between the cue and the target at study, 
influences judgments about access to the target (Hertzog, Fulton, Sinclair, & Dunlosky, 
2014). Altogether, this new line of evidence (to date only investigated in relation to FOK 
judgments) emphasizes metacognition as a general evidence evaluation system where 
evidence refers to any seemingly related information that comes to mind at the time of 
judgment. Some of these ideas are considered in more detail in Chapter 2.  
1.3.3 Types and levels of metacognitive influences 
Additionally, throughout the literature, researchers have often drawn a distinction between 
different types of influences on metacognitive judgments. Starting with Flavell and Wellman 
(1977), they distinguished between person, task and strategy-related influences, which they 
termed variables. All of these refer to knowledge that participants have about learning and 
memory. Person variables refer to, for example, knowledge of how well one learns, task 
variables refer to knowledge of how task manipulations (e.g., delay between learning and 
recall) affect retrieval, and strategy variables refer to knowledge about the usefulness and 
effectiveness of different learning strategies. Koriat (1997), focusing on judgments of 
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learning, made a distinction between intrinsic, extrinsic and mnemonic influences (or as he 
referred to them – cues). Intrinsic cues are for example characteristics of the studied items 
(e.g., level of relatedness between the cue and the target), extrinsic cues refer more 
specifically to the entire learning situation (e.g., time given to study each item), and 
mnemonic cues are considered internal and subjective (e.g., feeling of knowing the sought 
after target information). More recently Koriat (2000; see also Arango-Muñoz, 2010) 
suggested that the distinction could be made between implicit and explicit influences. 
Explicit (or judgment-based) influences collectively refer to what Koriat earlier called 
intrinsic and extrinsic influences. In other words, judgment based influences can be described 
as general knowledge and beliefs one has about learning and memory. These beliefs also 
encompass all variables originally described by Flavell and Wellman (1977). Mnemonic cues 
are thought of as implicit and heuristics-based. Heuristic in this case refers to the idea that 
they are not necessarily accurate, consistent with the inferential account of metamemory 
described above. When I am trying to recall the name of a book I read last month I might feel 
that the title started with the letter S while in fact the title was Americanah. However, based 
on the fact that any partial information comes to mind as I am thinking of the name, I infer 
that I am about to remember it. Cue familiarity and target accessibility are considered both to 
be examples of implicit heuristics that drive metacognitive judgments. The majority of this 
thesis (Chapters 2, 3, and 4) is focused on investigating implicit heuristics. 
While the distinction between implicit and explicit influences on metacognitive judgments 
has remained popular, explicit influences have been less researched and evidence for their 
impact on judgments remains limited. The influence of explicit processes on metamemory 
judgments has been most clearly examined using immediate JOLs. Variables such as the 
semantic relationship between the cue and the target (Castel, McCabe, & Roediger, 2007), 
how far in advance the predicted memory test is to take place (e.g., in 10 minutes as 
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compared to in a week; Koriat, Bjork, Sheffer, & Bar, 2004) and how many learning 
opportunities will be given for each cue-target pair (Kornell & Bjork, 2009) all influence JOL 
predictions. However, it is noteworthy that most commonly these variables are manipulated 
on a trial-level. As such, for example, a participant might encounter a semantically related 
cue-target pair on the first trial and a semantically unrelated cue-target pair on the second 
trial. Similarly, they might predict target retrieval in 10 minutes on a given trial and retrieval 
in a week on the subsequent trial. Those studies that have contrasted these trial-level designs 
with blocked or between-subject designs (Koriat et al., 2004; Kornell & Bjork, 2009) have 
found that the effect of these explicit types of variables on metamemory judgments 
disappears. Altogether, these studies provide converging evidence that participants do not 
actively use theory-based, explicit processes in making online judgments such as immediate 
JOLs even though when asked directly, participants do hold such theories about memory 
(Kornell & Bjork, 2009; van Velzen, 2013). Delayed JOLs have been found to change with 
whether participants are predicting future recognition or recall such that participants are more 
confident when predicting recognition as compared to recall, though so far this has only been 
examined in a trial-level design (Mazzoni & Cornoldi, 1993; Thiede, 1996). As such the role 
of explicit influences in metamemory judgments remains less clear. This is discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 5. 
1.4 Measures of metacognitive accuracy 
Before outlining the aims of the thesis as a whole, it is necessary to make some comments on 
the general analysis approach to the data in all the experimental chapters. Metacognitive 
accuracy is traditionally analysed either in absolute (calibration) terms or in relative 
(resolution) terms. Absolute accuracy looks at overall correspondence between metacognitive 
judgments and cognitive performance (e.g. whether for all items given a 60% JOL 
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participants remembered 60% of those items). If such correspondence between average 
performance and percentage JOLs given were true for all JOL responses, then a participant 
would be considered perfectly calibrated. Correspondingly, if participants overall gave 50% 
of yes JOL predictions, they would be perfectly calibrated if they remembered 50% of all 
items. If participants’ performance is higher than their JOLs, they are said to be 
underconfident whereas if it is lower they are overconfident. Much research has focused on 
poor calibration across tasks and populations (e.g., Kelley & Sahakyan, 2003). The 
underlying assumption of calibration however is that participants use confidence in 
probabilistic terms and recent research has suggested this might not be the case (discussed in 
more detail in subsequent chapters, see Hanczakowski et al., 2013). Another issue is that the 
analysis ignores item-by-item correspondence between judgments and performance, which is 
the focus of relative accuracy measures. The primary focus of this thesis thus is on relative 
accuracy.  
The most straightforward way to assess relative correspondence is to use correlations and the 
most commonly employed (see Nelson, 1984) in metacognitive tasks is the Goodman-
Kruskal gamma correlation (Goodman & Kruskal, 1954). Gamma compares the judgment 
and memory outcome for each item against all other items. If an item that is subsequently 
recognised receives a higher judgment than an item that is not recognised, that constitutes a 
concordant pair. If the recognised item receives a lower judgment than the not recognised 
item then that is a discordant pair. Gamma is based on comparing the number of concordant 
and discordant pairs (ignoring ties). The fact that each item is compared to all other items is 
what makes it a relative measure of accuracy.  
An alternative approach to relative accuracy employed throughout this thesis is the signal 
detection theory (SDT) approach. The advantage of this approach lies in that it can separate 
influences of participants’ response bias (criterion; their tendency to endorse one response 
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more than another) and their ability to discriminate between the classes of interest (see 
Macmillan & Creelman, 2004). When the classes refer to stimulus specific information (e.g., 
is it old or new; is it present or absent) we refer to type-1 SDT. When the classification refers 
to accuracy of responses, and metacognitive judgments in general, it is referred to as type-2 
SDT (see Higham, 2011). Naturally, the focus here is on type-2 SDT analysis as a method for 
evaluating accuracy of metacognitive judgments.  
Relative accuracy or discrimination is commonly assessed using d-prime (abbreviated d’) for 
binary (yes/no) judgments. This measure assumes that participants are evaluating two signals 
(one providing evidence for future target retrieval and one providing evidence to the 
contrary) in the presence of noise. The two signals are thought to be normally distributed and 
with equal variances. The distance between the two distributions corresponds to the 
participant’s ability to distinguish targets that will be retrieved from those that will not and is 
captured by d’.  
To calculate d’ for each participant we calculate the number of hits (Hn; number of 
remembered items given a yes JOL prediction), misses (Mn; number of remembered items 
given a no JOL prediction), correct rejections (CRn; number of not remembered items given a 
no JOL prediction) and false alarms (FAn; number of not remembered items given a yes JOL 
prediction). Using a Snodgrass & Corwin (1988) correction we then calculate the adjusted hit 
rate (H’) and adjusted false alarm rate (FA’) which are then used to calculate d’: 
 
1  𝐻! = 𝐻𝑛 + 0.5𝐻𝑛 +𝑀𝑛 + 1 
2  𝐹𝐴! = 𝐹𝐴𝑛 + 0.5𝐹𝐴𝑛 + 𝐶𝑅𝑛 + 1 
3   𝑑! =  𝑧 𝐻! − 𝑧 𝐹𝐴!  
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The Snodgrass and Corwin correction consists of adding 0.5 to the numerator and 1 to the 
denominator and was developed to deal with ceiling and floor effects. For example, if a 
participant had a perfect hit rate then without the correction it would not be possible to obtain 
z-values necessary for calculating d’. The d’ values usually range from 0 to 3, where 0 
indicates a full overlap between the two distributions and a corresponding inability to 
discriminate between the two classes of interest (here items that will and will not be 
remembered). The higher the value of d’, the higher the accuracy of the metacognitive 
predictions under investigation. 
Some researchers have also calculated d’ from confidence data by splitting the JOL 
confidence scale into assumed yes and no predictions (e.g., <=40% JOL confidence means a 
no JOL prediction and >=60% JOL confidence means a yes prediction; see for example 
Mason & Rottello, 2009). However, this makes assumptions about how participants interpret 
the confidence scale, which seems unlikely to be interpreted by all participants in all contexts 
in this manner (see Chapter 4). Rather, each participant can set their own threshold for 
negative and positive responding and this is likely to vary across experiments (see for 
example Serra & England, 2012). 
Due to these considerations, it is more appropriate to use the Area Under the Curve (AUC) 
measure of resolution for confidence responses (a commonly employed SDT measure of 
confidence accuracy). To compute AUC, 20%, 40%, 60%, 80% and 100% JOLs are each in 
turn considered a response threshold for a yes JOL prediction (starting with 20% and above = 
yes JOL). For each threshold, the corresponding hit rate (HR) and false alarm rate (FAR) are 
calculated. These are in essence the same as H’ and FA’ calculated using equations 1 and 2 
but without the Snodgrass and Corwin correction which in this case is not necessary. The 
results are then plotted against each other with FAR on the x-axis and HR on the y-axis 
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starting with the highest, most conservative response threshold (here, 100% = yes) in the 
bottom left corner of the graph. This results in a curve called the Receiver Operating 
Characteristics (ROC) curve (see Figure 1.4 for an example of such a curve). AUC is the area 
under this curve calculated with a trapezoidal rule. In contrast to d’, AUC ranges only from 0-
1 but is interpreted in the same way; the higher the value, the better the resolution.  
 
 
 
Figure 1.4: Example ROC curve. Each point represents different confidence criteria. The 
most conservative criterion (100%) is plotted first (left bottom corner) and each subsequent 
point represents a more liberal criterion. HR = Hit rate, FAR = False Alarm rate.  	
Lastly, under the SDT model, it is possible for two participants to be equally accurate even 
though one is more likely to give a yes JOL prediction than the other (for example). The 
response bias-free nature of d’ and AUC as measures of accuracy is one of the great 
advantages of the SDT approach. Further, analysing response bias (or criterion) is a useful 
way to further unravel participant responding across conditions. It is possible to calculate 
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criterion (abbreviated c), from binary responses using hit rate (H’, equation 1) and false alarm 
rate (FA’, equation 2), using the following equation: 
 
4  𝑐 =  − 12 ∗ [𝑧 𝐻! + 𝑧 𝐹𝐴! ] 
 
A criterion of 0 denotes no response bias. Positive criterion (values above 0) is a conservative 
response bias or a greater tendency toward negative (i.e. no) predictions whereas a negative 
criterion (values below 0) indicates a liberal response bias (greater tendency toward yes 
predictions).  
The clear advantage of the SDT approach is that one can separate accuracy from response 
bias. The ability to discriminate between two signals (e.g., what will be remembered vs. what 
will not be remembered) and individual tendency toward responding in a specific way are 
clearly two distinct phenomena. It is for this reason that throughout this thesis we employ d’ 
and AUC to assess relative accuracy. In Chapters 2 and 5 where we also investigated 
participant responding we further looked at bias in participant responding. Altogether, the 
SDT approach thus gives us increased sensitivity in investigating the effects under 
investigation. The use of SDT analyses while employed in the literature (e.g., Hanczakowski 
et al., 2013; Higham, 2011; Zawadzka & Higham, 2016), is still not very common and as 
such this is one of the novel contributions of this thesis. 
1.5 Thesis aims 
In summary, this thesis focuses on metacognitive monitoring just after acquisition and during 
retention, examining the processes underlying judgments predicting future item retrieval. The 
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method employed is the delayed JOL paradigm using cue-target word-pairs. While the FOK 
and immediate JOL literature has examined in detail what drives these judgments, the 
delayed JOL literature has done less in this respect. Despite the overlaps between the various 
metamemory paradigms, there are clear differences between them and the underlying 
memory processes they relate to. It is for this reason that a more detailed analysis of the 
determinants of delayed JOLs is warranted. The particular focus of this thesis is on how the 
delayed JOL relates to the underlying memory processes.  
Episodic memory is seen as a collection of separate features and attributes. This is true in the 
case of memory for simple, single items as much as in the case of memory for complex, 
composite scenes (Horner & Burgess, 2013; Tulving & Thomson, 1973). The partial access 
and inferential views of metamemory are clearly based around this broad idea that aspects of 
the memory event can be accessed even when the full representations cannot be brought to 
mind. Related to this is the view that information stored in memory can be available even 
when it is not fully accessible, as indicated by the ability to recognise items that cannot be 
recalled (Tulving & Pearlstone, 1966). This is the foundation of metamemory theories to 
date. 
The significance of the move towards inferential theories of metamemory is that they no 
longer suppose a direct, privileged link between memory and metamemory. In other words, 
the information that one brings to mind about the cue-target pair being judged in any 
metacognitive task is likely to be correct but does not need to be; one could bring to mind 
information completely unrelated to it. This is why the judgment is described as being 
inferred from the cues and information available at time of judgment.  
Correspondingly, it is often the case that variables that influence memory also influence 
metamemory, but the influences can be dissociated (Schacter, 1983). Manipulations such as 
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dividing attention at study have been found to decrease both memory performance and FOK 
accuracy (Sacher et al., 2009). On the other hand, while target priming has been shown to 
improve target memory it did not influence FOK judgments (Jameson, Narens, Goldfarb, & 
Nelson, 1990). Similarly, immediate JOLs have been shown to be subject to a range of 
metacognitive illusions such as judgments changing with font size of the cue-target pairs, 
with font size having no corresponding effect on memory performance (Rhodes & Castel, 
2008).   
In contrast, delayed JOL theories have mostly assumed that the judgment is based on 
evaluating access to the target. This is a result of the delayed JOL literature having focused 
primarily on explaining why it is more accurate than the immediate JOL; the uniting thread of 
all current theories being that the delayed JOL is based on recallability of the target at time of 
judgment (Rhodes & Tauber, 2011). The only extension to that view has been the suggestion 
that cue familiarity can also play an initial although limited role in guiding delayed JOLs 
(Metcalfe & Finn, 2008b). As such the aim of the present thesis is to ameliorate our 
understanding of the processes underlying delayed JOLs by focusing on variables related to 
memory and the idea of metacognitive judgments as a general inferential mechanism relying 
on varied sources of evidence. This is explored in studies with healthy adults, using a range 
of experimental manipulations and methods.  
More specifically, the first two experimental chapters focus on variables that might affect 
both memory performance and delayed JOLs. Chapter 2 extends the noncriterial recollection 
hypothesis (Brewer et al., 2010) to delayed JOLs. More particularly, it focuses on how access 
to where the target appeared at study (i.e. target source information) influences confidence 
that the target will be accessed (i.e. delayed JOL) and explores the boundary conditions on 
this effect. This is done in the context of looking at how access to this spatial information 
relates to memory for the target itself. Chapter 3 then turns to the classic cue familiarity 
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effect, which has been extended to JOLs only more recently (Metcalfe & Finn, 2008b). More 
specifically, the chapter investigates how manipulating familiarity experimentally (as is 
commonly done in metamemory paradigms) compares to effects of pre-experimental 
familiarity. This is achieved through using cues participants encounter in their daily lives as 
well as cues that they have never encountered before. Again, both types of familiarity are 
investigated in terms of how they affect memory performance and how they influence JOL 
responding. 
In contrast, Chapter 4 asks participants to justify their JOLs (without any further guiding 
instructions) and in this way explores what type of information they rely on in constructing 
their justifications. As with the previous chapters, the main focus is on what memory-related 
information (e.g., cue familiarity) participants describe as informing their judgments. 
However, this time this is derived from an in-depth analysis of participants’ report rather than 
experimental manipulations of the task. The analyses also compare the features of the content 
of the verbal reports that dissociate different types of JOLs (e.g., 0% vs. 20% confidence or 
yes vs. no JOL) and compare the results to some theoretical models of how differences 
sources of information underlie different types of judgments (e.g., lack of cue familiarity = no 
JOL).  
Whereas Chapters 2 to 4 examine the effect of implicit, mnemonic cues, Chapter 5 turns to 
the question of explicit, theory-driven influences. More specifically, it examines whether 
delayed JOLs are sensitive to the retrieval test (recognition vs. recall) they are predicting. In 
other words, the chapter explores whether participants would incorporate their theories about 
memory (recognition is easier than recall) into their prediction of the likelihood of retrieving 
the target.  
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Further, whereas Chapter 2 uses confidence judgments, Chapter 3 uses binary (yes/no) JOL 
predictions. As noted earlier, not only is there a range of metacognitive paradigms, each can 
be implemented in a variety of ways. To this date it has been common to use various formats 
interchangeably and comparisons between them have been rare. Despite this, a recent study 
found that confidence and binary immediate JOLs might not be equivalent, at least in 
immediate JOLs (Hanczakowski et al., 2013). More specifically, whereas confidence 
judgments were found to be underconfident in terms of calibration, binary judgments were 
well calibrated. This suggests either that participants employ the two response formats 
differently or we might be misinterpreting what confidence represents. Chapters 4 and 5 
compared the two response formats directly. As such not only does Chapter 4 introduce a 
completely novel methodology, both Chapter 4 and 5 further touch on methodological issues 
only now coming to light in the metacognitive literature. Previous research has found that 
question framing influences responding on cognitive (Mill & O’Connor, 2014) and 
metacognitive tasks (Finn, 2008). However, the idea that the response options given to 
participants could have the same effect is fairly novel (Jersakova, Moulin, & O’Connor, 
2016; Hanczakowski et al., 2013) and further explored in this thesis.  
In summary, the focus of this thesis is primarily theoretical. I explore how delayed JOLs 
relate to memory through (i) manipulating variables and observing how they impact memory 
and metamemory, (ii) asking participants to tell us how they construct their judgments and 
(iii) investigating whether participants’ delayed JOLs are sensitive to theories about memory. 
All metacognitive accuracy data is analysed using SDT. Further, methodological concerns are 
addressed by comparing response formats directly which allowed us to (i) establish the 
generalizability of findings, (ii) explore assumptions implicit in current interpretations of data 
in the literature and (iii) shed further light on how people evaluate their cognition.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
MEMORY AND METAMEMORY FOR VERBAL-SPATIAL 
ASSOCIATIONS 
2.1 Introduction 
The current theories of metamemory monitoring stress that judgments are based on the 
quantity of primarily target-related information that is accessible at the time of judgment. 
While the focus has usually been on semantic and ortographic target information (e.g., 
Koriat, Levy-Sadot, Edry, & de Marcas, 2003; Koriat, 1993), more recently it has been 
shown that other types of information access can  influence FOK judgments (Brewer et al., 
2010; Hertzog et al., 2014). It has also been shown that not just quantity but also quality (i.e. 
accuracy) of the accessed partial information can influence FOKs (Norman et al., 2016; 
Thomas et al., 2012). To date, neither of these ideas has been considered in the context of 
delayed JOLs. As such this chapter addresses (i) whether access to seemingly irrelevant target 
related information (its position at study) and (ii) the accuracy of that access (i.e. is the 
correct position remembered) influence delayed JOLs. Further, we asked how access to 
spatial information about the target relates to memory for the target item. 
Our daily experience is grounded in a spatiotemporal context and, consequently, when and 
where we have encountered information forms a large part of our learning.  Correspondingly, 
episodic memory has been defined as retrieval grounded in space and time (Henson & 
Gagnepain, 2010; Tulving, 1985) and some researchers have emphasized spatial context as 
fundamental to episodic memory (Burgess, Becker, King, & Keefe, 2001; Maguire & 
Mullally, 2013; Robin, Wynn, & Moscovitch, 2016). Supporting this idea is ample 
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neuroscientific evidence for connections between episodic item memory and spatial as well 
as relational processing (Burgess et al., 2001; Konkel & Cohen, 2009; Moscovitch et al., 
2005). Similarly, behavioural data support the idea that there are more similarities than 
differences between the processes that support encoding of spatial and (object) identity 
information (Köhler, Moscovitch, & Melo, 2001). Surprisingly, not much is known about 
how access to spatial context relates to item retrieval and metamemory retrieval predictions. 
The present chapter addresses this considerable gap in the literature, exploring whether and 
how memory and metamemory for verbal associations is influenced by access to information 
concerning where in space it was encountered. More specifically, this chapter investigates 
how access to information about the spatial configuration of previously learned visually 
presented cue-target word pairs relates to (i) memory retrieval accuracy for the learned target 
and (ii) metamemory judgments predicting whether the target would be retrieved. 
The first aim of the study was to explore whether memory for spatial information is related to 
recognition memory for the target. Identity-spatial associations have been considered in the 
context of working-memory (see Allen, 2015) and episodic long-term memory, with research 
in the latter case often focusing on the role of the hippocampus in spatial and relational 
processing (e.g., Burgess, Maguire, & Keefe, 2002; Konkel & Cohen, 2009). It has been 
shown that spatial information is bound to the item while not necessarily integrated with 
other source information (Starns & Hicks, 2008) and that this binding occurs at initial 
encoding (Allen, Vargha-Khadem, & Baddeley, 2014; Uncapher, Otten, & Rugg, 2006). In 
contrast, the present study primarily focused on exploring processes operating at the retrieval 
stage, and investigating how probability of retrieving item information (what was studied) 
relates to probability of retrieving spatial information (where it was presented at study). This 
has bearing on current attempts at mapping retrieval dependency between learned items and 
their constituent features (Horner & Burgess, 2013, 2014; Starns & Hicks, 2005; Trinkler, 
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King, Spiers, & Burgess, 2006). Further, and more crucially for the current study, 
understanding this has implications for interpreting the impact of (spatial) information access 
on metamemory judgments.  
Research on how metamemory judgments are constructed has shown that it is largely an 
evidence accumulation process relying on a number of access heuristics. Overall, the 
consensus is that the more partial or related information that is retrieved at time of judgment 
(e.g., semantic or orthographic information), irrespective of its accuracy (Koriat, 2000; 
Koriat, 1993), and irrespective of its relationship to recognition memory for the target (Alban 
& Kelley, 2013; Rhodes & Castel, 2008) the more confident participants are that they will 
know the target. More recently, research has started asking how accuracy of access (not just 
its quantity) contributes to metamemory monitoring (e.g., Dunlosky, Rawson, & Middleton, 
2005). Thomas et al. (2012) observed that accuracy of accessed partial information can in 
some instances also be a contributor to metamemory judgments. More specifically, 
participants were more likely to predict they will know the target (indicated by higher 
judgment magnitude) when the retrieved target-related information was accurate but only 
when the accessed information was conceptual (target category) and not perceptual (font 
colour) in nature. These findings might therefore suggest a distinction between perceived 
access (i.e. retrieving any information while searching for the target), which always 
influences metamemory judgments, and the accuracy of that access whose contribution to 
metamemory judgments is more selective. Thomas et al. (2012) specified that accuracy of 
retrieving partial information might only be a contributor to metamemory confidence when 
that information is tied to the meaning of the to-be-retrieved item (i.e. when it is conceptual). 
However, this conclusion is based on analysis of only very superficial perceptual features and 
the authors fail to specify why conceptual information should hold a special status other than 
that it is ‘inherent to verbal material’. If there are features that are not conceptual but fall into 
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the visuospatial domain whose accuracy of access contributes to metamemory predictions, 
then spatial information seems like a good candidate given its apparent importance to 
episodic memory. This study offers a follow-up on the Thomas et al. (2012) findings by 
examining whether accuracy of non-conceptual feature access can contribute to metamemory 
judgments. 
Across three experiments, we manipulated where the target appeared at study. After this 
Study Phase, participants were presented with the cue of each pair, and asked to give a JOL 
indicating on a scale (0-100%) how confident they are that they would recognize the target on 
the following memory test. Within this JOL stage we also asked participants to indicate 
where they thought the target appeared at study by selecting one of a number of possible 
locations on the screen and to indicate their retrospective confidence in the accuracy of their 
memory for the target location (0-100%). This was followed by a recognition test for the cue-
target pairings.  
In summary, the present study was designed to explore the relationship between identity and 
spatial location from both memory and metamemory perspectives. Firstly, we were interested 
in observing whether remembering where the target appeared would be related to memory for 
what the target was as indicated by target recognition performance. Secondly, we wanted to 
understand how JOLs are constructed through investigating how they relate to different types 
of target-related information access. Specifically, we explored whether, in addition to target 
recognition, JOLs would also be related to participants’ retrospective confidence in whether 
they remembered the target location correctly (perceived access to location information) and 
the accuracy of their spatial memory. To capture the level to which these three variables 
relate to JOL magnitude and to account for individual differences in JOL responding (e.g., 
some participants giving overall higher JOLs), we carried out an item-level regression 
analysis (described in more detail in the results section). This allowed us to determine 
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whether there is an independent significant contribution of all examined variables to JOL 
magnitude. In line with the broad accessibility view, we predicted that JOLs would increase 
with participants’ confidence that they correctly identified where the target was presented at 
study (i.e. perceived access). We further hypothesized that this effect would be independent 
of whether accuracy of spatial access also contributed to JOL magnitude and whether spatial 
access was related to item access.  
2.2 Experiment 1 
The key aim of Experiment 1 was to establish whether and how access to spatial information 
relates to item memory and impacts JOLs. As a secondary manipulation, we also manipulated 
whether participants were told they would be tested on their memory for target location, to 
check for whether outcomes are independent of intentionality of encoding and task 
expectations. Past research has shown that whether participants are told to specifically encode 
certain information can impact memory retrieval for that information (Eagle & Leiter, 1964; 
Naveh-benjamin, 1987; Williams, 2010). This allowed us to determine whether participants’ 
intention to encode spatial information mediates the impact that access to this information has 
on memory and metamemory. 
2.2.1 Method 
2.2.1.1 Participants 
This was an online experiment and all potential participants were explicitly instructed to 
complete the study on a computer (as compared to a phone or a tablet). They were also asked 
to confirm what device they were using. If a potential participant did not indicate he was on a 
computer, he was still allowed to complete the task (so as to prevent false reporting) but his 
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data was not collected. Data was collected only for those who completed the entire study. 
Altogether, there were 102 native English speakers (62 women; mean age = 26.1, SD = 9.1) 
who completed the full study on their computers (in a location of their choice) and, 
consequently, whose data was recorded. They were recruited via links to the experiment on 
(i) the University of Leeds Participant Pool Scheme, (ii) websites advertising online 
psychology experiments (e.g., Psychological Research on the Net and Call for participants) 
and (iii) social networking sites (i.e. Twitter, Facebook and Reddit).  
Participants were randomly allocated to one of two conditions with half the participants told 
they would be tested on memory for the target’s location (Intentional encoding condition) and 
half the participants not told this (Incidental encoding condition). Participants were not given 
any compensation for taking part in the experiment except for Psychology students at the 
University of Leeds who could claim course credit (the distribution of participants taking part 
for credit and those that did not was equal between the two experimental groups). Feedback 
was provided at the end of the experiment in the form of a breakdown of memory 
performance.  The study was granted ethical approval by the School of Psychology Ethics 
Committee, University of Leeds, UK. 
2.2.1.2 Materials 
For each participant, the studied items were randomly selected from a list of 628 common, 
singular English nouns (5-6 letters long) taken from the English Lexicon Project (minimum 
log Hyperspace Analogue to Language frequency 8.02; Balota et al., 2007). This meant each 
participant was exposed to a unique set of cue-target pairs. This same list of words was also 
used in Experiment 2 and Experiment 3. 
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2.2.1.3 Procedure 
In a self-paced Study Phase, participants first learned 32 individually presented cue-target 
pairs. While the cue always appeared in the centre of the screen in red font, the target 
appeared in one of four locations diagonally from it in black font (see Figure 2.1). The font 
colours differed so as to make it obvious which was the cue and which was the target (this 
was explained in the instructions). Each target location was occupied an equal number of 
times (eight in total). This was followed by a Judgment Phase where, on presentation of each 
studied cue (this time in black font), participants were asked to (i) indicate in which of the 
four locations its associated target appeared on screen at study, (ii) indicate a retrospective 
level of confidence in the correctness of their response (0-20-40-60-80-100%) and (iii) give a 
JOL prediction indicating their confidence that they would recognize the target on a 
recognition test (0-20-40-60-80-100%). Lastly, participants completed a forced-choice 
recognition test in which, for each of the 32 studied cues, they chose the correct target from 
two options (the distractor was a target of another studied pair to control for baseline 
familiarity). For each task, the response options were presented as buttons on screen and the 
participants responded by clicking on the appropriate button with their mouse. There were no 
time limits imposed on responding.  
While half of the participants were informed of the full test procedure before starting the 
experiment (Intentional encoding), half of the participants were not told they would be asked 
to remember the location of the studied target (Incidental encoding). Within conditions we 
also counterbalanced the order of judgments so that half the participants completed the JOL 
before the target location identification task whereas the other half completed the tasks in the 
order described above.  
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Figure 2.1: Schematic of Experiment 1 procedure. Cues in the Study Phase were presented 
in red font (depicted in grey here). 
 
2.2.2 Results 
In this and all subsequent experiments, we first report memory performance in the spatial 
judgment and final recognition tasks, along with the relationship between retrieval in these 
tasks. We then apply regression analysis to examine the factors that significantly predict JOL 
magnitude. 
2.2.2.1 Memory performance 
Firstly, we assessed whether participants in the two encoding conditions differed in their 
memory for both the target identity (measured as percentage of correctly recognized targets 
out of the total 32 trials) and target location (percentage of targets whose location was 
correctly remembered). An independent samples t-test revealed that participants correctly 
recognized more targets in the Incidental encoding condition (when they were not told they 
would also be tested on their memory for target location; M = 87.9%, SD = 12.4) as 
compared to when they explicitly attempted to remember both pieces of information (M = 
78.3%, SD = 16.7), t(92.26) = 3.30, p < .001, d = 0.66. In contrast, participants were not 
reliably more accurate at remembering the target location correctly when they were told their 
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memory for that information would be tested (M = 47.4%, SD = 17.0) as compared to when 
they were not (M = 45.0%, SD = 19.1), t < 1. 
2.2.2.2 Relating memory for target identity and target location 
In line with the first aim of the study, we investigated whether the ability to remember the 
location of the target at study was linked to the ability to recognize it on the recognition test. 
A 2 (condition: Intentional, Incidental) x 2 (location memory accuracy: correct, incorrect) 
mixed ANOVA was conducted on accuracy of target recognition (percentage of correctly 
recognized targets; Figure 2.2). The results showed that participants recognized a higher 
percentage of targets for which they earlier correctly remembered their location, F(1, 100) = 
23.34, p < .001, 𝜂!! = .19. There was an effect of condition, corresponding to improved target 
recognition accuracy in the Intentional encoding condition, F(1, 100) = 10.53, p < .01, 𝜂!! = .10. There was no interaction, F < 1.  
 
 
Figure 2.2: The percentage of items correctly recognized as a function of condition and 
whether their original location was accurately remembered in Experiment 1.	
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2.2.2.3 Accuracy of spatial memory confidence judgments and JOLs 
Participants gave a JOL predicting whether they would recognize the target paired with the 
presented cue. They also gave retrospective confidence judgments indicating whether they 
thought they remembered the target’s location accurately. We compared the accuracy of both 
judgments between the two encoding conditions (Incidental, Intentional). The mean AUC 
results are reported in Table 2.1. The AUC scores for JOLs were the same across the two 
encoding conditions, t(100) = 1.71, p = .090, d = 0.34. Similarly, AUC scores for the 
confidence for location judgments were the same across conditions, t < 1. A one sample t-test 
showed that all AUC values were above chance (.5) at p < .001. 
 
Table	2.1: Mean AUC for JOLs and confidence judgments for location by condition in 
Experiment 1. Standard deviations appear in parentheses. 
Encoding condition JOL for target Confidence for location 
Intentional .679 (.196) .680 (.168) 
Incidental .748 (.213) .700 (.134) 
 
2.2.2.4 JOL predictors 
It is expected that JOLs accurately track accuracy of target recognition, with higher JOLs 
expressed for correctly recognized targets. The second key aim of the study was to examine 
whether JOLs would also increase with having correctly remembered where the target was 
presented at study and with retrospective confidence in having retrieved this information 
accurately. To this end a regression analysis was conducted for each condition with JOL 
magnitude as the outcome measure. Target recognition accuracy (recognized, not 
recognized), location memory accuracy (correct, incorrect) and retrospective confidence in 
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location memory (0-100%) were the predictors. This analysis was done on a trial-by-trial 
basis, with a separate regression computed for each participant following a method proposed 
by Lorch and Myers (1990; see also Allen & Hulme, 2006; Metcalfe et al., 2013). The 
resulting beta values for each predictor were then analysed using a one-sample t-test to 
determine whether they were significantly different from 0. This enabled a trial-by-trial 
examination of how a participant’s target location memory accuracy, target location memory 
confidence and their eventual target recognition accuracy, each predicts the JOL they 
produce, while controlling for inter-participant variability.  
Results for the three predictors of interest are presented in Table 2.2. Target recognition 
accuracy is a predictor of JOL magnitude as would be expected. More importantly, 
participants’ confidence in having remembered the target’s location (i.e. perceived access) 
was also a significant predictor of JOLs. In addition, whether the spatial information was 
remembered accurately (i.e. target location accuracy) also played a contributing factor to JOL 
magnitude. 
 
Table 2.2: Mean beta values for each variable included in the within-subject regression 
analyses of JOL magnitude in Experiment 1 by condition along with one-sample t-test 
results. 
Condition Factor β SE β t df p 
Incidental 
Encoding 
Target recognition accuracy .051 .022 2.35 42 .023 
Location memory accuracy .049 .020 2.52 50 .015 
Location memory confidence .621 .040 15.34 49 <.001 
Intentional 
Encoding 
Target recognition accuracy .053 .024 2.20 34 .034 
Location memory accuracy .094 .025 3.72 49 .001 
Location memory confidence .574 .044 12.81 48 <.001 
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2.2.3 Summary 
Starting with an examination of memory performance, spatial information was related to 
recognition accuracy for the target, indicating that access to spatial context information is 
related to access to item identity. In other words, when presented with the cue, participants 
can remember both where the associated target was presented as well as what it was, and 
ability to retrieve spatial information implies ability to retrieve target identity. It is possible 
that participants were more likely to remember any information about items that were overall 
better encoded during study. Nevertheless, the observation that this was true for both 
encoding conditions shows that it does not hinge on intentional encoding of item-spatial 
information, thus suggesting that this verbal-spatial binding might be relatively automatic in 
nature. This extends findings from studies on object-spatial binding (e.g., Starns & Hicks, 
2008) to verbal material and further lends support to the idea that spatial information is 
encoded fairly automatically (Köhler et al., 2001).  
We also saw a decrease in recognition memory performance in the Intentional as compared to 
the Incidental condition. In other words, when participants were trying to actively remember 
both item and spatial information, their item memory suffered. One possible explanation is 
that being told to encode both target identity and target position might have changed 
participants’ encoding strategies relative to when they were told to only encode target 
identity. Thus, the Intentional encoding condition may have biased participants toward less 
effective strategies, focusing on shallow, perceptual features rather than on deeply processing 
the cue-target content and relationship, which can negatively impact memory performance 
(Craik & Lockhart, 1972; Thomas et al., 2012).  
Turning to metamemory judgments, the results showed that JOLs are related to access to 
information about the target’s position at study. The beta values obtained from the regression 
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analyses showed that participants’ confidence in the accuracy of their target location 
identification was the biggest predictor of their JOLs from the variables considered in the 
analysis. This result extends previous findings in the metamemory literature by demonstrating 
that spatial information about where a recently learned target was located, a type of partial 
information about the target, could impact JOL magnitude. The results also showed that the 
accuracy of the accessed spatial information relates to JOL predictions. Thomas et al. (2012) 
found that metamemory judgments do not increase with accuracy of accessed perceptual 
features (font colour), leading them to suggest that the accessed feature needs to be 
conceptual (or otherwise tied to the meaning representation of the target item) for accuracy of 
its access to inform metamemory judgments. Here we extend these findings by showing that 
JOLs for verbal material increase with accuracy of access to features that fall into the 
visuospatial domain (namely spatial access) with higher JOLs given to items whose location 
was correctly identified. Notably, this spatial access was related to item access. While 
Thomas et al. (2012) did not report the full descriptive data, they did suggest in the discussion 
that in their study accuracy of access to conceptual attributes also related to recognition 
performance whereas this was not the case for accuracy of access to their perceptual 
attributes. Altogether, this would imply that whether accuracy of access relates to 
metamemory judgments could be dependent on whether that feature access is related to item 
memory and not on whether it is conceptual in nature (or otherwise tied to the meaning of the 
target). 
The next question of interest was whether there are boundary conditions on the so far 
observed effects. Köhler et al. (2001) have suggested that not all spatial information might be 
equivalent, with retrieval of absolute information (where exactly an item was presented) 
harder than retrieval of relative spatial information (i.e. where in relation to other items it was 
presented). Consequently, one can distinguish between different types of spatial information, 
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with a possible hierarchy in the ease of spatial access. This in turn suggests that how access to 
spatial information relates to item memory and JOL magnitude might be dependent on the 
type of spatial information tested. In Experiment 1, participants could complete the spatial 
memory test by remembering both where the target appeared exactly on screen (absolute 
location) and where it appeared in relation to the cue (relative location). In Experiment 2, we 
investigated whether the pattern of results would hold if test of spatial information no longer 
indicated precisely where the target appeared on screen but only captured its relative position 
to the cue. We expected that relative-only spatial information would be harder to access than 
spatial information that is both relative and absolute.  
2.3 Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 implemented the same methodology as Experiment 1 with the exception that 
the location of the cue on screen varied between study trials. More specifically, the cue could 
appear in one of 16 possible locations on screen. As in Experiment 1, the target appeared in 
one of four diagonal locations from the cue. At test, the cue was only presented in the centre 
of the screen, and participants were asked to remember the position of the target on screen in 
relation to the cue. This meant that the target’s location at recall did not correspond to the 
target’s exact (absolute) location on screen at study. This allowed us to examine whether 
access to spatial information about the target would still be considered meaningful 
information in JOLs, and relate to target memory, when the assessed location no longer 
indicated where the target actually appeared at study.  
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2.3.1 Method 
2.3.1.1 Participants 
Participants (104 in total, 68 women; 1 undisclosed gender; mean age = 24.6, SD = 8.0) were 
randomly assigned to one of two instructions conditions (52 participants in each). As in 
Experiment 1, participants completed the experiment online on their computers.  
2.3.1.2 Procedure 
The general procedure was the same as in Experiment 1. The key change was at study; 
whereas in Experiment 1 the cue was always presented in the centre of the screen, in 
Experiment 2 the screen was figuratively divided into a 4x4 grid and the cue could appear in 
any one of the 16 locations within that grid (see Figure 2.3). The target again appeared in one 
of four diagonal locations from the cue (top-right, top-left, bottom-right, bottom-left). For 
example, the cue could appear in the top right corner of the screen in which case the target 
would have been presented immediately below the cue, diagonally from it to the left. Each 
diagonal relationship between the cue and the target was shown eight times.  
Again, the cue was presented in red font and the target in black font to make it clear which 
was which. The Judgment Phase was the same as in Experiment 1 with the cue appearing in 
the centre of the screen in black and participants asked to pick one of the four locations 
diagonally from the cue at which the target was positioned in relation to it at study. The 
positioning of the cue and the target at test did not map onto any of the actual cue or target 
locations at study, which meant the location identification judgments in this experiment were 
purely about the relation between the two items. Again, participants also provided a 
confidence judgment about their ability to remember the spatial relationship correctly and a 
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JOL predicting their ability to recognize the target. The order of these judgments was 
counterbalanced across participants. The final part of the experiment was a Memory Phase 
where participants had to choose the corresponding target to each cue from two options. As in 
Experiment 1, half of the participants were informed they would be asked to remember the 
spatial cue-target relationship (Intentional encoding condition) and half of the participants 
were not told this (Incidental encoding condition). 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Schematic of Experiment 2 procedure. The cue in the Study Phase is here 
presented in grey whereas in the experiment it was presented in red. 
 
2.3.2 Results 
2.3.2.1 Memory performance 
Firstly, we investigated whether participants differed in their target identity and target 
location memory performance across the two encoding conditions. An independent samples t-
test showed that participants recognized the same percentage of targets in the Intentional 
encoding condition (M = 79.8%, SD = 16.2) as in the Incidental encoding condition (M = 
81.1%, SD = 16.7), t < 1. The percentage of targets whose relative-location was accurately 
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remembered between the Intentional encoding (M = 29.8%, SD = 11.9) and Incidental 
encoding (M = 33.8%, SD = 11.3) conditions was likewise not different, t(102) = 1.79, p = 
.076, d = 0.35. The performance on the spatial memory task was lower than in Experiment 1 
but a one sample t-test confirmed that the performance was above chance (25%) in the 
Intentional encoding, t(51) = 2.87, p = .006, and the Incidental encoding, t(51) = 5.63, p < 
.001, condition. 
 
2.3.2.2 Relating memory for target identity and target location 
Secondly, we analysed whether if participants had access to the relative cue-target location 
information (indexed by spatial memory accuracy) they were also more likely to have access 
to the target itself (indexed by target recognition accuracy). A 2 (condition: Intentional, 
Incidental) x 2 (location memory accuracy: correct, incorrect) mixed ANOVA was used to 
analyse target recognition accuracy (percentage of targets correctly recognized; Figure 2.4). 
There was no effect of location memory accuracy F(1, 102) = 1.65, p = .202,  𝜂!! =  .02, 
condition, F < 1, or the interaction, F < 1. These findings indicate that being able to recognize 
the target did not imply one also remembered where it was presented at study in relation to 
the cue, and vice-versa.  
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Figure 2.4: Percentage of items correctly recognized as a function of condition and 
whether their original location was accurately remembered in Experiment 2. 
 
 
2.3.2.3 Accuracy of spatial memory confidence judgments and JOLs 
To analyse accuracy of both judgments, we again compared AUC between the two encoding 
conditions (see Table 2.3). JOL accuracy was the same between conditions, t < 1, as was the 
confidence for location accuracy, t(102) = 1.83, p = .071, d = 0.36. All the reported AUC 
scores were above chance (.5) as determined by a one-sample t-test (all p-values < .05). 
 
Table 2.3: Mean AUC for JOLs and confidence judgments for location by condition in 
Experiment 2. Standard deviations appear in parentheses. 
Encoding condition JOL for target Confidence for location 
Intentional .708 (.185) .584 (.123) 
Incidental .680 (.193) .539 (.123) 
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2.3.2.4 JOL predictors 
The next question of interest remained whether JOLs would be related to target location 
memory accuracy and retrospective confidence in having correctly remembered the (relative) 
target position in addition to target recognition accuracy. As in Experiment 1, trial-level, 
within-participant regression analyses were used to examine the relative contributions of 
target recognition accuracy (recognized, not recognized), location memory accuracy (correct, 
incorrect) and location memory confidence (0-100%) to JOL magnitude. The results (see 
Table 2.4) again showed that location memory confidence was a significant predictor of JOLs 
as was target recognition accuracy. This time location memory accuracy did not predict JOL 
magnitude in either of the conditions.  
 
Table	2.4: Mean beta values for each variable included in the within-subject regression 
analyses of JOL magnitude in Experiment 2 by condition along with one-sample t-test 
results. 
Condition Factor β SE β t df p 
Incidental 
Encoding 
 
Target recognition accuracy .086 .020 4.34 42 <.001 
Location memory accuracy .025 .020 1.23 50 .225 
Location memory confidence .584 .032 18.16 50 <.001 
Intentional 
Encoding 
Target recognition accuracy .053 .021 2.55 41 .015 
Location memory accuracy -.017 .023 -0.74 49 .465 
 Location memory confidence .591 .044 13.45 48 <.001 
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2.3.3 Summary 
In Experiment 2 we observed that memory for relative spatial information was not related to 
memory for the target itself as assessed by performance on the recognition task. This builds 
on results of Experiment 1 (where both relative and absolute spatial information was 
accessible), and shows that while probability of spatial and identity access can be related this 
is not always the case, depending on the type of spatial information tested.  
This time there were no effects of intentionality of encoding condition on recognition 
memory performance (which was lower in the Intentional encoding condition of Experiment 
1). In neither experiment did we instruct participants on what strategies to use to encode the 
cue-target pairs. A possible explanation for the results of Experiment 1 was that participants 
adopted different encoding strategies between the encoding conditions. This would imply that 
participants who took part in Experiment 2, might have adopted similar encoding strategies 
independent of condition, leading to equivalent recognition performance. 
In regards to metamemory judgments, Experiment 2 again demonstrated that perceived 
access to relative spatial information (measured here by participants’ confidence in the 
accuracy of their location judgements) relates to JOL magnitude.  However, in Experiment 2 
we did not observe any effect of accurately remembering where the target appeared in 
relation to the cue on JOL magnitude once other factors were taken into account. This is in 
contrast to Experiment 1 where we did observe this effect. However, in Experiment 1 spatial 
access was related to target recognition memory whereas in Experiment 2 it was not. This 
gives further support to the idea that the determining factor in whether accuracy of access 
relates to JOLs is not dependent on the type of information accessed but solely on whether it 
is related to item access.  
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In summary, the results of Experiment 2 helped to further clarify the relationship between 
metamemory and memory. When only relative spatial target information was available, 
access to this information was no longer related to item memory and correspondingly, 
accuracy of this access did not relate to JOL magnitude. Experiment 2 differed from 
Experiment 1 in that (i) retrieval of absolute target location was not supported and (ii) the 
spatial information (being relative only) was harder to access (as indicated by spatial memory 
performance). It is not clear which of the two factors could drive the differences in the 
observed results. The aim of the final experiment was to understand how the observed pattern 
of results compared to a condition in which cue location again varied in an uninformative 
manner but only absolute target location (i.e. exact position on screen) was assessed. To 
allow for direct comparisons, we not only tested this new condition but also replicated results 
of Experiment 1 and 2.  
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2.4 Experiment 3 
Experiment 3 aimed to replicate the outcomes of the first two experiments, and extend to a 
condition where only the target’s absolute location was assessed. If support for absolute 
spatial access is a key differentiation between Experiment 1 and 2 then access to absolute-
only spatial information should be related to item access and accuracy of this access should 
impact JOL magnitude. A possible explanation for this could be that absolute spatial location 
of the target is more closely linked to the target representation than information on how it 
relates to other items such as the cue. Alternatively, as absolute information may be more 
difficult to access than relative information (Köhler et al., 2001), the results might be similar 
to Experiment 2, with no link between (absolute-only) spatial access and item access. 
Regardless, we expected to see the same effect of perceived spatial access on JOL magnitude 
as in previous experiments in all conditions.  
The instructions manipulation was removed as it was a secondary focus in Experiments 1 and 
2, and did not have any major effects on the metamemory outcomes. Given that target 
recognition performance seems to have somewhat suffered in the Intentional encoding 
conditions (in Experiment 1), we focused only on the Incidental encoding condition. Finally, 
we reduced the possible target locations from four to three, and increased the number of 
choices at the recognition test from two to three, in an attempt to reduce the difference in 
difficulty levels between these memory tasks. 
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2.4.1 Method 
2.4.1.1 Participants  
Overall, 153 participants (101 women, 1 undisclosed gender; mean age = 25.5, SD = 7.3) 
took part in the study. Of these 51 participants were assigned to the Full reinstatement 
condition (same as Experiment 1), 52 were assigned to the Relative-only condition (same as 
Experiment 2) and 50 were assigned to the Absolute-only condition. As in previous 
experiments, participants completed the experiment online on their computers. 
2.4.1.2 Procedure 
The procedure was an adaptation of the first two experiments with the key manipulation at 
study. Participants first studied a series of 33 cue-target pairs (an increase from Experiment 1 
and 2 to allow for equal number of presentations for each of the spatial locations). In the 
condition that replicated Experiment 1 (here termed the Full reinstatement condition), the cue 
always appeared in the centre of the screen whereas the target appeared in one of three 
diagonal locations from the cue (the three locations were randomly chosen out of the four 
possibilities for each participant). In the condition that replicated Experiment 2 (here termed 
the Relative-only condition) the cue appeared in one of 16 possible locations on the screen 
(within a 4x4 grid) and the target in one of three possible diagonal locations from it. In the 
new, Absolute-only condition, while the target again appeared in one of three diagonal 
locations from the centre indicated by a fixation point (same as in the Full reinstatement 
condition), this time the cue did not appear in the centre but in any other diagonal location 
from the target (see Figure 2.5). Again, the cue was always presented in red font and the 
target in black font to distinguish the two. 
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Following study, participants were presented with each of the studied cues in the centre of the 
screen and were asked to indicate where the target appeared at study. In the Absolute-only 
condition the options corresponded to actual target locations. In the Relative-only condition 
the options corresponded to where the target appeared in relation to the cue but did not 
represent where the target was located on the screen. In the Full reinstatement condition, the 
options corresponded to both the absolute-only and relative-only target position at study. 
Participants also indicated their confidence in their spatial memory and gave JOLs 
concerning whether they thought they would recognize the target in the recognition test. The 
last part of the experiment was a recognition test where for each cue participants were asked 
to select the target from three options (all distractors were targets from the study). 
We removed the instructions manipulation so that no participants were told to remember the 
spatial information. As in previous experiments, the order of the judgments was 
counterbalanced across participants. 
 
 
Figure 2.5: Schematic of Experiment 3 procedure. The Study Phase schematic is for the 
Absolute-only condition (target position corresponds exactly to presented options at test). The 
cue in the Study Phase is here presented in grey whereas in the experiment it was presented in 
red. 
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2.4.2 Results 
2.4.2.1 Memory performance  
Firstly, we compared overall memory performance between the three conditions. An 
independent samples ANOVA showed that percentage of correctly recognized targets was the 
same between the Absolute-only (M = 78.7%, SD = 18.1), the Relative-only (M = 80.1%, SD 
= 22.4) and the Full reinstatement (M = 81.2%, SD = 20.5) conditions, F < 1. However, 
participants performed better in identifying the targets’ combined absolute and relative 
location as seen in the Full reinstatement condition (M = 51.3%, SD = 16.2) as compared to 
only the relative target location (M = 40.5%, SD = 14.1), and the absolute-only target location 
(M = 34.3%, SD = 8.7), F(2, 150) = 20.95, p < .001, 𝜂!! =  .22. Pairwise comparisons using 
the Bonferroni correction indicated that the latter two groups differed from each other only 
marginally (p = .063) whereas both were lower than the performance in the Full reinstatement 
condition (p < .001). However, whereas performance in the Relative-only condition was 
above chance (33%), t(52) = 3.85, p < .001, performance in the Absolute-only condition was 
not, t(49) = 1.06, p = .293. 
2.4.2.2 Relating memory for target identity and target location 
As in the previous experiments, we analysed target recognition performance by whether that 
target’s location was correctly remembered (Figure 2.6). A 3 (condition: Full-reinstatement, 
Absolute-only, Relative-only) x 2 (location memory accuracy: correct, incorrect) mixed 
ANOVA analysing recognition performance revealed marginal effect of location memory 
accuracy, F(1, 150) = 3.85, p = .051,  𝜂!! =  .03. There was no effect of condition, F < 1, but 
there was an interaction between the two factors F(2, 150) = 7.22, p = .001, 𝜂!! =  .09. For 
the Full-reinstatement condition, access to spatial information was related to access to the 
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actual target as indicated by recognition performance, t(50) = 3.82, p < .001, d = 0.56, 
whereas in the Relative-only,  t < 1, and the Absolute-only, t < 1, conditions this was not the 
case. These analyses confirm and extend the findings of the first two experiments. 
 
 
Figure 2.6: The percentage of items correctly recognized as a function of condition and 
whether their original location was accurately remembered in Experiment 3. 
 
2.4.2.3 Accuracy of spatial memory confidence judgments and JOLs 
Mean AUC scores assessing accuracy of JOLs and confidence judgments are reported, per 
condition, in Table 2.5. A one-way between subjects ANOVA showed that there was no 
difference between conditions in JOL accuracy, F < 1. There was however a significant 
difference between conditions in the accuracy of the location confidence judgments, F(2, 
150) = 8.73, p < .001, 𝜂! =  .95. Post-hoc tests using the Bonferroni correction showed that 
participants in the Absolute-only condition were significantly worse than participants in the 
Full Reinstatement (p < .001) and the Relative-only (p = .004) conditions. There were no 
further differences.  
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Further, a one-sample t-test was employed to determine whether all AUC values were 
significantly above chance performance (0.5). JOLs across all conditions were accurate above 
chance (all ps < .001). In contrast, the confidence location AUCs were above chance for the 
Full Reinstatement (p < .001) and Relative-only (p < .001) conditions but not in the Absolute-
only (p = .062) condition.	
	
Table	2.5: Mean AUC for JOLs and confidence judgments for location by condition in 
Experiment 3. Standard deviations appear in parentheses. 
Encoding condition JOL for target Confidence for location 
Full Reinstatement .717 (.190) .636 (.139) 
Relative-only .746 (.181) .619 (.145) 
Absolute-only .733 (.182) .596 (.117) 
 
2.4.2.4 JOL predictors 
As before, we analysed the combined contributions of the variables of interest to JOL 
magnitude. In other words, we investigated whether, for each condition, it could be said that 
the JOL was related to a number of sources of information including target recognition 
accuracy (which it aims to predict), target location memory accuracy (which in some 
conditions is related to target memory) and retrospective location memory confidence for the 
targets (i.e. perceived access). The results of the within-participant, trial-level regression 
analyses are presented in Table 2.6. The Full reinstatement condition results mirror those of 
Experiment 1 as all three variables were shown to significantly predict JOL magnitude. The 
Relative-only condition similarly mirrors results of Experiment 2 as we again observe the 
effect of location memory accuracy on JOLs disappearing. Lastly, the Absolute-only 
condition shows the same pattern of results as the Relative-only condition with target 
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recognition accuracy and location identification confidence being the only significant 
predictors of JOLs from the variables included in the analysis. 
 
Table	2.6: Mean beta values for each variable included in the within-subject regression 
analyses of JOL magnitude in Experiment 3 by condition along with one-sample t-test 
results. 
Condition Factor β SE β t df p 
Full reinstatement Target recognition accuracy .080 .018 4.54 37 <.001 
Location memory accuracy .099 .021 4.67 50 <.001 
Location memory confidence .582 .035 16.86 50 <.001 
Relative-only Target recognition accuracy .177 .019 9.07 47 <.001 
Location memory accuracy .020 .017 1.18 51 .244 
Location memory confidence .482 .039 12.25 51 <.001 
Absolute-only Target recognition accuracy .159 .025 6.42 39 <.001 
Location memory accuracy .002 .023 0.10 48 .925 
 Location memory confidence .535 .036 14.84 48 <.001 
	
2.4.3 Summary 
The results of Experiment 3 confirm and extend those of Experiments 1 and 2. It appears that 
while memory for combined absolute and relative spatial information is related to recognition 
memory for the target, the relative-only and absolute-only cue-target spatial memory is not. 
Memory accuracy for spatial information only related to JOL magnitude in the Full 
reinstatement condition where we observed this dependency between spatial and item access. 
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The relationship between location memory confidence and JOL magnitude was true for all 
conditions and shows that confidence in accessed partial information (even when this 
information is not related to memory performance) can increase with confidence that the 
target will be recognised. 
2.5 Discussion 
This study investigated whether and how access to spatial location of the target at study 
relates to recognition accuracy for the target and to JOL magnitude. Given the relevance of 
spatial context to how we characterize episodic memory (Burgess et al., 2001; Maguire & 
Mullally, 2013; Robin et al., 2016; Tulving, 1985), it is important to understand whether 
remembering where the learned item was located at study relates to confidence that it will be 
retrieved later and whether it relates to actual memory for the item. We examined whether 
this was true for both relative and absolute spatial information. Our main findings were as 
follows: 
1. Participants can remember item location, even when this is incidental to the encoding 
instructions, except for absolute-only location.  
2. The accuracy of this item location identification is positively related to the accuracy 
of a subsequent cue-target recognition task, but only in the Full Reinstatement 
condition where both absolute and relative spatial information is available. 
3. Perceived access to target’s position at study (indicated by participants’ confidence in 
their location judgment) significantly predicted JOLs in all conditions, irrespective of 
actual memory performance for this information. This is true at an individual trial 
level within each participant when the contribution of actual memory performance 
(which is being predicted) is taken into account.  
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4. Accuracy of spatial access relates to JOL magnitude only in instances when it is also 
related to item access (the Full Reinstatement condition).  
These novel findings provide a number of new insights concerning episodic memory and 
metamemory. We focus first on the memory results and then move onto the metamemory 
outcomes. 
Past research has shown that spatial information is bound to the item while not necessarily 
being integrated with other source information (Starns & Hicks, 2008) and that this binding 
occurs at encoding (Uncapher et al., 2006). The present study extends these findings by 
demonstrating that participants were able to encode where learned information was presented 
and could retrieve this information even when not initially instructed to attend to it during 
encoding. Furthermore, those items for which participants were able to successfully retrieve 
location information were then more likely to themselves be correctly recognised, at least in 
the case of the Full Reinstatement condition (Experiments 1 and 3). These findings indicate a 
process of binding between cue and target within a spatial configuration, producing multi-
element associative representations or engrams (e.g., Horner & Burgess, 2013; Tulving, 
1983) containing information about identity and location. The processes that operate at 
encoding to initially construct such representations may be relatively automatic in nature 
(Köhler et al., 2001), as similar outcomes are apparent in both intentional and incidental 
conditions. 
However, the relationship between access to spatial information and target recognition 
accuracy was mediated by the type of location task that was implemented; the likelihood of 
remembering where the target was presented was only related to memory for target identity in 
the Full Reinstatement condition, and not when the spatial information tested was for either 
the target’s absolute or relative spatial information only. This may be related to relative ease 
of access. We observed that making location judgments when both relative and absolute 
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spatial information was accessible (in the Full Reinstatement condition) was easier than 
accessing absolute-only or relative-only spatial information in isolation. Indeed, performance 
for absolute-only spatial information was at chance, suggesting that relative-only spatial 
information is somewhat easier to access, in line with previous findings (Köhler et al., 2001). 
A possible explanation for this is that retrieval of absolute location requires access to object 
identity whereas retrieval of relative item position can be retrieved even when item identity is 
not available (Köhler et al., 2001). While we cannot directly speak to participants’ ability to 
recall target items as this was only tested via recognition, we can nevertheless conclude that 
relative-only processing might be favoured to absolute-only processing, and that removing 
either element reduces spatial memory performance relative to conditions of full 
reinstatement. This increase in difficulty of access to location seems to minimize any 
relationship between location memory accuracy and subsequent target memory recognition. 
Thus, the ability to remember where is only related to the ability to remember what when the 
former information is relatively more accessible and both relative and absolute routes to 
retrieval are made available. 
A primary focus of the current work was the exploration of the factors that relate to judgment 
of learning (JOL) magnitude concerning cue-target recognition performance. The results 
from all three experiments demonstrated that participants’ JOL magnitude, predicting that 
they would recognize the target on a later memory test, directly increased with their belief 
that they could retrieve spatial information about the recently learned cue-target word-pairs. 
These results were demonstrated when the data was analysed on a trial-level in an item-by-
item analysis within participants, meaning that observed predictors of JOLs were independent 
of variability across participants (such as some participants giving overall higher JOLs). This 
finding held when participants were not instructed to attend to the spatial information at 
study. Furthermore, this held true when both absolute and relative spatial information was 
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accessible (i.e. the Full Reinstatement condition) as well as when the test was only for the 
targets’ absolute or relative positions and access to the spatial information did not relate to 
recognition accuracy for the target. Lastly, perceived spatial access was shown to 
significantly predict JOL magnitude even when the contributions of target recognition 
performance and spatial memory accuracy to explaining JOL variance were also considered. 
This finding adds to the growing literature on the type of information that relates to 
metamemory judgments. 
The results of the current study further provide evidence that delayed JOLs can change with 
heuristics not indicative of future item memory. While this has been demonstrated for 
immediate JOLs (i.e. judgments made during or immediately after study of each item and 
before next item is presented; Alban & Kelley, 2013; Koriat & Bjork, 2006; Rhodes & 
Castel, 2008), it has not yet been demonstrated in delayed JOLs. Overall, these finding are in 
line with the accessibility view of metamemory (Koriat, 1993) suggesting that the more 
information one can access at time of judgment (irrespective of accuracy), the more confident 
one is that they know the target.  
Additionally, the study extends the findings of Thomas et al. (2012), which demonstrated that 
in particular cases, the quality or accuracy of information access can also increase 
metamemory judgments. They found that the accuracy of accessed conceptual (target 
category) but not perceptual (font colour) information about the target increased FOKs. The 
experiments presented here demonstrated that the accessed information does not have to be 
conceptual but can also fall into the visuospatial domain for its accuracy to affect 
metamemory judgments. More specifically, we observed that accuracy of access to spatial 
information about the target increased JOL magnitude but only when the spatial access was 
related to recognition accuracy for the target (as seen when both absolute and relational 
spatial information was tested as in Experiment 1 and the Full-reinstatement condition of 
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Experiment 3). Based on these results we suggest that the determining factor in whether 
accuracy of access relates to metamemory judgments is how that access relates to item 
memory. 
A caveat to the present findings is that by asking participants about specific characteristics of 
the learned information (e.g., the target’s spatial location), we are making that information 
particularly salient. It is less clear whether participants assess access to this type of contextual 
information when making a JOL if not asked about it. This issue is relevant to the majority of 
metacognitive literature at present (see for example Hertzog et al., 2014) and relates to the 
fact that we continue to have to rely on explicit report from participants to be able to 
investigate the variables of interest. This is discussed in more detail and addressed in Chapter 
4. In the context of the present study, we tried controlling for this issue by (i) 
counterbalancing the order of the two judgments across participants and (ii) by manipulating 
whether participants were instructed to pay attention to the spatial information at encoding. 
The observed results were clearly independent of the encoding condition manipulation. 
Another limitation is the correlational nature of the results. This means that we can only 
speak to their being a relationship between the factors of interest without being able to make 
strong causality statements. However, using a regression has allowed us to show that the 
confidence in spatial memory significantly predicted JOL magnitude even when other 
variables were taken into account. What is more, the other variables in the analysis (memory 
for the target and memory for its spatial location) were the type of variables that classic 
theories of delayed JOLs would argue should be the primary determinants of such judgments 
as they relate to (or at least appear to relate to) target memory strength. That spatial memory 
confidence significantly predicted JOL magnitude when these other variables were included 
in the analysis suggests that access to contextual information can influence metacognitive 
judgments. 
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In summary, the results of this study add to the growing literature exploring which type of 
information access and item features can impact metamemory judgments (Alban & Kelley, 
2013; Jersakova et al., 2015; Koriat et al., 2003; Schwartz, Pillot, & Bacon, 2014; Thomas et 
al., 2012) by demonstrating that access to contextual (spatial) features relates to an increase in 
delayed JOL magnitude. As such we extended the noncriterial recollection hypothesis 
developed in the context of FOK research to the delayed JOL paradigm. Further, the study 
suggests that considering the combined influences of perceived access and accuracy of 
feature access on metamemory predictions allows for a fuller understanding of how 
metamemory judgments are constructed. We also specified a possible mechanism that 
modulates the relationship between access accuracy and metamemory judgments (namely its 
relationship to item memory). Nevertheless, we also note some of the problems of this type of 
approach that is relevant to much of the metacognitive literature.  
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CHAPTER 3 
EXPERIMENTAL vs. PRE-EXPERIMENTAL CUE 
FAMILIARITY 
3.1 Introduction 
In many metacognitive paradigms, the cue is the only information participants are reliably 
provided with and the one piece of information that researchers can be confident participants 
have access to at time of judgment. It is assumed that participants attempt to retrieve the 
target and related information but unless asked directly about their access, we do not know 
whether that information was activated when the JOL was made. Correspondingly, the 
particular role of the cue in metamemory judgments has garnered much attention and 
Schreiber & Nelson (1998) suggested a broad category of ‘cue effectiveness’ effects that 
impact metacognitive judgments. For example, Schreiber and Nelson (1998) found that FOK 
and POK judgments were sensitive to the number of concepts semantically linked to the test 
cue, with cues that were linked to smaller sets leading to higher judgments. They suggested 
that more concepts lead to more competition, which in turn lead to a decrease in 
metacognitive confidence. Similarly, the likelihood of TOT experiences was found to 
increase with the amount of information contained in the cue used to elicit the target, even if 
this increase in information was redundant (e.g., repetitions in general knowledge definitions 
used to elicit search for the target term; Koriat & Lieblich, 1977). These types of effects 
highlight the importance of the cue even in judgments made specifically about the 
accessibility of the target.  
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Given the nature and prevalence of the cue-target paradigm in the metacognitive literature, 
the present chapter explores the influence of the cue on memory for the target item and on 
JOLs. More specifically, we focused on two types of cue familiarity (experimental and pre-
experimental) and compared them directly thus speaking to two literatures that have to date 
developed independently from each other. Across two experiments we manipulated 
experimental cue familiarity by presenting half of the cues in a pre-study rating task, thus 
increasing their familiarity at time of study and throughout the task compared to the rest of 
the cues. We also manipulated pre-experimental familiarity by using either completely novel, 
pseudo-word cues (Experiment 4a) or real-word cues (Experiment 4b). Altogether this 
allowed us to examine how different types of cue familiarity relate to memory and 
metamemory in paired-associate paradigms.  
Vast majority of cue effects in metacognitive research have focused on experimental 
familiarity i.e. manipulating the level of exposure to some cues as compared to others within 
the experiment (Metcalfe, Schwartz, & Joaquim, 1993; Reder & Ritter, 1992; Reder & 
Schunn, 1996; Reder, 1987; Schunn, Reder, Nhouyvanisvong, Richards, & Stroffolino, 
1997). Most commonly experimental familiarity is manipulated through a pre-task exposure 
to some items that later form the cues (e.g., in a seemingly unrelated rating task) or through 
manipulating duration and frequency of cue presentation during the study phase (Benjamin, 
2005; Liu, Su, Xu, & Chan, 2007; Metcalfe et al., 1993; Metcalfe & Finn, 2008b; Reder & 
Ritter, 1992; Vernon & Usher, 2003). This wealth of research has demonstrated that 
metacognitive judgments are strongly influenced by experimentally manipulated familiarity 
with the cue term used to elicit the judgment; the higher the familiarity with the cue, the 
higher the likelihood of a positive metacognitive response. This is true even in cases where 
the cue actually requests access to novel target information, achieved, for example through 
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changing one word of an otherwise familiar general knowledge question or a riddle (e.g., 
Vernon & Usher, 2003).  
The effect of cue familiarity has first been demonstrated in speeded judgments i.e. predictions 
made under a time limit with the aim of capturing the nature of pre-retrieval mechanisms 
(Reder & Ritter, 1992). Given that the cue is the first and only information presented at 
judgment it is not surprising that it should play a role in these initial, guiding processes. Since 
this earliest work however, the role of experimental cue familiarity has been extended to 
other, non-timed paradigms starting with FOK judgments made for inaccessible items 
(Metcalfe et al., 1993) but also evidenced in confidence judgments made for just retrieved 
targets (Chua et al., 2012) and judgments made at learning (Metcalfe and Finn, 2008b). 
Current models of metacognitive judgments made about memory highlight the interacting 
roles of cue familiarity and target accessibility (Benjamin, 2005; Koriat & Levy-Sadot, 2001; 
Metcalfe & Finn, 2008b) and it is accepted that across paradigms, the cue plays an important 
guiding role in metacognitive judgments, particularly early in the judgment process.  
Despite the general similarities across the episodic paradigms, there remains disagreement as 
to whether experimentally manipulating cue familiarity affects access to the target with some 
studies observing this effect (e.g., Metcalfe & Finn, 2008b), some studies finding no effect 
(e.g., Benjamin, 2005) and yet others reporting mixed results where secondary variables (time 
given to make a judgment) impacted whether an effect of cue familiarity on target 
accessibility was found (e.g., Liu et al., 2007). In memory research, experimental 
manipulations of familiarity have primarily investigated how it influences the study of pre-
experimentally novel information. For example, Ebbinghaus (1885/1964) demonstrated that 
speed of learning of new, nonsense syllables improved with repeated experimental exposure 
to any given item. Most recently, one study has observed that experimental familiarity is also 
important for building new associations (Reder, Liu, Keinath, & Popov, 2016). More 
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specifically, participants studied cue-target pairs where the cue was a pair of (to them pre-
experimentally novel) Chinese characters and the target an English word. Across multiple 
study-test sessions over a number of weeks in each of which participants studied new 
character-word associations, participants performed better at associating the words to 
characters they have previously been exposed to (even when the association they were asked 
to form was novel to them). In summary, the effects of experimental familiarity on memory 
are inconclusive. 
In contrast, the advantage of pre-experimental familiarity to memory has been demonstrated 
in working memory (Allen, Havelka, Falcon, Evans, & Darling, 2015; Darling, Allen, 
Havelka, Campbell, & Rattray, 2012; Ricks & Wiley, 2009) and long-term memory for single 
items (Rawson & Van Overschelde, 2008; Ricks & Wiley, 2009; Van Overschelde, Rawson, 
Dunlosky, & Hunt, 2005) as well as for associations such as memory for item source or 
contextual information (DeWitt, Knight, Hicks, & Ball, 2012; Reder et al., 2013). Some have 
argued that semantic memory (pre-experimental familiarity) is a prerequisite for and 
facilitates episodic encoding (Hintzman, 1988; Moscovitch et al., 2005; Tulving & 
Markowitsch, 1998); a conclusion dating back to research demonstrating that general 
knowledge schemas of the world influence how well and what information is encoded 
(Bartlett, 1932). One of the classic examples of how prior knowledge improves encoding of 
new information comes from studies on domain-specific learning comparisons between 
experts and novices (e.g., chess masters’ memory for location of chess pieces). Across 
knowledge domains, experts tend to do better for new information learned in that domain 
than novices (Chase & Simon, 1973; Voss, Vesonder, & Spilich, 1980).1 Similarly, it is easier 
to recall episodic encoding details for familiar compared to completely novel proverbs 																																																								1	A related example is the finding that items are better encoded if preceded by or presented alongside congruent 
information as compared to incongruent information (Bein et al., 2015; Bransford & Johnson, 1972; Staresina, 
Gray, & Davachi, 2009). In other words, pre-experimentally formed expectations and knowledge schemas can 
influence encoding.	
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(Poppenk, Köhler, & Moscovitch, 2010) and context reinstatement aids face recognition of 
well-known faces of celebrities but not of newly learned faces (Reder et al., 2013). Overall, it 
has been repeatedly demonstrated that it is easier to encode new information when it can be 
integrated with pre-existing knowledge. 
The effect of pre-experimental familiarity on metacognition is less explored but some studies 
have similarly addressed the question of how expertise influences metamemory. The earliest 
study investigating the impact of expertise in general knowledge information domains found 
no effect on FOK accuracy (Roberts & Rhodes, 1989). This was confirmed in a more recent 
study which similarly found no effect of self-efficacy beliefs across knowledge domains on 
FOK accuracy in a semantic, general knowledge task (Marquié & Huet, 2000). Peynircioğlu 
and Tekcan (2000) tested native Turkish speakers with varied levels of English proficiency 
on Turkish-English word translations and found that proficiency impacted the magnitude of 
FOK judgments but not their accuracy. More recently, studies have also started investigating 
the role of expertise in episodic metamemory. More specifically, novice and expert chess 
players were asked to study moves in a chess end-game and predict that they would 
remember the moves in the future (i.e. make an immediate JOL); not only were experts more 
accurate, novice players’ accuracy was not significantly different from 0 (de Bruin, Rikers, & 
Schmidt, 2007). On the other hand, a study which asked participants to study new facts from 
a range of knowledge domains in which their level of expertise varied (as indicated by self-
report), observed consistent overconfidence in participants’ predictions, which was more 
pronounced for items from well known as compared to less known topics (Shanks & Serra, 
2014). As such the effects of expertise and pre-experimental familiarity on metacognition 
remain unclear and are likely to differ between tasks. Furthermore, there has not been a study 
to date that has explored the question of pre-experimental familiarity in an episodic delayed 
JOL paradigm. 
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In summary, while experimentally manipulating cue familiarity always influences 
metacognitive judgments, the influence on memory is less clear. In contrast, while pre-
experimental familiarity seems to always aid encoding, its effect on metamemory remains 
undecided. Further, majority of studies have investigated experimental and pre-experimental 
familiarity separately. An exception is a study by Poppenk et al. (2010) who compared 
memory for pre-experimentally familiar proverbs to memory for completely novel proverbs. 
Half of the novel proverbs were shown to participants in a pre-study rating task increasing 
their experimental familiarity. Source memory was the same for pre-experimentally and 
experimentally familiar proverbs, both of which were remembered better than the novel 
items. The authors concluded that pre-experimental and experimental familiarity could 
provide a similar kind of encoding advantage. However, except for their study, no one to date 
has compared the two directly, especially not in an associative episodic memory paradigm. 
As such the generalizability of this conclusion remains in question. Further, no one has 
explored the two types of familiarity and their combined influence on metacognitive 
judgments. The present chapter aims to fill this gap by comparing the effects of experimental 
and pre-experimental familiarity on memory and metamemory. 
A notable aspect of the metacognitive studies looking at the effects of cue familiarity is the 
idea of change in the influence on JOLs across time. Vernon and Usher (2003) demonstrated 
that metacognitive judgments can undergo a number of developments and transformations in 
the weighing of accessible evidence (e.g., cue familiarity) across periods of up to 12 seconds. 
This demonstrated that metacognitive judgments are dynamic in nature and comparing 
judgments across a number of time windows can ensure some of the subtleties of the 
evidence evaluation processes underlying predictions such as JOLs are not missed. 
Correspondingly, in addition to manipulating experimental and pre-experimental familiarity, 
this study manipulated the amount of time given to participants to make their JOLs. More 
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specifically, drawing on Koriat & Levy-Sadot (2001) and Vernon and Usher (2003), we 
employed a speeded condition where participants had to give their JOL within two seconds of 
cue presentation and a delayed condition where participants had to first wait two seconds 
before giving their response (again within two seconds i.e. in a 2000-4000ms window from 
the cue appearing on screen. The speeded time window is slower than that employed in the 
most similar paradigms to the current study (Benjamin, 2005; Metcalfe & Finn, 2008b) which 
have focused primarily on capturing initial, pre-retrieval mechanisms in paradigms where 
participants are not given enough time to do more than register the cue. We were instead 
interested in observing whether the changes in cue familiarity effects would be more 
temporally extended.   
In summary, the present chapter revisits and extends some classic findings in the 
metacognitive literature through exploring the effects of experimental and pre-experimental 
cue familiarity on JOLs and associative memory. Experiment 1 employed pseudo-word cues 
(i.e. pre-experimentally novel cues) and these were contrasted with (pre-experimentally 
familiar) real-word cues in Experiment 2. Both experiments also manipulated experimental 
familiarity through a pre-study rating task, which exposed participants to half of the to-be-
studied cues. Throughout the chapter, cue familiarity (high vs. low) refers specifically to the 
experimental cue familiarity manipulation that was common to both Experiment 4a and 4b. In 
contrast, the pre-experimental familiarity, between-experiment manipulation is referred to as 
the cue type (real word vs. pseudo-word cues) manipulation. We also investigated whether 
these influences would change when participants had to respond within two seconds of cue-
presentation at judgment (speeded condition) as compared to when they first had to wait two 
seconds before responding within a two second window (i.e. between 2000-4000ms after cue 
presentation (delayed condition). Due to the speeded nature of the paradigm, this time we 
employed binary (yes/no) JOL predictions rather than confidence JOLs. We were interested 
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in how the two familiarity manipulations affected (i) memory for the target, (ii) the likelihood 
of participants giving a positive (yes) JOL prediction, (iii) the response criterion adopted by 
participants, (iv) their metacognitive accuracy and (v) whether these effects would differ 
between the two time windows.  
Given previous memory research we predicted that both experimental and pre-experimental 
familiarity would be linked to an improvement in memory performance for the target but that 
these effects might interact. More specifically, we expected that memory would be better for 
the real-word cue-target pairs as compared to pseudo-word cues paired with real-word 
targets. We also anticipated that manipulating experimental familiarity of the pseudo-word 
cues would improve memory for the targets. Further, we predicted that experimental 
familiarity would increase positive JOL predictions in both cue type conditions. We were 
interested in observing whether this would be reflected in a response criterion shift, 
suggesting a change in response strategies. Lastly, we expected the cue familiarity effects to 
be strongest in the speeded conditions and less pronounced in the delayed conditions and to 
see this difference especially for the pseudo-word cues.  
3.2  Method 
3.2.1 Participants 
All participants were students at Université de Bourgogne; 34 (7 men, mean age = 20.2, SD = 
2.1) participated in Experiment 4a and 32 (3 men, mean age = 19.7, SD = 2.0) participated in 
Experiment 4b. They were all native French speakers, took part for course credit and were 
only allowed to participate in one of the experiments. The study was granted ethical approval 
by the University of Leeds ethics review board. 
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3.2.2 Materials 
For Experiment 4a, a list of 122 French pseudo-words was created. The pseudo-words were 
all six letters long and consisted of two or three syllables. We used pseudo-words rather than 
rare words because we wanted to use items that were completely novel to participants, items 
that they could not have had any previous experience with. The list of pseudo-words was 
generated using the trigram algorithm available through the Lexique Toolbox (New & Pallier, 
2001b). The algorithm takes real words provided by the user and creates a list of non-words 
by randomly switching trigrams (sequences consisting of three letters) from the words 
provided. The generated list was read over by two native French speakers independent to the 
project and independently of each other. They checked to make sure the pseudo-words were 
pronounceable and with plausible word structure. Real words and any words that resembled 
real words too closely (e.g., pronounced they sounded like real words) were either removed 
or further changed by replacing certain letters. Pseudo-words were checked so that none 
differed by merely a difference of one letter and no pseudo-words shared the first three or the 
last three letters. This was so as to avoid the appearance of repeats. Further, a list of 100 real 
words was generated for the targets. These were all 6 letter long, singular nouns of frequency 
in films between 15-40 as indicated by the Lexique database (New, Pallier, Brysbaert, & 
Ferrand, 2004). 
For Experiment 4b, a list of 226 singular, French nouns, 5-8 letters in length was used. The 
norms used in Experiment 4a did not yield sufficient number of items. As such to select the 
items, the Gougehnheim 2.0 norms (New & Pallier, 2001a) were used with the spoken 
frequency of the words in the range of 10 – 30. 
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3.2.3 Procedure 
3.2.3.1 Experiment 4a 
The study was programmed in PsychoPy (Peirce, 2007) and participants completed the entire 
study on their own on a computer in the presence of the experimenter (see Figure 3.1 for 
schematic of experimental procedure). Firstly, in the Rating Phase, participants were 
presented twice with a list of 20 randomly chosen pseudo-words, one item at a time. For one 
presentation cycle they rated the pseudo-words on pleasantness (on a five-point scale with 1 
indicating not at all and 5 being very pleasant) and on the other presentation cycle they rated 
them on resemblance to real words (1 being not at all and 5 being very resembling). The 
order in which they completed the two judgments was randomized and participants had three 
seconds to press the key corresponding to their choice for each item. In the subsequent Study 
Phase participants studied 40 cue-target pairs, each presented for six seconds. The cues 
consisted of 20 pseudo-words encountered in phase 1 (high familiarity) and 20 were pseudo-
words presented for the first time (low familiarity). All targets were real words. This was 
followed by a Judgment-of-Learning (JOL) Phase in which participants were re-presented 
with all the cues indicated, by pressing one of two keys, whether yes or no they would 
recognize the associated target. Lastly, participants completed a Memory Phase where all the 
cues were re-presented and participants chose the associated target from among two options 
(the correct target and another target presented at study), by pressing on the corresponding 
key.  
Participants completed the whole task (all four phases) twice in a blocked design. In one 
block they were given two seconds to make each JOL (speeded condition) while in the other 
block they had to wait two seconds from presentation of the cue before making the judgment 
after which they again had two seconds to respond (delayed condition). Participants were 
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presented with a warning signal 500ms  before their time was up, to let them know they 
should respond. The order in which they completed the conditions was counter-balanced 
across participants. The trials on which they failed to respond within the given time frame 
were excluded from analysis. Before each testing session, the cue-target pairs were randomly 
generated for each participant so that each encountered different items. 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Outline of Experiment 4 procedure. The items presented here are French 
pseudo-words (cues) paired with real French words (targets; Experiment 4a). 	
3.2.3.2 Experiment 4b 
The procedure was the same as in Experiment 4a with three exceptions. Firstly, participants 
studied pairs of real words rather than pairs of pseudo-words and real-words. Secondly, in the 
Rating Phase, the judgment about resemblance to real-words was replaced by a concreteness 
judgment (1 representing very abstract and 5 representing very concrete). We wanted the 
second rating task in both experiments to encourage deep processing and to relate to the 
content of the information being processed (rather than its perceptual features). This was so 
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as to ensure the effectiveness of the cue familiarity manipulation. To this end it was not 
possible to find the same rating task for both real-word and pseudo-word cues and so instead 
we looked for comparable judgments (abstract/concrete here and resemblance to real-words 
in Experiment 4a). 
3.3  Results 
3.3.1 Responding 
In the speeded conditions, in Experiment 4a participants took on average 1079ms (SD = 215) 
to respond and in Experiment 4b this was 1083ms (SD = 209). Most participants gave a 
response for all trials. On average, in Experiment 4a participants failed to give a response for 
0.3% of trials and this was 1.2% of trials in Experiment 4b.  
In the delayed conditions, after the two seconds elapsed and participants were allowed to 
respond, in Experiment 4a they responded on average 591ms after the deadline (SD = 202) 
and in Experiment 4b they responded in 555ms (SD = 177). On average, participants missed 
0.6% trials in Experiment 4a and 0.9% trials in Experiment 4b. This shows that overall 
participants did not struggle with the imposed time deadlines.  
3.3.2 Memory Performance 
To analyze memory performance, a cue type (pseudo-word, real word) x cue familiarity 
(high, low) x timing condition (speeded, delayed) mixed ANOVA was carried out on the 
number of items correctly recognized on the recognition test (see Figure 3.2). There was a 
main effect of cue type, F(1, 64) = 4.53, p < .05, 𝜂!! = .07, with better recognition 
performance in Experiment 4b which employed real word cues than in Experiment 4a which 
used pseudo-word cues. There was no main effect of timing condition, F(1, 64) = 1.82, p = 
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.182, 𝜂!! =  .03, or cue familiarity, F(1, 64) = 1.51, p = .224, 𝜂!! =  .02. There was however a 
cue familiarity x cue type interaction, F(1, 64) = 7.42, p < .01, 𝜂!! =  .10. There were no other 
significant interactions (all ps > .300).  
Follow up analyses of the cue familiarity x cue type interaction showed that for high 
familiarity cues, there was no difference in recognition accuracy between words and 
pseudowords, t(64) = 1.03, p = .308, d = 0.26, whereas for low familiarity cues, targets paired 
with real words were better recognized than targets pairs with pseudowords, t(64) = 3.01, p < 
.01. All in all, it seems that experimental cue familiarity improved memory performance for 
targets paired with pseudo-words such that they were remembered as well as targets paired 
with real-word cues. 
 
  
Figure 3.2: Mean percentage of correctly recognised items by condition (fast vs. slow), cue 
type (pseudo-word vs. real-word) and cue familiarity (high vs. low familiarity). Error bars 
indicate standard error of the mean. 
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3.3.3 JOL responding 
The same ANOVA as above was conducted to analyse the percentage of positive (i.e. yes) 
JOL predictions (Figure 3.3) to explore how the variables of interest impacted responding. 
Again, there was a main effect of cue type, F(1, 64) = 10.86, p < .01, 𝜂!! =  .15, with 
participants giving overall more positive JOL predictions in Experiment 4b than participants 
in Experiment 4a. As predicted, the cue familiarity effect was confirmed with participants 
predicting they will recognize more targets paired with high familiarity than low familiarity 
cues, F(1, 64) = 72.40, p < .001, 𝜂!! =  .53, across experiments and across conditions. There 
was also a cue familiarity x cue type interaction showing this difference between positive 
predictions for high vs. low familiarity cues was greater in Experiment 4a than in Experiment 
4b, F(1, 64) = 4.07, p < .05, 𝜂!! =  .06. In other words, experimentally induced familiarity 
had more of an effect on JOL responding when the cues were pre-experimentally novel 
(pseudo-words) as compared to already known (real words) but both differences were 
significant (p < .001). Further, participants gave more positive JOL responses to low 
familiarity real-word as compared to low familiarity pseudo-word cues, t(64) = 4.10, p < 
.001, d = 1.03. There was also a numerical but marginal difference between high familiarity 
real word and pseudo-word cues, t(64) = 1.89, p = .064, d  = 0.47. Contrary to our prediction, 
there was no effect of timing condition, F < 1, nor any further interactions (lowest p-value = 
.110).  
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Figure 3.3: Mean percentage of yes JOL predictions by condition (fast vs. slow), cue type 
(pseudo-word vs. real-word) and cue familiarity (high vs. low familiarity). Error bars 
indicate standard error of the mean. 
 
3.3.4 Response bias 
To further understand changes in responding, we also analysed criterion or response bias (see 
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= .004, 𝜂!! =  .14, but no effect of time condition, F < 1. Overall, this shows that in both 
experiments participants responded more liberally when the cue was experimentally more 
familiar to them. 
 
Table	3.1: Average response criterion by cue type, condition and cue familiarity (SDs in 
brackets). 
  Cue familiarity 
Cue Type Condition Low High 
Pseudo-words Delayed .58 (.42) .16 (.45) 
 Speeded .60 (.41) .25 (.44) 
Real-words Delayed .32 (.41) .04 (.46) 
 Speeded .25 (.49) -.01 (.50) 
 
3.3.5 JOL accuracy 
To assess relative monitoring accuracy, we analysed d’ (see Table 3.2). Using the same 
ANOVA as described above, we found no effect of cue familiarity,  F(1, 64) = 3.21, p = .078, 𝜂!! =  .05, cue type, F(1, 64) = 1.74, p = .192, η!! =  .03, timing condition, F < 1, or 
interactions (lowest p-value = .201). This means that overall, participants’ JOL prediction 
accuracy was the same across experiments, timing conditions as well as cue types and 
familiarity. 
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Table	3.2: Average d’ by cue type, condition and cue familiarity (SDs in brackets). 
  Cue familiarity 
Cue Type Condition Low High 
Pseudo-words Delayed .26 (.52) 38 (.62) 
 Speeded .14 (.69) .45 (.70) 
Real-words Delayed .41 (.57) .39 (.49) 
 Speeded .39 (.64) .51 (.63) 
 
3.4 Discussion 
The present chapter compared effects of experimental and pre-experimental cue familiarity 
on delayed JOLs and memory. Pre-experimental familiarity was manipulated by varying the 
type of cue employed, with Experiment 4a using novel pseudo-word cues and Experiment 4b 
using real, average frequency words as cues. Experimental familiarity was manipulated 
through a pre-study exposure to half the cues in a rating task. The results showed that (i) 
experimental and pre-experimental familiarity aided the creation of novel cue-target 
associations and these effects interacted with each other, (ii) familiarity increased the rate of 
positive JOLs given with an interaction between the two types of familiarity, (iii) 
experimental cue familiarity also influenced response bias with more liberal responding for 
cues that were experimentally highly familiar as compared to cues that had low experimental 
familiarity.  There were no differences in metacognitive accuracy between items and no 
effects of time condition.  
Firstly, the lack of effect of time condition needs to be addressed. While we did not expect 
this manipulation to influence memory, we did expect it to impact how cue familiarity and 
cue type influenced JOL responding. Previous studies have observed that cue familiarity was 
a strong influence on JOL responding in speeded conditions (Benjamin, 2005, Metcalfe & 
Finn, 2008b) and exerted diminished (Metcalfe & Finn, 2008b) or no influence (Benjamin, 
78		
2005) in delayed conditions. Compared to these other studies, our speeded condition was 
slower (2000 milliseconds as compared to 750-1000 milliseconds), which likely accounts for 
this lack of a difference. In other words, it is possible that the effect of cue familiarity on 
JOLs changes only in that first 1000 millisecond window from cue presentation and then 
levels off and remains fairly constant. This might be true at least in episodic cue-target 
paradigms that employ single words, which are fast to process. In contrast, a semantic study, 
which used general knowledge questions as cues, found changes in the effect of cue 
familiarity on FOKs between judgments made before two seconds as compared to judgments 
made after 10 seconds from cue presentation (Koriat & Levy-Sadot, 2001). Similarly, a study 
that has used triplets of remote associates, asking participants to come up with a fourth word 
linking to all three presented words observed changes in the impact of cue familiarity on 
judgments in a much larger time window (Vernon & Usher, 2003). The timing of these 
influences is very likely task and stimulus dependent; single words are faster to process than 
sentences or even triplets of words. It is evident that in the context of the current study, the 
two time conditions were not sufficiently different from each other and the effects 
investigated in this chapter do not dynamically develop across the time frames employed. 
The memory results showed that both types of familiarity influenced the ability to form novel 
cue-target associations. Memory was better for targets paired with pre-experimentally 
familiar real words as compared to novel (pseudo-word) cues. Further, experimentally 
manipulating cue familiarity improved access to the target in the case of pre-experimentally 
novel cues. More specifically, memory for targets paired with high familiarity cues 
(presented in the pre-study rating task) was better than for targets paired with low familiarity 
cues when the employed cues were pseudo-words, with no effect of experimental cue 
familiarity observed for real-word cues. Further, memory for targets paired with the high 
familiarity pseudo-word cues was the same as memory for targets paired with real word cues. 
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The pseudo-word results are consistent with a recent finding that experimentally 
manipulating familiarity of pre-experimentally novel cues improves the formation of novel 
cue-target associations (Reder et al., 2016). It is also consistent with Poppenk et al.’s (2010) 
suggestion that both types of familiarity might provide a similar type of encoding advantage. 
This is the first study to have directly compared both types of familiarity in an associative 
task, and to demonstrate the non-additive effects that were observed. Nevertheless, it is 
necessary to note that the lack of an effect of experimental familiarity on target memory with 
real-word cues might be due to already high memory performance for these items. In other 
words, experimental cue familiarity might also aid in associating pre-experimentally familiar 
cue-target pairs but the advantage of experimentally manipulating familiarity is likely to 
always be higher (and sometimes exclusive) to pre-experimentally novel items. 
Past research has shown that novel information is best encoded when it can be integrated with 
past experience and knowledge (e.g., Allen et al., 2015; Chase & Simon, 1973; DeWitt et al., 
2012; Reder et al., 2013; Staresina & Davachi, 2009), which offers a possible explanation for 
the current findings. An alternative explanation comes from work on the advantage of deep 
levels of processing and elaboration to encoding (Craik & Lockhart, 1972), particularly in 
forming associations (Bower, 1970; Bower & Winzenz, 1970). While we did not instruct 
participants on how to encode the cue-target pairs, the real-word items offer themselves to 
techniques such as imagery or the creation of a narrative about the cue-target pairing. This is 
not possible with the pseudo-word cues. However, it is plausible that with repeated exposure, 
participants might find ways to disambiguate the pseudo-word cues and maybe even relate 
them to real words (even though effort was made to ensure this was not possible when 
creating the items). This would make it possible to use more elaborate encoding strategies 
when studying a target paired with a highly familiar pseudo-word cue. It would be of interest 
to compare the present results to a condition where the low familiarity cues were rare or low 
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frequency words rather than pseudo-words. This would allow for the differentiation between 
the effect of having a cue that carries no meaning and a cue that has low level of familiarity. 
A possible confound of the present experiments is that this differentiation is not possible.  
As predicted, both types of familiarity (experimental and pre-experimental) impacted the 
percentage of positive (yes) JOL predictions given. In other words, participants gave a higher 
percentage of yes JOLs to highly familiar cues as compared to low familiarity cues and more 
yes predictions were also given to real-word as compared to pseudo-word cues. Further, the 
two effects interacted such that the effect of experimental cue familiarity was bigger for 
pseudo-word cues. The response criterion analysis further showed that participants were more 
liberal in their responding for high familiarity cues (both pseudo-word and real-word) as 
compared to low familiarity cues.  
It would be of interest to extend the present paradigm to the study of memory and 
metamemory in older and clinical populations. Older adults have been shown to be 
particularly impaired on associative (as compared to item) memory (Old & Naveh-Benjamin, 
2008), with this impairment especially evident when asked to make novel associations 
(Badham & Maylor, 2011; Naveh-Benjamin, Hussain, Guez, & Bar-On, 2003). Similarly, an 
impairment in forming (novel) associations has been observed in temporal lobe epilepsy 
(TLE), leading to the suggestion that the memory deficit in TLE could be particularly a 
deficit in binding (Herfurth, Kasper, Schwarz, Stefan, & Pauli, 2010; Leritz, Grande, & 
Bauer, 2006; Saling et al., 1993). It would be of interest to investigate the extent to which 
these types of associative deficits could be ameliorated by the combined contributions of 
experimental and pre-experimental familiarity. Correspondingly, it would be of interest to 
investigate how cue familiarity effects would impact metacognitive judgments in a context 
where the target might be more difficult to retrieve.  
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In summary, this study showed that both experimental and pre-experimental cue familiarity 
aid in forming novel associations, confirming and extending previous findings. What is more, 
memory for targets paired with highly familiar pseudo-words was equivalent to memory for 
targets paired with real-words, demonstrating that multiple presentations of novel items can 
facilitate encoding in a manner offered by information stored in long-term memory. Further, 
both types of familiarity influenced metacognitive judgments, with an increase in yes JOLs 
with both experimental and pre-experimental familiarity manipulations but these effects 
interacted such that there was no effect of experimental familiarity on pre-experimentally 
familiar cues. In contrast to the memory findings, the effects of cue familiarity and cue type 
on JOL responding were additive. It is clear that while manipulations that affect memory are 
also likely to influence metamemory, the effects do not have to map directly onto each other. 
Further, cue effects in delayed JOL have been seen as primarily prominent in initial, pre-
retrieval processes as exhibited in highly speeded judgments (within 1000 milliseconds of cue 
presentation; e.g., Benjamin, 2005; Metcalfe & Finn, 2008b). Here we extend the role of the 
cue to judgments made later and show that different types of cue familiarity (experimental 
and pre-experimental) can influence delayed JOLs.  
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CHAPTER 4 
INSIGHTS FROM JUDGMENT-OF-LEARNING 
JUSTIFICATIONS  
4.1  Introduction 
Metacognitive judgments are understood as corresponding to quantity and quality of some 
(internal) evidence gathered toward the judgment being made (e.g., ease of reading as 
evidence that an item has been sufficiently learned and will be later remembered; Rhodes & 
Castel, 2008) and reflecting the probability that the given judgment is correct (Kepecs & 
Mainen, 2012). Correspondingly, Chapters 2 and 3 showed that varying levels of access to 
target related information and cue familiarity influences delayed JOLs. As noted in the 
discussion of Chapter 2, one of the worries in metacognitive research is that when we ask 
participants about access to particular type of information (such as memory for target spatial 
location) or when we manipulate the strength of certain features (such as cue familiarity), we 
are making these features particularly salient to participants. The outstanding question then is 
whether we would observe the same effects if we did not explicitly manipulate or probe these 
factors and rather only relied on their natural variation across items in any given task. This 
chapter investigates what metacognitive judgments represent by evaluating how participants 
spontaneously construct and justify their delayed JOL confidence. Participants provided 
written reports alongside their JOLs and we used natural language processing techniques to 
characterize the type of information and explanation that differentiate one JOL confidence 
from another, and to quantify the extent to which any two JOLs are justified with reference to 
different types of evidence. We also manipulated whether participants gave JOLs on a 
confidence scale (Experiment 5) or as a binary judgment (Experiment 6). This allowed us 
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compare the two response formats directly and evaluate how they relate to each other in 
terms of how they are constructed. 
This study draws on research investigating retrospective confidence in contents of memory 
retrieval, which has established that probing participants for explanations and justifications of 
their answers is a powerful tool for characterizing processes underlying cognition and 
metacognition. For example, Koriat et al. (1980) asked participants to list reasons for and 
against their chosen answer to a general knowledge question. They observed that confidence 
was influenced by the amount of evidence accessed in support of the given answer, lending 
support to the idea that confidence is a result of a process of evaluation of different sources of 
evidence. More recently, Selmeczy and Dobbins (2014) asked participants to justify why they 
were confident (or not) in their judgments on a recognition task (calling an item old or new 
i.e. previously studied or seen for the first time). Their analyses of the content of these 
responses showed a pattern of results supporting dual-process accounts of recognition 
memory (see Yonelinas, 2002); for example, the presence of ‘remembering’ characterized 
high confidence old responses in contrast to medium confidence responses which were more 
likely to contain references to ‘familiarity’. In other words, this quantitative analysis of 
subjective reports lent support to one side of an on-going debate in recognition memory. 
Furthermore, these results were obtained without explicit instructions or theory-laden 
manipulations from the experimenters, who did not highlight specific experiences or types of 
evidence for participants to focus on. Overall, these studies (see also Gardiner, Ramponi, & 
Richardson-Klavehn, 1998; Urquhart & O’Connor, 2014; Williams, Conway, & Moulin, 
2013) give credibility to the idea that much can be learned from asking participants to explain 
their metacognitive judgments and experiences even though it remains uncommon practice. 
In the present study we adopted and developed the analytical approach pioneered by 
Selmeczy and Dobbins (2014) to gain insight into processes underlying delayed JOLs.  
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Based on results of the previous chapters and the literature discussed, we expected 
participants to reference both cue familiarity and target accessibility in their justifications. 
More importantly, we were interested in observing how the type of evidence referenced 
mapped onto the confidence expressed. Further, we wanted to observe whether the pattern of 
justifications for confidence responses would map onto justifications of binary responses.    
There is an underlying assumption in JOL confidence analysis that the confidence responses 
can be split into binary (yes and no) predictions. This is implicit in the use of calibration 
measures, which assume that confidence responses correspond to a prediction of likelihood of 
future retrieval (e.g., Finn & Metcalfe, 2007; Koriat, Sheffer, & Ma’ayan, 2002; Serra & 
England, 2012). This corresponds to the idea that low confidence JOL predictions should 
probabilistically equate to a rejection of future retrieval (i.e. 40% predicted success rate 
means greater likelihood of failure). This has meant that some have explicitly suggested to 
split the confidence scale down the middle to enable calculations of statistics such as d’ (see 
for example Masson & Rotello, 2009). And yet recent results suggest that JOL confidence 
responses and binary responses might not be equivalent and can lead to different pattern of 
results (Hanczakowski et al., 2013).  
The comparison of confidence to binary responses does not have only methodological 
consequences but also holds theoretical interest. To review the theoretical developments in 
the delayed JOL literature, early theories have focused on explaining JOLs as a result of 
single process (target retrieval) evaluations (e.g., Nelson & Dunlosky, 1991). In this view it 
was assumed that participants accrue one type of evidence (the degree to which the target is 
accessible) toward their JOL—the more evidence they collect, the higher their JOL. 
According to this view, different JOLs (e.g., 60% as compared to 80%) merely expressed 
different degrees of access to the target.  Recently, an alternative two-stage view proposed a 
quick pre-retrieval stage driven by cue-familiarity followed by an effortful memory search 
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(target accessibility evaluation) stage (Benjamin, 2005).  Metcalfe & Finn (2008b) further 
elaborated this view, suggesting the first stage can result in (i) a quick “don’t know” decision 
driven by lack of cue familiarity (expressed as responding with the lowest point on the JOL 
scale) or (ii) the initiation of the second effortful retrieval stage. In this case, the prediction is 
that there are qualitatively different processes that underlie the lowest confidence JOL (i.e. 
0%) and distinguish it from all others. More specifically, it is a cue-driven evaluation as 
compared to a target-based judgment. If this is true, we would expect participants to refer to 
these types of evidence in their justifications and to observe a qualitative difference in the 
evidence favoured at different levels of the JOL scale.  
An alternative two-stage view has focused on explaining JOLs as consisting first of a yes or 
no judgment, directly followed by an assignment of confidence. Dunlosky et al. (2005) 
observed that when participants were asked to make a confidence judgment about the 
accuracy of their JOL prediction (a second-order judgment, SOJ), a plot of the SOJ 
magnitude against JOL confidence resulted in a U-shaped function. In other words, 
participants were most confident in the predictions that lay on the extremes of the JOL scale 
and as their JOL confidence moved toward the mid-ranges, participants became less 
confident in the accuracy of their retrieval predictions. Dunlosky et al. (2005) interpreted the 
anchor of the SOJ function (i.e. the function’s minimum, where participants were least 
confident in the accuracy of their JOLs) as the point where yes and no predictions diverge. 
This would imply that the low end of the JOL scale is interpretable as no predictions, and the 
high end as yes predictions. Dunlosky et al. (2005) speculated that yes and no predictions are 
driven by different evidence evaluation processes, although their exact nature has not been 
specified. Nonetheless, this framework suggests a point of divergence within the range of 
JOLs available to participants with the point placed in the mid-regions of the scale. More 
87		
specifically, it suggests that yes and no predictions are qualitatively different and that a point 
can be located on the confidence scale where they diverge.  
While the models described above are not irreconcilable, they do lead to a somewhat 
different pattern of predictions. Primarily, they both suggest there is an underlying point of 
divergence in the JOL scale either side of which the scale is characterized by different 
processes. Metcalfe and Finn (2008b) place that point on the lowest ends of the scale and 
describe it in terms of the information evaluation processes that change at that point while 
Dunlosky et al. (2005) place it in low to mid ranges (see also Serra & England, 2012) and 
describe it in terms of a yes/no distinction. This yes/no distinction along the center of the 
scale has similarly been hypothesized elsewhere (Hanczakowski et al., 2013) and is 
consistent with confidence interpretations described above. Notably, the speculated yes/no 
distinction in confidence judgments has not yet been demonstrated and its potential 
relationship to cue as compared to target related processes is poorly understood.  
The aim of this chapter was to evaluate the types of evidence that characterize confidence and 
binary JOLs and to compare these against each other, thus evaluating methodological and 
theoretical assumptions made in the literature. Across two experiments, participants 
completed a standard JOL task with cue-target word pairs.  In Experiment 5 participants 
made JOL predictions on a 6-point numeric confidence scale (0-20-40-60-80-100%) whereas 
in Experiment 6 participants made first a binary yes/no JOL prediction followed by a three-
point verbal confidence judgment made about that prediction (sure-maybe-guess). In both 
experiments there was a total of six JOL response options and participants provided written 
justifications on a subset of their JOLs. They were not given any instructions on how to write 
their justifications nor did we manipulate any variables known to influence JOL confidence. 
Thus, we assessed how participants arrive at JOL confidence independently and 
spontaneously without making any one source of information (e.g., cue familiarity) more 
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salient than others. The general procedure and majority of methods adopted to analyze the 
text data were modeled on Selmeczy & Dobbins (2014). Across two experiments we 
examined: (i) how participants justify their JOLs; (ii) to what extent are such justifications 
characterized by cue and target references; (iii) whether there is an underlying yes/no 
distinction in numeric JOL confidence responses.  
4.2 Method 
4.2.1 Participants 
All participants that took part were affiliated with the University of Leeds (students and staff) 
with 54 participants (13 men; mean age = 23.4; SD = 7.4) in Experiment 5 and 73 participants 
(12 men; mean age = 27.5, SD = 10.7) in Experiment 6. In Experiment 5, two participants 
were excluded, both for not following instructions (one for using only 0% and 100% 
judgements, the other because her written responses referred to multiple cue-target pairs 
instead of the pair preceding the written report). This left 52 participants in the analysis for 
Experiment 5 (13 men, mean age = 22.5, SD = 6.2). In both experiments, participants either 
received course credit or £5 as reimbursement. The study was granted ethical approval by the 
School of Psychology Ethics Committee, University of Leeds, UK. 
4.2.2 Stimuli 
For each participant, the studied items were randomly selected from a list of 628 common, 
singular English nouns (5-6 letters long) taken from the English Lexicon Project (minimum 
log Hyperspace Analogue to Language frequency 8.02; Balota et al., 2007). Each participant 
was exposed to a unique set of 90 cue-target pairs (45 in each of the two experimental 
blocks).  
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4.2.3 Procedure 
The study was programmed using PsychoPy (Peirce, 2007)  with all participants completing 
the task individually on a computer, in the presence of the experimenter. In both experiments, 
participants completed two identical blocks consisting of three consecutive phases (see 
Figure 4.1); the task was repeated so as to collect sufficient number of JOL justifications. In 
each block participants: (i) studied 45 cue-target pairs-presented for six seconds each with a 
fixation cross between all trials; (ii) were presented with the cue of each pair, and gave a JOL 
predicting recognition performance for the target on the subsequent memory test; and (iii) 
completed a forced choice recognition test where, on presentation of each cue, they selected 
the cue-matched target from two words (both options were targets from the study). All 
choices were made by pressing a key corresponding to the confidence response or target. 
The only difference between the two experiments was in the JOL stage (part ii of the 
procedure). In Experiment 5, participants gave their JOLs on a six-point numeric confidence 
scale (0-20-40-60-80-100%). In Experiment 6, participants first gave a binary yes/no 
response indicating whether they would recognise the target, followed by a three-point verbal 
confidence judgment (sure-maybe-guess) relating to the yes/no response. In both experiments 
there were 6 distinct response options participants could give.  
On a subset of the judgment trials, immediately after giving a JOL, participants justified the 
previously rendered JOL using a written, keyboard-entered response. Over the two blocks 
participants could give a maximum of 18 justifications (nine per block)—three per response 
option. More specifically, no questions were asked on the first five trials of either block. 
After that, requests for written justifications were spread out throughout the judgment task as 
follows.  If the maximum number of justifications was reached for a given JOL response 
type, no more justifications were asked for that response option. Participants would not be 
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asked for any written responses for the two trials following a justification, though this 
enforced gap reduced over the course of the block (there was no enforced justification gap for 
the last 10 trials). Some participants therefore gave fewer judgments than others, especially 
since some participants would use some JOL responses less than others. On average 
participants gave 15.4 justifications in Experiment 5 (SD  = 1.9) and 12.7 justifications in 
Experiment 6 (SD = 2.7).  
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4.2.4 Text analysis methods 
4.2.4.1 Text data pre-processing 
Before any text analysis was carried out, we corrected spelling mistakes in the text and 
removed articles (a and the). We also removed justifications where participants used it to 
explicitly indicate they wanted to change the JOL response they had given (in total, three 
justifications in Experiment 5, six justifications in Experiment 6). In all of the reported 
analyses, we aggregated the descriptive reports for each JOL confidence level and response 
type across participants for comparison. At least 100 justifications were collected per JOL 
type (see Table 4.1 for number of justifications collected per JOL response category).  
4.2.4.2 Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA) 
LSA is a technique by which one can evaluate the semantic relationship between a single 
term and a text document. Drawing on singular value decomposition (closely related to factor 
analysis), LSA creates a mathematical (matrix/vector) representation of a large body of text, 
mapping the semantic relationships between single words and sets of words. This mapping 
relies on frequency of co-occurrence but also on a weighting function that takes into account 
the ‘importance’ of a term to a given text (see Landauer, Foltz & Laham, 1998 for more 
detail). LSA that has been trained on a relevant corpus of texts (e.g., general or subject 
specific) to create this representation, also called semantic space, can then be applied to new 
examples to compute their semantic relationship.  The subsequent classification of semantic 
similarities between new examples very closely imitates humans (e.g., Laham, 1997). The 
online LSA tool (available at http://lsa.colorado.edu/) offers a semantic space that has been 
trained on ‘general reading’ corpus with 300 factors (Dennis, 2006). We used this to classify 
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the semantic similarity between each justification and the cue-target pair it was written in 
response to. More specifically, we computed an LSA score between the cue and the 
justification and compared it against the LSA score computed between the target and the 
justification. The toolkit returns a cosine value for each comparison; as such the range of 
output values is -1 to 1, with 0 or lower interpreted as no semantic relationship. Following 
Wandmacher, Ovchinnikova, and Alexandrov (2008), we set negative LSA values to 0 since 
in this context we could not interpret a justification and a studied item (cue or target) as being 
more dissimilar than ‘not similar at all’. If, for example, a justification for a given JOL 
response type is more likely to refer to the cue than the target (e.g., “I cannot remember 
studying the word truth” where ‘truth’ is the cue) then the LSA value should be higher for the 
cue-justification as compared to the target-justification comparison. This enabled us to assess 
whether any JOL category was characterized by referring more to the cue or the target, as 
predicted by Metcalfe and Finn’s (2008b) two stage JOL account.  
4.2.4.3 Word frequency analysis (n-grams) 
An n-gram is a continuous series of words found to occur within a text (n = 1, 2, 3 are 
referred to as uni-grams, bi-grams and tri-grams respectively). To compare sets of texts (in 
this case, justifications) the frequency of occurrence of each n-gram is counted across all 
justification texts. To account for some participants writing more than others (and possibly 
repeating themselves), we restricted the analysis so that each JOL justification could 
contribute a maximum of 1 to any given n-gram count. For any given n-gram (e.g., “do not 
remember”) we could thus compute the total number of justifications that contained it for 
each JOL category.  
In previous experiments analysing n-grams (Selmeczy & Dobbins, 2014; Urquhart & 
O’Connor, 2014), only two categories were ever compared against each other. This was done 
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using a binomial test, computing a p-value for the proportion of occurrence of the given n-
gram under one response category assuming a binomial distribution with the p-parameter of 
0.5. This allowed for the examination of whether the n-gram was significantly more likely to 
appear in justifications for one response category or whether the probability of it occurring in 
texts justifying either response category was equal. Since in this study we had six response 
categories in each experiment, we adapted the binomial test to account for probability of 
success of 1/6. In other words, for each JOL category, we computed whether that proportion 
of occurrence (out of all occurrences) was significantly higher than that n-gram having equal 
probability of occurrence in all JOL categories.    
This analysis allowed the isolation of simple phrases that were most likely to be used in 
justifying one JOL response type as compared to all others. Where LSA focused on semantic 
similarity between the studied items (cue and target) and the justification texts, n-gram 
analysis examined whether different phrases (e.g., relating to familiarity as compared to 
retrieval success) would differentiate different JOL response categories. Rather than 
analysing information specific to each trial (i.e. whether participants named or referred to the 
studied items), this analysis enabled the extraction of general phrases that held true across 
trials, irrespective of what the studied cue or target were. In this way the n-gram analysis 
complemented, and helped to further explicate, the LSA results. 
4.2.4.4 Classification analysis (Support Vector Machine [SVM]) 
SVM is a machine-learning algorithm commonly used in text classification. Here we 
employed it as a tool for quantifying the extent to which different JOL responses differed 
from each other. If there are highly distinct features that separate one category from another 
(such as reference to different types of processes), then the SVM would pick up on this and 
classification of future examples would be highly accurate. On the other hand, if the 
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differences were merely of degree (e.g., different levels of target access), then the 
classification of future examples would be low.  
To carry out SVM analysis, we represented each written justification as a vector where each 
vector component corresponded to a uni-gram, bi-gram or tri-gram, with 0 denoting its 
absence in the given justification text and 1 denoting its presence. We included all n-grams as 
this allowed us to account for individual word usage as well as word combinations, which 
carry specific semantic meaning. For example, the uni-grams ‘not’, ‘remember’ and 
‘confident’ could only be coded as present once which would mark the texts ‘I am confident I 
will not remember’ and ‘I am not confident but might remember’ as the same while including 
the bigrams ‘not remember’ and ‘not confident’ avoided this problem. Each n-gram thus 
constituted an input feature and each text was represented as a vector of features while the 
output was the JOL category the given vector belonged to (e.g., 0%). In principle, an SVM 
looks for a ‘decision boundary’ or a line that separates the two sets of data being compared so 
that the distance between the boundary and any point of any class is the biggest it can 
possibly be—that is why it is called a maximum-margin classifier (Hamel, 2009). Once an 
SVM has been trained it can be used to classify new data which will be assigned either of the 
categories the SVM has been trained on, based on which side of the margin it falls on. 
The SVM analysis was implemented with scikit-learn, an open source toolkit developed for 
Python (Pedregosa et al., 2011). To compare two JOL response categories (e.g., 0% vs. 20% 
JOL), the justification responses for both were labeled and combined. We trained the 
classifier on a randomly selected half of the combined data with a linear kernel and a cost 
value of 0.10 and tested it on the other half. Once the classifier was trained, it was then used 
to classify the remaining half of the data, and its performance was evaluated by its ability to 
distinguish correctly what JOL a given text was written for.  The JOL confidence models 
described in the Introduction both speculate a divergence on the confidence scale with 
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regards to the processes that drive the judgment. A difference in processes relied upon (i.e. a 
qualitative difference) should lead to high classification accuracy whereas differences merely 
of degree (i.e. quantitative differences) should lead to low classification accuracy due to low 
likelihood of distinct, differentiating features. 
4.3 Results 
4.3.1 Memory and JOL responses 
In Experiment 5, participants correctly recognised 84.7% (SD = 11.6) targets on the final 
memory test. In Experiment 6 they correctly recognised 86.2% (SD = 12.2) of targets. 
Memory performance did not differ between the two experiments, t < 1. 
Since we did not manipulate anything, we did not expect accuracy to differ. Nevertheless, we 
report d’ and AUC for interest. In Experiment 1, average AUC for block 1 (M = .674, SD = 
.154) was the same as mean AUC in block 2 (M = .713, SD = .144), t(51) = 1.91, p = .062, d 
= .03. In Experiment 2, d’ in the first block (M = .717, SD = .487) was the same as d’ in the 
second block (M = .705, SD = .605), t < 1. See Figure 4.2 for the mean proportion of trials 
each JOL category was used and Table 4.1 for the number of written justifications collected 
per JOL category.  
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Figure 4.2: Mean percentage of trials in each JOL category by experiment. Error bars 
indicate standard error of the mean. 
 
 
Table	4.1: Number of justifications collected in each JOL category by experiment. 
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4.3.2 Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA) 
Metcalfe & Finn (2008b) proposed that the lowest point on the JOL confidence scale should 
reflect the result of a cue-evaluation stage whereas all other JOL levels should correspond to 
target access evaluations. We used LSA to evaluate whether for each JOL response type, 
participants were more likely to refer semantically to the cue or the target in their 
justifications (or neither). For each trial with a JOL justification, we computed an LSA value 
between the cue and the written justification and compared it against the LSA value 
computed between the target and the justification.  Because the written justifications refer to 
specific memories, one could expect that overall the semantic similarity scores would be 
fairly low. However, if participants refer specifically to the cue or the target term (or 
information relating to them) this would increase the score. Additionally, because LSA has 
been shown to successfully map meaning (Laham, 1997), this would be true even when 
participants did not directly refer to the cue or the target but, for example, reported partial 
semantic information about them.  We used paired-samples t-tests to compare the cue-
justification and target-justification LSA scores for each JOL response category (e.g., 0% 
JOL confidence) to analyse whether the JOL justifications were more likely to refer to the 
cue or the target term. The LSA scores range from 0 (no relationship) to 1 (high semantic 
relationship). This analysis was done for both Experiment 5 and 6 separately with the results 
reported in Table 4.2. 
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Table 4.2: Mean cue-justification and target-justification LSA scores in each JOL 
category by experiment. 
 
Exp. 
JOL  
category 
Cue  
LSA score 
Target  
LSA score 
 
t-value 
 
df 
 
p-value 
 
d 
5 0% .21 (.14) .17 (.12) 2.29 120 .024* 0.30 
 20% .20 (.13) .17 (.10) 2.42 143 .017* 0.27 
 40% .20 (.11) .19 (.11) 0.55 133 .581 0.07 
 60% .17 (.12) .19 (.13) 1.58 119 .118 0.19 
 80% .20 (.13) .21 (.14) 0.39 129 .700 0.05 
 100% .21 (.12) .24 (.14) 2.09 134 .039* 0.22 
6 No - Sure .08 (.12) .06 (.11) 1.14 98 .259 0.12 
 No - Maybe .08 (.12) .08 (.13) 0.38 171 .704 0.03 
 No - Guess .11 (.14) .08 (.13) 2.79 133 .006* 0.25 
 Yes - Guess .14 (.17) .09 (.13) 2.64 101 .010* 0.31 
 Yes - Maybe .10 (.13) .09 (.13) 1.03 192 .302 0.08 
 Yes - Sure .14 (.17) .16 (.19) 1.37 202 .172 0.11 
Note. (standard deviations appear in parentheses). Results of paired-samples t-tests comparing the cue 
and target LSA scores within each JOL category are reported. *s indicate significance at an alpha 
threshold of .05. 
 
The results of the LSA revealed that in Experiment 5, the 0% and 20% JOL confidence level 
justifications were more likely to semantically refer to the cue than the target. On the other 
hand, the 100% level was more likely to refer to the target than the cue. The pattern of results 
of Experiment 6 showed it was the guess responses (for both no and yes predictions) that 
were more likely to refer semantically to the cue rather than the target term. These results 
demonstrate that participants rely on both cue and target related information in justifying 
their JOLs and that these two types of processes provide a useful framework for 
100		
differentiating different types of JOL predictions. To understand more precisely whether the 
cue-references were the same or differed between the different JOL responses we turned to 
word-frequency analysis.   
4.3.3 Word-frequency analysis 
The next step in the analyses was the examination of unique phrases that differentiated one 
JOL response from all others. This allowed us to determine whether the cue references in 
JOL justifications were of the same character (e.g., expressing lack of cue familiarity) or 
whether they relied on the cue term differently (e.g., cue familiarity characterizing 20% 
whereas its absence characterizing 0% JOL). Further, whereas LSA only tracked semantic 
similarity, participants could express lack of cue familiarity without actually naming the cue 
itself (e.g., “This cue is not familiar”). Compared to LSA, n-gram analysis thus allowed us to 
capture these types of phrases and extract meaningful patterns of expression across trials that 
were significantly more likely to occur for one type of JOL response as compared to others. 
For example, we expected to see an increase in recollection-specific terminology with 
increases in JOL confidence as well as greater use of intensity modifiers indicating greater 
certainty of access.   
To constrain the number of n-grams analysed, we focused only on bi-grams and tri-grams 
with a minimum total occurrence of 10 (stricter than previous analyses which have included 
uni-grams and used lower median occurrences). We only reported tri-grams and bi-grams 
reaching significance at p < .05 (Table 4.3 reports n-gram analysis results for Experiment 5, 
Table 4.4 for Experiment 6). For each JOL, the analysis extracted phrases that occurred 
significantly more often than would be expected if the phrase was used equally across all JOL 
responses. Notably, this does not preclude the possibility that certain phrases might have 
significantly higher proportion of occurrence than 1/6 for two JOL category responses (e.g., if 
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they never occurred for any other response) and thus allows for extraction of similarities 
(e.g., are there certain phrases that characterize no predictions that are never employed in yes 
predictions) as well as the expected characterization of differences. 
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Table 4.3: n-gram analysis results for Experiment 5. 
JOL n-gram Count Total Proportion p 
0% not remember this 8 11 .73 <.001 
 remember seeing this 13 30 .43 <.001 
 remember what word 6 11 .55 <.001 
 do not remember 39 66 .59 <.001 
 seeing this word 13 31 .42 <.001 
 I do not 43 79 .54 <.001 
 remember this word 10 26 .38   .007 
 I cannot remember 17 45 .38 <.001 
 not remember seeing 25 32 .78 <.001 
 cannot remember what 9 19 .47 <.001 
 cannot remember word 5 11 .45   .025 
 do not 58 114 .51 <.001 
 not remember 42 73 .58 <.001 
 that word 6 16 .38 .038 
 have no 7 11 .64 <.001 
 this word 31 99 .31 <.001 
 word at 6 10 0.6 .002 
 I do 43 81 .53 <.001 
 seeing this 14 33 .42 <.001 
 at all 18 23 .78 <.001 
 remember seeing 35 105 .33 <.001 
 cannot remember 34 88 .39 <.001 
 I cannot 22 78 .28 .009 
20% seeing word but 7 10 .70 <.001 
 be able to 12 37 .32    .024 
 do not think 8 14 .57 <.001 
 not think I 7 13 .54 <.001 
 vaguely remember seeing 8 10 .80 <.001 
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 but I cannot 6 14 .43    .019 
 but cannot remember 7 17 .41    .015 
 I am not 11 30 .37    .011 
 do not really 7 10 .70 <.001 
 what it was 7 17 .41    .015 
 remember seeing word 14 42 .33    .011 
 do not remember 18 66 .27 .030 
 I do not 26 79 .33 <.001 
 I cannot remember 14 45 .31 .015 
 I remember seeing 13 39 .44 .009 
 what it 9 23 .39 .009 
 not confident 6 12 0.5 .008 
 be able 12 37 .32 .024 
 not really 8 11 .73 <.001 
 not think 9 15 .60 <.001 
 am not 11 33 .33 .017 
 I cannot 24 78 .31 <.001 
 word so 5 11 .45 .024 
 really remember 10 15 .67 <.001 
 seeing word 17 48 .35 .001 
 vaguely remember 11 14 .79 <.001 
 able to 12 39 .31 .029 
 might be 6 10 .60 .002 
 with it 6 15 .40 .027 
 I do 26 81 .32 <.001 
 do not 39 114 .34 <.001 
 not remember 20 73 .27 .018 
 cannot remember 24 88 .27 .014 
 remember seeing 34 105 .32 <.001 
40% think I remember 6 16 .38 .038 
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 word but cannot 7 11 .64 <.001 
 word but I 7 13 .54 <.001 
 if I saw 7 14 .50 <.001 
 I remember seeing 17 39 .44 <.001 
 think I could 6 13 .46 .013 
 remember word but 5 11 .45 .025 
 I think I 15 52 .29 .025 
 word and 9 29 .31 .046 
 word it 5 12 .42 .036 
 word I 7 18 .39 .021 
 second word 8 22 .36 .021 
 to recognise 7 18 .39 .021 
 I could 20 63 .32 .003 
 but I 20 71 .28 .016 
 if I 13 29 .45 <.001 
 word but 25 58 .43 <.001 
 I may 8 19 .42 .008 
 but cannot 12 29 .41 .001 
 cannot recall 8 19 .42 .008 
 I think 27 85 .32 <.001 
 recognise it 10 28 .36 .018 
 think I 26 82 .32 <.001 
 I remember 41 176 .23 .026 
 remember seeing 26 105 .25 .035 
60% but I am 7 18 .39 .021 
 I think I 21 52 .40 <.001 
 remember making 7 13 .54 <.001 
 could recognise 5 10 .50 .015 
 I might 6 16 .38 .038 
 I feel 13 35 .37 <.001 
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 and I 9 20 .45 <.001 
 I am 19 71 .27 .037 
 think I 27 82 .33 <.001 
 feel I 6 13 .46 .013 
 I can 13 45 .29 .042 
 pair word 8 15 .53 <.001 
  it but 6 15 .40 .027 
80% I remember word 10 28 .36 .018 
 I am pretty 9 14 .64 <.001 
 in my head 7 16 .44 .010 
 one of 5 11 .45 .025 
 am pretty 9 14 .64 <.001 
 pretty sure 5 10 .50 .015 
 it was 19 70 .27 .024 
 I remember 43 176 .24 .008 
 in my 10 31 .32 .028 
 I associated 6 14 .43 .019 
  my head 7 19 .37 .028 
100% I can remember 11 26 .42 <.001 
 link between 8 18 .44 .005 
 as I 7 19 .37 .028 
 thought of 5 10 .50 .015 
 it is 9 25 .36 .026 
 can remember 12 31 .39 <.001 
  I can 14 45 .31 .015 
 I made 10 27 .37 .009 
Note. A count of occurrences of each n-gram in justifications for the corresponding JOL category are 
reported along with total number of occurrences, proportion of occurrence and p-value computed 
using the binomial test. 
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The n-gram analysis results presented in Table 4.3 show the 0% JOL confidence level was 
characterized by an inability to remember (“do not remember”) and could be interpreted as 
expressing lack of cue familiarity as participants indicated they cannot even remember having 
seen the presented word at study  (“not remember seeing”). The 20% JOL confidence level 
on the other hand was characterized by a vague sense of cue familiarity (“vaguely remember 
seeing [word]”) accompanied by a lack of recollection for the target term (“but cannot 
remember”… “what it was”). While the LSA results revealed that the 0% and 20% JOL 
confidence levels were more likely to refer to the cue than the target term semantically, the n-
gram analysis showed they nevertheless differed from each other in whether the cue term was 
said to be remembered. The 40% JOL also referenced cue familiarity suggesting the role of 
the cue in JOLs is not isolated to lowest confidence responses when it is not familiar but can 
in itself provide a degree of evidence when the target cannot be accessed. Indeed, 
justifications for the 40% and 60% JOL confidence levels expressed feelings of possible 
target access (“I think I could recognise but cannot recall”) whereas the 80% JOL confidence 
level started bringing in language of certainty (“pretty sure”) and memory for associations (“I 
associated”). Unsurprisingly, the 100% JOL expressed memory for the target term (“I can 
remember”). All in all, this pattern of descriptions fits with Metcalfe and Finn’s (2008b) 
suggestions that a lack of cue familiarity leads to a 0% JOL confidence response whereas, 
when the cue is recognized, the JOL confidence increases with increase in target access. The 
results further demonstrated that the role of the cue does not stop after that initial stage and is 
carried as evidence through to the target access stage. 
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Table 4.4: n-gram analysis results for Experiment 6. 
JOL n-gram Count Total Proportion p 
No-Sure do not remember 28 78 .36 <.001 
 I do not 37 93 .40 <.001 
 remember this word 11 31 .35 .012 
 cannot remember seeing 7 12 .58 <.001 
 not remember this 9 12 .75 <.001 
 word at all 10 21 .48 <.001 
 not remember seeing 12 32 .38 <.001 
 do not even 11 12 .92 <.001 
 not even remember 11 11 1.00 <.001 
 do not 53 137 .39 <.001 
 this word 32 120 .27 .007 
 not remember 33 89 .37 <.001 
 even remember 11 11 1 <.001 
 not recognise 5 11 .45 .025 
 I do 37 99 .37 <.001 
 have no 5 12 .42 .036 
 no idea 6 11 .55 .004 
 word at 10 25 .4 .005 
 not even 11 13 .85 <.001 
 at all 16 34 .47 <.001 
 remember seeing 24 90 .27 .016 
No-Maybe able to recognise 6 13 .46 .013 
might be able 8 15 .53 <.001 
not sure if 5 11 .45 .025 
be able to 23 66 .35 <.001 
I cannot remember 23 78 .29 .005 
that I would 5 10 .50 .015 
am not sure 7 20 .35 .037 
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if I saw 6 13 .46 .013 
I might be 7 15 .47 .007 
I would recognise 7 20 .35 .037 
may be able 7 11 .64 <.001 
do not remember 20 78 .32 <.001 
I would remember 7 10 .70 <.001 
cannot remember what 8 19 .42 .008 
cannot remember 41 144 .28 <.001 
word but I 9 28 .32 .039 
 I saw 9 27 .33 .034 
 associated with 8 24 .33 .048 
 of two 6 14 .43 .019 
 now but 5 10 .50 .015 
 not sure 18 61 .30 .014 
 be able 23 66 .35 <.001 
 would remember 7 10 .70 <.001 
 to recognise 6 15 .40 .027 
 recognise it 13 37 .35 .006 
 to pair 5 11 .45 .025 
 what word 9 23 .39 .009 
 would be 11 34 .32 .021 
 for this 6 14 .43 .019 
 I feel 10 24 .42 .003 
 sure if 5 11 .45 .025 
 to me 8 12 .67 <.001 
 I cannot 26 103 .25 .024 
 if I 29 49 .59 <.001 
 it if 7 13 .54 .002 
 to mind 6 14 .43 .019 
 I may 13 21 .62 <.001 
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 would recognise 8 21 .38 .016 
 remember it 14 49 .29 .034 
 I would 27 74 .36 <.001 
 I might 14 41 .34 .006 
 may be 8 18 .44 .005 
 able to 23 67 .34 <.001 
 it but 10 22 .45 .002 
 remember what 12 34 .35 .009 
 might be 10 27 .37 .009 
 not remember 22 89 .25 .047 
 but I 26 92 .28 .005 
 word but 19 72 .26 .038 
No-Guess to guess 6 16 .38 .038 
word so 9 24 .38 .012 
do not remember 25 78 .32 <.001 
I do not 27 93 .29 .046 
seeing word 15 48 .31 .011 
be guess 9 14 .64 <.001 
cannot remember 41 144 .28 <.001 
 not remember 29 89 .33 <.001 
 I do 28 99 .28 .004 
 at all 11 34 .32 .021 
Yes-Guess think I would 10 21 .48 <.001 
I think I 16 47 .34 .005 
but I cannot 9 25 .36 .026 
I recall 5 10 .50 .015 
but cannot 12 36 .33 .013 
 think I 21 77 .27 .020 
 but I 23 92 .25 .036 
 I think 25 88 .28 .006 
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Yes-Maybe think I remember 7 13 .54 <.001 
I think it 7 13 .54 <.001 
when I see 14 23 .61 <.001 
think I will 6 13 .46 .013 
 
 
not hundred percent 10 15 .67 <.001 
I see it 14 17 .82 <.001 
presented with it 6 10 .60 <.001 
hundred percent sure 9 13 .69 <.001 
would recognise it 5 11 .45 .025 
word but I 10 28 .36 .018 
I am not 13 41 .32 .018 
to do with 11 19 .58 <.001 
I remember seeing 12 35 .34 .010 
 remember other word 7 16 .44 .010 
 but not sure 7 15 .47 .006 
 word but not 9 18 .50 <.001 
 something to do 11 16 .69 <.001 
 but I am 9 27 .33 .034 
 I think I 17 47 .36 <.001 
 I would recognise 7 20 .35 .037 
 I can remember 12 33 .36 .008 
 second word 8 22 .36 .021 
 word and 15 37 .41 <.001 
 I know 9 18 .50 .001 
 see it 14 18 .78 <.001 
 tried to 8 10 .80 <.001 
 I will 21 73 .29 .011 
 percent sure 9 13 .69 <.001 
 I see 18 34 .53 <.001 
 exact word 5 11 .45 .025 
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 presented with 10 26 .38 .007 
 when I 15 35 .43 <.001 
 other word 15 46 .33 <.001 
 think I 28 77 .36 <.001 
 word that 8 22 .36 .021 
 but I 29 92 .32 <.001 
 and think 9 10 .90 <.001 
 it when 6 13 .46 .013 
 word when 7 13 .54 .002 
 something to 11 17 .65 <.001 
 word but 23 72 .32 .001 
 it was 18 64 .28 .019 
 but not 20 40 .50 <.001 
 to do 11 19 .58 <.001 
 word was 8 23 .35 .042 
 remember other 7 16 .44 .010 
 am not 16 47 .34 .005 
 it I 5 10 .50 .015 
 not hundred 10 15 .67 <.001 
 I think 35 88 .40 <.001 
 hundred percent 12 18 .67 <.001 
 it is 17 51 .33 .004 
 do with 11 19 .58 <.001 
 words I 6 15 .40 .027 
 will recognise 7 14 .50 .004 
 think it 8 15 .53 .002 
 with it 13 32 .41 .001 
 I remember 41 139 .29 <.001 
 not sure 18 61 .30 .014 
 recognise it 13 37 .35 .006 
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 I feel 10 24 .42 .003 
 it but 9 22 .41 .006 
Yes-Sure I remember this 7 16 .44 .010 
 so I am 5 12 .42 .036 
 I remember word 10 24 .42 <.001 
 I thought of 5 10 .50 .015 
 I can remember 12 33 .36 .008 
 in my head 13 20 .65 <.001 
 which is 5 10 .50 .015 
 because I 14 31 .45 <.001 
 words together 7 15 .47 .007 
 my head 13 27 .48 <.001 
 two words 15 38 .39 <.001 
 I remembered 14 20 .70 <.001 
 word association 5 10 .50 .015 
 remember this 15 56 .27 .049 
 I had 6 15 .40 .027 
 remember word 18 68 .26 .049 
 remember that 8 16 .50 .002 
 I remember 43 139 .31 <.001 
 I imagined 6 10 .60 .002 
 I thought 9 26 .35 .029 
 association between 7 13 .54 .002 
 thought of 8 13 .62 <.001 
 in my 23 55 .42 <.001 
 this is 6 14 .43 .019 
 can remember 16 40 .40 <.001 
 I can 24 50 .48 <.001 
 this pair 5 11 .45 .025 
 word in 5 10 .50 .015 
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 I made 11 24 .46 <.001 
Note. A count of occurrences of each n-gram in justifications for the corresponding JOL category are 
reported along with total number of occurrences, proportion of occurrence and p-value computed 
using the binomial test. 
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As seen in Table 4.4, the types of descriptions for the highest confidence no and yes 
responses correspond to 0% (e.g., “do not remember”) and 100% (e.g., “I can remember”) 
responses of Experiment 5. It is noteworthy that the high confidence JOLs and yes JOL 
predictions refer to not just the target, but also memory for the “word association” or “link 
between” the items. This supports recent findings that memory for associations made 
between the cue and the target at study influences metacognitive confidence (Hertzog et al., 
2014) and demonstrates that this is true even when participants are not instructed to use any 
specific memory techniques in learning the cue-target pairs. 
The guess responses (for both yes and no JOL predictions), were fairly low on unique n-gram 
use compared to the other JOLs. The LSA results revealed that participants were more likely 
to reference the cue than the target for these responses but the n-gram results are not clear as 
to which way this was. However, the tri-gram “not remember seeing” occurred 10 times in 
justifications for the no-guess responses (as compared to 12 occurrences for no – sure and 9 
occurrences for no – maybe). While this proportion of occurrence for no – guess justifications 
was only marginal (p = .052), altogether, these results show that references to lack of cue 
familiarity were reserved for no JOL predictions. Consequently, it seems likely that if there is 
a distinction between yes and no predictions, it is in whether the cue feels familiar or not. 
Nevertheless, the results indicate a less clearly defined distinction between yes and no 
responses than some (e.g., Dunlosky et al., 2005) would predict. Guess predictions (which 
here capture low magnitude SOJs) might just be what the term suggests—instances where 
participants do not feel strongly predisposed toward a yes or a no prediction and rather the 
evidence available to them (or its lack) makes them uncertain about the future retrieval status 
of the items they are evaluating. If anything, this highlights the usefulness of allowing 
participants to express uncertainty. If one were to interpret the character of the yes/no 
distinction, it is the closest to the differentiation between 0 and 20% JOL.  
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Lastly, some phrases were almost equally likely for all of the no predictions. Namely “I do 
not”, “do not remember”, “cannot remember” and “not remember seeing”. This indicates that 
participants were less clear on how to differentiate the three no response types from each 
other and were inclined towards using similar responses across all three confidence levels 
associated with no predictions. Together with the results from Experiment 5, these results 
suggest that if there is an underlying yes/no distinction in the JOL confidence scale, it is 
likely located at the low-ends of a numeric scale, with the majority of the scale above this 
point consistent with use of yes predictions. This is consistent with framing effects which 
suggest that participants primarily accrue evidence toward a yes prediction as indicated by 
their judgments being swayed by whether the question is phrased in terms of forgetting or 
remembering (Finn, 2008; Koriat, Bjork, Sheffer, & Bar, 2004; Serra & England, 2012).   
4.3.4 Support Vector Machine (SVM) analysis 
Our final analysis was to evaluate the extent to which the written justifications for any two 
JOL response types were quantifiably distinct.  Within each experiment, we trained SVM 
classifiers to compare each JOL category against all other JOL categories. If two JOL 
categories were justified by referring to different types of evidence, then classification 
accuracy for distinguishing the two categories would be good. The results are reported in 
Table 4.5, which presents overall SVM classifier performance for all JOL categories 
expressed as percentage of examples classified correctly.  
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Table 4.5: Bivariate SVM classification accuracy results by experiment. 
Experiment 5 50-60 
 
20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 
 
60-70 
0% 75.9 81.7 86.3 93.1 94.7 
 
70-80 
20%   57.9 73.7 79.9 84.5 
 
80-90 
40% 
 
  59.1 69.9 80.2 
 
90-100 
60% 
  
  60.3 69.0 
  80% 
   
  53.3 
        
Experiment 6        
 
No-
Maybe 
No-
Guess 
Yes-
Guess 
Yes-
Maybe 
Yes-
Sure   
No-Sure 76.4 64.2 85.3 91.3 92.2   
No-Maybe   62.7 65.7 71.1 91.2   
No-Guess    67.5 80.2 90.1   
Yes-Guess     62.4 86.4   
Yes-Maybe      84.6   
 
Note. The results express percentage of test cases classified accurately and reflect the degree to which 
two JOL categories could be said to differ in how they were justified. 
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Examining all adjacent JOL confidence levels, Experiment 5 revealed that the 0% and 20% 
JOLs were classified with the highest degree of accuracy (this performance was significantly 
different from the classification performance in the next i.e. 20% vs 40% comparison; X2 = 
9.13, p = .003). This would agree with the proposal that if there is a divergence in processes 
relied on in making the confidence judgments, it is located between the lowest two points on 
the scale. All other JOL confidence levels would appear to be graded variations of a similar 
process (the highest classification accuracy between these of 60.3% was not significantly 
different from chance performance of 50%; X2 = 2.31, p = .129). 
In Experiment 6, the highest adjacent classification accuracy was between yes-maybe and 
yes-sure predictions, which was significantly higher than the classification accuracy between 
the yes and no prediction boundary (i.e. the guess responses); X2 = 11.84, p < .001. This is 
consistent with the n-gram results which showed there were very few distinct features (bi-
grams and tri-grams) characterizing the guess responses but contrary to the prediction that 
yes vs. no predictions should be highly classifiable (Dunlosky et al., 2005). 
Overall, the highest confidence yes prediction was well classified in contrast to all other 
responses (Experiment 6) whereas the 100% responses’ classification compared to other high 
JOL confidence responses (60% and 80% JOL) approached chance performance (50%; 
Experiment 5). If participants treated most (if not all) of the JOL confidence scale as 
accumulation of evidence toward a yes prediction then it follows that the JOL confidence 
levels were more clearly defined when there were fewer options provided for a positive 
prediction. This is in line with other research (e.g., Finn, 2008; Koriat, Bjork, Sheffer, & Bar, 
2004) which has shown that participants need to be asked to predict their own forgetting to 
treat the confidence scale as also expressing the degree to which they might forget (i.e. a no 
prediction) as compared to only the degree to which they might remember (or what we would 
classify as a yes prediction).  
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In contrast, the no responses of Experiment 6 were less clearly demarcated (as compared to 
the yes predictions). As we saw from the n-gram analysis, there was a great deal of overlap 
between the n-grams participants used as a way of classifying their no predictions. Overall, it 
seems that in a paradigm where participants aim to predict their remembering, they struggle 
to differentiate between different levels of not remembering (or forgetting). This is again 
consistent with the idea that participants would primarily focus on the familiarity of the cue 
as a way of rejecting future target memory. Cue familiarity is a less varied type of signal than 
the more heterogeneous nature of different levels and types of target access that would be 
thought to characterize the unique yes JOL predictions.  
 Most relevant in regards to the current study, the classification pattern for the two response 
formats is clearly different. This suggests that while there is a distinction in the types of 
processes driving the JOL confidence responses, it might be troublesome trying to assign 
them a discrete no vs yes prediction status. Rather, the two response formats might encourage 
related but nevertheless different modes of evaluation.  
4.4 Discussion 
Within any metacognitive paradigm, aspects of the task are manipulated so that specific 
information is made salient to participants; in metamemory tasks this is usually through 
encoding or retrieval instructions. The question that arises is whether the information that is 
shown to influence metacognitive judgments in such paradigms remains relevant in other 
contexts (see for example Hertzog et al., 2014). This study asked: what information do 
participants consider relevant to their JOLs in the absence of any such manipulation and how 
does this information map onto theory? More specifically, we investigated spontaneous 
written justifications for numeric confidence and binary (yes/no) JOL predictions. 
Participants completed a standard JOL task and on some trials were asked to justify their 
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predictions, which were subsequently analysed using a range of natural language processing 
techniques. The results showed that (i) participants could justify their metacognitive 
judgments, (ii) confidence JOL justifications mapped broadly onto current theory as they 
referenced both cue and target related information, (iii) confidence JOLs had different 
characteristics to binary JOLs.  
Overall, participants were able to justify their JOLs and did so with reference to both cue- 
and target-related information as well as with reference to associations they made between 
them. This was even though we did not manipulate these factors nor did we instruct 
participants in any way as to how they should learn the items and what information they 
should focus on when making their JOLs. The results thus complement studies which have 
shown that emphasis on cue, target and associative information shifts metacognitive 
confidence (Benjamin, 2005; Hertzog et al., 2014; Metcalfe & Finn, 2008b) and support the 
heuristics view of metacognitive judgments as based on evidence accumulation processes 
(Brewer, Marsh, Clark-Foos, & Meeks, 2010; Koriat, 2000).  
The results of confidence JOLs were consistent with the predictions of Metcalfe and Finn 
(2008b). The 0% and 20% JOL responses were the most divergent of any adjacent JOL 
confidence levels as indicated by highest classification accuracy. The content analyses 
supported the idea that, whereas the 0% JOLs corresponded to a lack of cue familiarity, the 
20% JOLs were given to items whose cue was familiar but whose target was not accessible. 
All other JOL confidence levels reflected an increase in target accessibility. We therefore 
provide support for an account of JOL confidence as resulting from a two-stage evaluation, 
with interrogation of different evidence characterizing each stage. 
The results of Experiment 6 suggested that participants referred to the cue to distinguish 
between a no and some degree of a yes response as well as to characterize high confidence no 
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responses from all other responses. This would map onto the differences between 0% and 
20%, suggesting that if there is an underlying yes/no distinction in the JOL confidence scale, 
it is a differentiation of the lowest confidence responses only. Consistent with this, there is 
also an indication that participants struggled to distinguish three different levels of no 
confidence predictions from each other, at least when framed in terms of remembering. The 
degrees of yes predictions were more clearly demarcated from each other. However, the 
overarching distinction between yes and no predictions was less clear-cut than predicted (e.g., 
Dunlosky et al., 2005) and it remains questionable whether yes vs. no responding reflects 
how participants approach the JOL confidence scale.  
At the very least, it is clear that analogous points on the two 6-point scales were not 
equivalent—we cannot treat the numerical JOL confidence scale as evenly split into yes and 
no responses. Across the two question formats, both ends of the scale corresponded, i.e. a 0% 
JOL was equivalent to a high confidence no and a 100% JOL was equivalent to a high 
confidence yes. It is unsurprising that our understanding of the extremes of the scale might be 
correct. However these extremes differed in how they related to the mid-range responses and 
this is where we observed the most differences. The overall different pattern of JOL 
justifications across the two response formats highlights that participants do not use all points 
of the two scales in the same ways.   
This lack of equivalence is worth highlighting, especially as there is an underlying 
assumption in much metacognitive research that confidence judgments are probabilistic. It is 
common, for example, to interpret 0%, 20% and 40% as no predictions. This is seen 
particularly in assessments of metacognitive accuracy in terms of calibration; an assessment 
of whether metacognitive judgments correspond exactly to performance (perfect calibration 
would be for items given 60% JOLs were recognized at a rate of 60% in subsequent memory 
tests etc.). Considerable research has gone into understanding what drives poor calibration 
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which is observed across domains (see for example Finn & Metcalfe, 2007; Gigerenzer, 
Hoffrage, & Kleinbolting, 1991; Koriat, Lichtenstein, & Fischhoff, 1980; Koriat, Ma’ayan, 
Sheffer, & Bjork, 2006; Kornell & Bjork, 2009). However, recently Hanczakowski et al. 
(2013; see also Zawadzka & Higham, 2015) showed that the common observation that 
participants tend to display underconfidence in terms of calibration (i.e. lower average 
confidence JOL than overall memory performance) is not observed with a yes/no response 
format and when the proportion of yes responses is used to assess calibration. Hanczakowski 
et al. interpreted this as indicating that participants are not truly underconfident as has been 
previously assumed and that the results could rather be explained as driven by 
misunderstanding of how participants treat the JOL confidence scale. This finding is 
consistent with the suggestion from the current study that participants are treating most of the 
JOL confidence scale as a yes prediction.  
This further relates to findings that question format influences how participants respond in 
both metacognitive (Finn, 2008; Serra & England, 2012) and recognition memory tasks (Mill 
& O’Connor, 2014). For example, participants anchored their JOLs lower on the JOL 
confidence scale when judging future remembering as compared to forgetting (Serra & 
England, 2012). Similarly, recognition judgments for whether an item has been studied or is 
seen for the first time have been shown to be influenced by whether the question is termed in 
terms of judging ‘oldness’ or ‘novelty’ (Mill & O’Connor, 2014). More specifically, 
participants shifted their response bias to more likely disconfirm the question asked (more 
likely to respond ‘new’ when asked ‘old?’). This study adds to a newly growing literature 
demonstrating that, in addition to question format, response format also influences participant 
responding in metacognitive tasks (Jersakova, Moulin, & O’Connor, 2016; Overgaard & 
Sandberg, 2012). Taken together, these studies demonstrate that consideration of the methods 
used to assess a cognitive or a metacognitive phenomenon is of theoretical importance, with 
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direct consequences for the inferences we draw from our data. In processes that are 
characterized as evidence evaluation, it is remarkable that the question and response format 
can influence what type of evidence participants consider and how they interpret it. Such 
findings help to further elaborate on the evidence evaluation processes that underlie 
participant responses in cognitive tasks.  
A further question of interest is how the present results might be of relevance to other 
metamemory and metacognitive tasks. A self-apparent comparison is to the immediate JOL 
paradigm, in which participants render judgment immediately after study, with both the cue 
and the target present. Immediate JOLs have been demonstrated to differ from delayed JOLs 
and to rely on different types of evidence (Koriat & Bjork, 2006; Rhodes & Tauber, 2011). 
More specifically, whereas delayed JOLs require an evaluation of access to information in 
long-term memory, immediate JOLs rely primarily on information held in short-term 
memory.  Consequently, one would expect to observe different patterns of responses and 
distinct content in justifications for immediate as compared to delayed JOLs; for example, 
participants do not need to attempt to retrieve the target which is present in immediate JOLs 
and they might instead focus on the level of association between the cue and the target 
(Koriat & Bjork, 2005).  
The expectation isn’t that the extension of the present paradigm to other metacognitive tasks 
would produce exactly the same results. Based on the current findings, our prediction would 
be that participants would be able to produce justifications for their immediate JOLs (and 
other metacognitive judgments) and that these would reference pertinent, task specific 
information (e.g. the relationship between the cue and the target). A similar paradigm 
employed in other types of metacognitive tasks is likely to confirm that they can collectively 
be considered evidence aggregation and evaluation processes. Conversely, it would be of 
interest to investigate which types of influences participants might not be aware of through 
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failing to account for them in their justifications. Equally, it is possible that under particular 
circumstances the confidence scale can be interpreted as equally split into binary yes/no 
responses even though it does not seem to be the case with delayed JOLs. The key message 
of this chapter is that this should not be assumed before it is confirmed for the given 
experimental context under which the particular metacognitive paradigm is being 
investigated. 
In summary, we provide evidence for metacognitive confidence judgements as resulting from 
evaluative processes that weigh the degree of evidence toward the decision framed by the 
response-eliciting question (in this case, ‘will this item be remembered?’). The present study 
demonstrates that participants have at least a degree of access into this process and can justify 
the JOLs they are making. What is more, they do so with reference to processes observed to 
influence JOL magnitude in the literature, primarily memory related signals relating to the 
cue (how familiar it is) and the target (how about associated information can be accessed). 
Importantly, the results demonstrate that widely used numeric confidence JOLs are unlikely 
to have an underlying, direct yes/no mapping. At the very least, this distinction is unlikely to 
be couched in probabilistic terms (e.g., 40% interpreted as a rejection of future retrieval). 
This finding should guide future interpretations of metacognitive confidence judgments and 
encourage researchers to avoid making unwarranted assumptions about what participants’ 
confidence judgments represent. The particular anchoring of the confidence scale is likely to 
shift between tasks and participants, and the distance between the points on the scale (in 
terms of the strength of evidence they refer to) is also subject to shifts (Zawadzka & Higham, 
2016). Further, these results highlight the need for confirming results across response 
formats. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE COMPARATIVE AND RELATIVE NATURE OF 
DELAYED JOLs 
5.1 Introduction 
In his cue-utilization framework, Koriat (1997) suggested that there are a number of cues 
(intrinsic, extrinsic and mnemonic) that influence JOLs (see section 1.3.3 of the Introduction 
for more detail). Briefly, intrinsic cues refer to characteristics of the studied items (e.g., level 
of relatedness between the cue and the target), extrinsic cues refer to the entire learning 
situation (e.g., time given to study each item), and mnemonic cues refer to internal and 
subjective experiences (e.g., feeling of knowing the sought after target information). All the 
preceding chapters have examined the role of stimulus specific (mnemonic) cues (e.g., cue 
familiarity) in delayed JOLs. In contrast, this chapter looks at the effects of extrinsic, theory-
based influences. In keeping with the central theme of this thesis, we examined whether 
delayed JOLs are sensitive to the memory test they are predicting (recognition as compared to 
recall). The major focus of this chapter is on whether this is dependent on the test and 
response format employed.  
One of the oldest and most reliable findings in memory research is that recognition memory 
is superior to recall (MacDougall, 1904). Although there are exceptions to this rule when one 
considers extralist or nonlist cues (i.e. not directly studied but related items), in a standard 
cue-target learning paradigm where participants are presented with the studied cues at test 
and either asked to recall the target or to choose it from a list of options, participants perform 
better in the latter task (Tulving & Thomson, 1973). Consistent with this, past research has 
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shown that participants are sensitive to memory test format (i.e. recognition/recall) when 
making delayed JOLs if the memory test predicted is manipulated on a trial-level, in a within 
subject design or if they have past experience with the memory test format (e.g., multiple 
study-JOL-test cycles; Mazzoni & Cornoldi, 1993; Thiede, 1996). This could seem to suggest 
that participants are sensitive to theories about memory when making delayed JOLs. 
However, it is also possible that the results are specific to the experimental design employed. 
The immediate JOL literature provides a good illustration of this idea. It has been 
demonstrated that immediate JOLs are also sensitive to extrinsic, theory based influences but 
only when these are made salient to participants i.e. in trial-level as compared to blocked 
designs (Koriat, Bjork, Sheffer, & Bar, 2004; Kornell & Bjork, 2009). For example, when 
participants were asked to predict their ability to remember recently learned information in 
two weeks time as compared to the following day or the following year, participants only 
changed their JOLs with retention interval when the test delay predicted changed on a trial 
level as compared to a blocked or between subject design (i.e. participants would on each 
trial predict retention for a different test delay rather than only one delay throughout the 
entire task). This was even though they clearly believed that forgetting increases over time 
when asked independently of the task. This has been termed the stability bias and interpreted 
as indicating that participants assume their memories remain relatively stable over time when 
making online, trial-level judgments (Koriat et al., 2004; Kornell & Bjork, 2009).  
Alternatively, this is consistent with Koriat’s (1997) observation that immediate JOLs are 
comparative in nature. More specifically, if the study list is composed of different sets of 
items (e.g., related as compared to unrelated pairs of words), participants will use this 
contrast between the items when constructing their JOLs (Castel et al., 2007; Tiede & Leboe, 
2009). Similarly, metacognitive	illusions,	such	as	JOLs	changing	with	perceptual	fluency	
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This further relates to recent findings that confidence judgments given in immediate JOLs are 
relative in nature rather than absolute (Hanczakowski et al., 2013; Zawadzka & Higham, 
2015). As mentioned previously, these studies argued that participants do not use confidence 
in probabilistic terms and do not attempt to ascertain the probability of future retrieval or the 
percentage of items they will retrieve. Instead, participants may use confidence to rank the 
items against each other with high confidence corresponding to items most likely to be 
retrieved on the subsequent memory test in comparison to other items on the list. As such 
confidence judgments on any given trial are made in relation to other judgments made and 
stimuli encountered on the same task (see Rahnev et al., 2015 for similar arguments about 
perceptual metacognitive judgments). It is likely that these findings are not particular to 
immediate JOLs. 
We wanted to explore whether delayed JOLs could also be characterized as comparative and 
relative. We did this in the context of exploring whether participants are sensitive to the 
memory test they are predicting by investigating whether test format modulates this effect. If 
participants were sensitive to the memory test (recognition vs. recall) they were predicting 
irrespective of the test format employed (trial-level vs. blocked), one could conclude that 
delayed JOLs are actually sensitive to theory-based (explicit) influences. If this effect were to 
be modulated by test format, this would indicate that delayed JOLs are instead comparative 
and relative in nature. As such, across two experiments, we manipulated whether participants 
predicted future recognition or recall and whether they made both predictions in an 
intermixed, trial-level design (Experiment 7a) or in a blocked design (Experiment 7b). 
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Another variable of interest was whether results would generalize across confidence and 
binary JOL responding. Chapter 4 demonstrated that the two response formats do not 
necessarily map directly onto each other. This adds to a growing literature that highlights the 
need to confirm patterns of results across multiple judgment response formats (Hanczakowski 
et al., 2013; Jersakova et al., 2016). This is to ensure that the observed results are not simply 
driven by the response format employed. In this chapter we turn to the direct, within-subject 
comparison of confidence and binary JOLs and the implications this has for study of delayed 
JOLs.  
In summary, we manipulated (a) whether participants predicted recognition or recall with half 
of trials assigned to each memory prediction, (b) whether these predictions were made side-
by-side in a mixed design or whether they were blocked with only one prediction made at a 
time and (c) whether participants gave confidence or binary JOLs (again, one judgment 
response format employed for half the trials). Whereas (a) and (c) were manipulated within 
subject in a 2x2 design, (b) was manipulated between subject across the two experiments. We 
examined whether participants would change their JOLs according to whether they were 
predicting future recognition or recall, whether this would be dependent on the design and 
whether the results would generalize across JOL response formats. Altogether, this allowed 
us to explore whether (i) delayed JOLs are relative in nature and (ii) how confidence and 
binary JOLs compare. We expected that participants would perform significantly better on 
the recognition as compared to the recall task. Based on results from the immediate JOL 
literature (e.g., Susser et al., 2013), we anticipated that participants would only be sensitive to 
this difference in the memory test performance they were predicting in the trial-level design. 
Similarly, due to other findings in the immediate JOL literature (Hanczakowski et al., 2013), 
we also expected to see differences in calibration and overall JOL responding between the 
different JOL response formats but not in resolution accuracy.  
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5.2 Method 
5.2.1 Participants  
All participants were native English speakers affiliated with the University of Leeds (students 
and staff) with 25 participants (4 men, mean age = 23.0, SD = 5.6) in Experiment 7a and 26 
participants (7 men, mean age = 26.3, SD = 9.6) in Experiment 7b. Participants either took 
part for course credit or were reimbursed £3 for taking part. They were only allowed to 
participate in one of the experiments. The study was granted ethical approval by the School 
of Psychology, University of Leeds ethics review board. 
5.2.2 Materials  
For each participant, the studied items were randomly selected from a list of 628 common, 
singular English nouns (5-6 letters long) taken from the English Lexicon Project (minimum 
log Hyperspace Analogue to Language frequency 8.02; Balota et al., 2007). Each participant 
was exposed to a unique set of 60 cue-target word-pairs (e.g., truth-eagle). 
5.2.3 Procedure 
Across two experiments, we used a Judgment format (binary, scale) x Memory test predicted 
(recognition, recall) within subjects design. This means that all participants completed all 
conditions. The difference between Experiment 7a and Experiment 7b was in how the 
Memory test manipulation was employed (in a trial-level vs. blocked design). See Figure 5.1 
for a schematic of the procedure in Experiment 7a. 
Participants were not informed at the beginning of the study as to how their memory will be 
tested, rather, they were only told to memorize the pairs. A deviation from previous chapters 
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was an introduction of study instructions, making sure participants deeply encoded all pairs. 
Due to the experimental design we needed to expand the number of cue-target pairs but the 
core questions of this chapter prevented us from using multiple study-test cycles as was done 
in previous chapters. This was because experience with the test-format would influence 
participant responses on subsequent cycles (see Thiede, 1996). To ensure that participants 
were not performing at floor in recall, participants were instructed to use the most effective 
associative learning strategy: mental imagery (Bower, 1970; Bower & Winzenz, 1970).  
The general procedure was the same as in previous chapters with subsequent Study, 
Judgment and Memory Test Phases (see Figure 5.1). In the Study Phase, participants first 
learned 60 individually presented cue-target word pairs. They were instructed to use mental 
imagery to remember each pair. This was followed by a Judgment-of-Learning (JOL) Phase 
where, on presentation of each studied cue participants were asked to predict whether (i) they 
will recognize the associated target or (ii) whether they will recall it. For half of the trials 
participants made a binary (yes/no) prediction whereas on the other half of the trials 
participants gave a confidence judgment (0-20-40-60-80-100%) by pressing on the 
corresponding key. The last part of the experiment was a memory test where, on presentation 
of each cue, participants were asked to (a) select the associated target from 3 options (all 
targets from the study) or (b) recall the target and type the answer on the keyboard. After 
memory for all items was tested consistent with the retrieval test the JOL predicted; 
participants also completed a recognition test for all items they attempted to recall.  
In Experiment 7a, the Judgment Phase was split into two blocks (counterbalanced across 
participants). Each block started with instructions informing participants of the judgment 
response format they were to use in that block. In one block participants made binary (yes/no) 
JOLs while in the other block they gave confidence responses expressed as a percentage (0%-
20%-40%-60%-80%-100%). The retrieval format (whether recognition or recall was 
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predicted) was manipulated on a trial level within-block. Participants were presented on 
screen with the cue-word as well as an instruction word at the top of the screen (Recognise? 
or Recall?). It was ensured that half the trials within each JOL format block received each 
type of prediction. The order in which the judgments were made within each block was 
randomised. 
In Experiment 7b, the Judgment Phase was split into four blocks (counterbalanced across 
participants). Again, each block started with a set of instructions explaining the JOL response 
format to use and the memory test participants were to predict. Across the four blocks 
participants were asked to (a) predict whether they will recognize the target using a binary 
response format, (b) predict whether they will recognize the target using a confidence scale, 
(c) predict whether they will recall the target using a binary response format and (d) predict 
whether they will recall the target using a confidence scale. Same as in Experiment 7a, the 
cues were accompanied by an instruction word (Recognise? or Recall?) at the top of the 
screen to ensure that participants remembered which prediction they were making in each 
block. 
 
 
Figure	 5.1: Schematic of Experiment 7a procedure. Experiment 7b differed in that there 
were 4 blocks in the Judgment Phase and participants only predicted recognition or recall 
within each block (never both). 
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5.3 Results 
5.3.1 Memory 
Firstly, we compared average memory performance (see Figure 5.2) between conditions and 
experiments using an Experiment (7a, 7b) x Judgment format (binary, confidence) x Memory 
test (recall, recognition) ANOVA. Average recognition performance was significantly higher 
than recall performance, F(1, 49) = 514.62, p < .001, 𝜂!! =  .91. There was no difference in 
memory performance between whether confidence or binary JOLs were used, F < 1, and 
between experiments, F < 1. 
 
  
Figure	5.2: Mean percentage of items correctly remembered (recall and recognition) in 
Experiment 7a and 7b by JOL response format. Error bars indicate standard error of the 
mean. 
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5.3.2 JOL responding 
In line with previous studies (e.g., Kornell & Bjork, 2009), we first looked at absolute 
correspondence between number of items remembered and the average JOL expressed. One 
of the key variables of interest was whether JOL predictions would be sensitive to the 
retrieval test they were predicting and whether this would change with (i) the nature of the 
experimental design (blocked vs. trial-level) and (ii) the JOL response format employed 
(confidence vs. binary JOL). To investigate this we compared the average JOL confidence 
(expressed as percentage) on recognition and recall trials with the average percentage of 
positive (yes) predictions of binary JOLs given. The fact that both yielded percentages 
allowed us to compare the two JOL response formats directly (see Figure 5.3). 
 
  
Figure	5.3: Average JOLs for recognition and recall predictions expressed as a binary 
judgment (percentage of yes predictions) or overall confidence expressed for Experiment 
7a and Experiment 7b. Error bars represent standard error of the mean. 
 
We carried out the same Experiment (7a, 7b) x Judgment format (binary, confidence) x 
Memory test (recall, recognition) ANOVA as before, this time to analyse mean JOL 
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both Memory test, F(1, 49) = 16.91, p < .001, 𝜂!! =  .26, and Judgment format, F(1, 49) = 
314.83, p < .001, 𝜂!! =  .86. Further, there was also a two-way interaction between Memory 
test and Experiment, F(1, 49) = 5.60, p = .022, 𝜂!! =  .10, and an interaction between 
Judgment format and Memory test, F(1, 49) = 16.35, p  <.001, 𝜂!! =  .25, but not between 
Judgment format and Experiment, F < 1. Lastly, the results also showed a three-way 
interaction between all factors of interest, F(1, 49) = 5.28, p = .026, 𝜂!! =  .10.  
To understand the interactions more closely, we split the data by experiment and analysed 
these separately using a Judgment format x Memory test ANOVA. We found that in 
Experiment 7a, higher JOLs were given for recognition as compared to recall predictions, 
F(1, 24) = 31.97, p < .001, 𝜂!! =  .57. There was no effect of Judgment format, F(1, 24) = 
2.83, p = .105, 𝜂!! =  .11, or the interaction, F(1, 24) = 1.21, p = .283, 𝜂!! =  .05. In 
Experiment 7b on the other hand, there were no differences between recognition and recall 
predictions in the magnitude of JOL expressed, F < 1. Again, there was no effect of 
Judgement format, F(1, 25) = 1.56, p = .223, 𝜂!! =  .06, or the interaction, F < 1. 
In summary, the above results show that JOLs were higher for recognition than recall when 
the type of retrieval predicted changed on a trial level (Experiment 7a) but not when memory 
test predicted (recall, recognition) was blocked (Experiment 7b). This pattern of results did 
not differ with the type of JOL response format (binary, confidence scale) used. However, 
overall participants seem to have given a higher proportion of yes responses than the average 
JOL confidence that they expressed (as indicated by the main effect of Judgment format). 
The three-way interaction between all factors of interest further shows that this was not 
consistently so for all conditions. For example, in Experiment 7a the magnitude of difference 
between the two response formats is bigger for recognition than recall predictions. In 
experiment 7b, it is the opposite. As such there seem to be small variations in how the JOL 
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response formats are employed even though the key main effects of interest and interactions 
remain the same. 
5.3.3. Absolute accuracy (calibration) 
The above analysis shows that in Experiment 7a JOL responding differed between 
recognition and recall predictions. Nevertheless, it is not clear how close these predictions 
were to actual memory performance. One way to assess JOL accuracy is in calibration terms 
– comparing whether the average JOL percentage (confidence or yes responding) is the same 
as the percentage of items correctly remembered. For recognition predictions we looked at 
recognition accuracy and for recall predictions we looked at recall accuracy. Within each 
experiment, we conducted a Measure (memory performance, JOL) x Memory test (recall, 
recognition) x Judgment format (confidence, binary) ANOVA. 
In Experiment 7a, there was a main effect of Measure indicating that JOL responses and 
memory performance differed, F(1, 24) = 8.12, p <.01, 𝜂!! =  .25. There was no effect of 
Judgment format, F(1, 24) = 1.57, p = .222, 𝜂!! =  .06, but a main effect of memory test, F(1, 
24) = 151.64, p <.001, 𝜂!! =  .86. There was also a Measure x Memory test interaction, F(1, 
24) = 220.70, p < .001, 𝜂!! =  .91, with no other significant interactions (lowest p value = 
.104). Even though JOLs changed with memory test, participants overestimated recall, t(24) 
= 5.30, p < .001, d = 0.67, and underestimated recognition, t(24) = 10.45, p <. 001, d = 1.43. 
In Experiment 7b, unsurprisingly, there was a main effect of Measure as average JOL 
responses and memory performance differed, F(1, 25) = 6.89, p <.05, 𝜂!! =  .22. There was 
no main effect of Judgment format, F < 1, but a main effect of Memory test, F(1, 25) = 
161.75, p  < .001, 𝜂!! =  .87. This was further qualified by a Measure x Memory test 
interaction, F(1, 25) = 163.47, p < .001, 𝜂!! =  .87, which is consistent with results reported 
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above showing that whereas in terms of memory performance, recognition and recall 
differed, JOL responses were the same for both memory test predictions. Same as in 
Experiment 7a, recall was overestimated, t(25) = 4.28, p < .001, d = 0.77, and recognition 
was underestimated, t(25) = 9.05, p < .001, d = 1.79. There were no further interactions 
reaching significance (lowest p value = .103).  
The calibration analysis shows that in both experiments, participants failed to fully capture 
the difference in memory performance between recognition and recall. This was true even in 
Experiment 7a where participants changed their JOL responses based on what they were 
predicting (unlike in Experiment 7b). The calibration results show that despite the change in 
responding, participants continued to underestimate recognition and overestimate recall. 
Whereas calibration has been criticised as an imperfect tool for assessing confidence JOL 
accuracy unless also generalized to other JOL response formats (Hanczakowski et al., 2013), 
it is clear that this concurrent over/underestimation of memory performance was equally true 
for binary and confidence JOL responses. 
5.3.4 Relative accuracy (resolution) 
We also conducted an analysis of relative accuracy. Compared to absolute correspondence 
between responding and memory performance as assessed above, relative accuracy aims to 
capture item-by-item correspondence between JOL predictions and memory. We computed 
d’ for binary responses (see Figure 5.4) and AUC for confidence responses (see Figure 5.5). 
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Figure	5.4: Average resolution accuracy for binary responses (d’) by Experiment and by 
Memory test. Accuracy was first assessed consistent with what participants predicted i.e. if 
JOLs predicted recall we assessed how accurately participants predicted recall performance 
and the same for recognition. We also assessed how accurately participants predicted 
recognition when they made recall JOL predictions. Error bars represent standard error of the 
mean. 	
Firstly, an Experiment (7a, 7b) x Memory test (recall, recognition) ANOVA was used to 
investigate d’. We computed d’ consistent with JOL predictions; if participants were asked to 
predict recognition then recognition memory performance was used to determine the hit rate 
and false alarm rate of the JOL predictions. We observed an effect of Memory test, F(1, 49) = 
57.98, p < .001, 𝜂!! =  .54, as recall predictions were more accurate than recognition 
predictions across both experiments. There was no effect of Experiment, F(1, 49) = 1.63, p = 
.208, 𝜂!! =  .03, and no interaction, F < 1.  
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Figure	5.5: Average resolution accuracy for confidence responses (AUC) by Experiment 
and by Memory test.  Accuracy was first assessed consistent with what participants predicted 
i.e. if JOLs predicted recall we assessed how accurately participants predicted recall 
performance and the same for recognition. We also assessed how accurately participants 
predicted recognition when they made recall JOL predictions. Error bars represent standard 
error of the mean.  
 
The same ANOVA was used to analyse the relative accuracy of confidence JOLs (AUC) 
which showed a different pattern of results.  This time there was no effect of Memory test, 
F(1, 49) = 1.62, p = .209, 𝜂!! =  .03, as well as no effect of Experiment, F < 1. There was also 
no interaction between the two factors, F(1, 49) = 1.31, p = .259, 𝜂!! =  .03. All in all, 
confidence accuracy was the same across Experiments and Memory test predicted.2 In 
summary, relative accuracy appears to have differed across the two response formats.3 
																																																								2	Even	 though	 there	appears	 to	be	a	numerical	difference	 in	 the	 recall	 and	 recognition	 JOL	accuracy	 in	Experiment	7a,	this	is	not	significantly	different,	consistent	with	the	results	of	the	ANOVA	(p	=	.068).	3	We	also	calculated	AUC	for	the	binary	data	to	make	sure	the	difference	in	the	pattern	of	results	was	not	due	 to	 differences	 in	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 tests	 employed	 to	 analyze	 them.	 The	 binary	 AUC	 data	 results	showed	 the	 exact	 same	 pattern	 as	 that	 observed	 with	 d’	 i.e.	 higher	 recall	 as	 compared	 to	 recognition	accuracy	across	experiments.	
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Lastly, we also checked JOL prediction accuracy by whether the target was subsequently 
recognised or not, irrespective of what the JOL predicted (recall or recognition).4 This 
allowed us to compare JOL accuracy when participants predicted recognition as compared to 
when they predicted recall, keeping the memory performance constant. If participants did not 
truly differentiate between the two test formats in their predictions, then we would expect the 
accuracy prediction to be the same. If participants were sensitive to test format then JOL 
accuracy for recognition predictions should be higher than JOL accuracy when predicting 
recall if both judgments are assessed in terms of recognition performance. Same as before, we 
compared d’ for binary judgments and AUC for confidence judgments (see Figures 5.4 and 
5.5). 
To analyse each JOL response format and the corresponding resolution accuracy (d’, AUC) 
we carried out a JOL prediction (recall, recognition) x Experiment (7a, 7b) ANOVA. The 
analysis of d’ showed no main effect of what JOL aimed to predict, F < 1, or Experiment, 
F(1, 49) = 1.39, p = .244, 𝜂!! =  .03, but we did observe a significant interaction, F(1, 49) = 
13.08, p < .001, 𝜂!! =  .21. Follow up analyses showed that in Experiment 7a, when 
participants predicted recognition performance they were more accurate in predicting 
recognition than when they were predicting future recall performance, t(24) = 2.62, p = .015, 
d = 0.62. In Experiment 7b, there was no significant difference in how accurately participants 
predicted their future recognition performance between recognition and recall JOL 
predictions, t  < 1.  
																																																								4	 The	 primary	 aim	 of	 the	 experiment	 was	 to	 assess	 accuracy	 of	 JOL	 predictions	 consistent	 with	 the	memory	 test	 predicted.	 To	 this	 end	 we	 first	 tested	 participants’	 memory	 consistently	 with	 what	 they	predicted	(recognition	for	recognition	predictions	and	recall	for	recall	predictions).	This	meant	that	while	it	was	possible	to	test	recognition	for	items	that	were	previously	recalled	at	the	end	of	the	experiment,	it	was	 not	 sensible	 to	 test	 recall	 for	 items	 that	were	 previously	 tested	 on	 recognition.	 These	 items	were	more	likely	to	be	remembered	since	participants	saw	the	targets	multiple	times.	Consequently,	we	were	not	 able	 to	 carry	 out	 this	 specific	 analysis	 for	 the	 reverse	 situation	 as	 well	 (recall	 performance	when	participants	predicted	recognition).	
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However, the same analysis of the AUC data did not yield the same results. There was no 
effect of what the JOL aimed to predict, F < 1, but an effect of Experiment, F(1, 49) = 5.83, p 
= .020, 𝜂!! =  .11. There was no interaction, F < 1. Participants were more accurate at 
predicting recognition performance (irrespective of what they aimed to predict) in 
Experiment 7b as compared to Experiment 7a. 
5.3.5 Response bias 
We also analysed response bias for binary responses (see Table 5.1). This is the tendency to 
respond either yes or no, independent of metamemory accuracy. The fact that discrimination 
(or relative accuracy) is controlled for means that bias (or criterion) is a more sensitive 
measure of responding effects than looking at the average of positive (yes) JOL responses as 
done earlier. 
 
Table	5.1: Average criterion by Experiment and memory task. Standard deviations appear 
in parentheses. 
 Recall Recognition 
Experiment 7a -.05 (.46) -.03 (.41) 
Experiment 7b -.15 (.44) .09 (.45) 
 
An Experiment (7a, 7b) x Memory test (recognition, recall) ANOVA was used to analyse the 
criterion results from binary data. There was no effect of memory test, F(1, 49) = 3.18, p = 
.081, 𝜂!! =  .06, no effect of experiment, F < 1, and no interaction, F(1, 49) = 2.45, p = .124, 𝜂!! =  .05. Even though the interaction was not significant, we conducted follow up within 
Experiment t-tests as we were primarily interested in whether participants set the same or 
different criteria for the recall and recognition predictions within experiment. While there 
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were no differences in Experiment 7a, t < 1, participants used a more conservative response 
criterion for recognition as compared to recall predictions in Experiment 7b, t(25) = 2.26, p = 
.033, d = 0.54.  
This reflects the fact that in Experiment 7b participants did not change their responding based 
on what they were predicting (recognition or recall). In both tasks, the average percentage of 
yes predictions was about 50% and yet average recall performance was 32% and average 
recognition performance was 80%. What this means is that recognition predictions would 
have contained a lot of misses (instances where participants did recognise the item but 
predicted they wouldn’t). Conversely, recall predictions must have contained a large number 
of false alarms (instances where participants predicted they will remember the item but 
didn’t). In other words, recognition predictions contained fewer yes predictions than was 
warranted given the task (i.e. conservative responding) whereas recall predictions contained 
more yes responses than was warranted (i.e. liberal responding).  
For the confidence data, we computed a response criterion for all possible confidence 
thresholds for a yes prediction (as done to compute AUC).  The analysis focused on within 
experiment differences between response criterion placements for recognition and recall 
predictions (subtracting recall c from recognition c; see Figure 5.6). A yes response threshold 
(20%, 40%, 60%, 80%, 100%) x Experiment (7a, 7b) ANOVA revealed a main effect of 
threshold, F(4, 196) = 3.01, p = .019, 𝜂!! =  .06, experiment, F(4, 196) = 7.52, p = .008, 𝜂!! =  .13, and a significant interaction, F(4, 196) = 2.73, p = .031, 𝜂!! =  .05. To better 
understand the interaction and as we were primarily interested in within experiment criterion 
differences, within each experiment and for each response threshold, we looked at whether 
the criterion difference for recognition and recall predictions was significantly different from 
0. Because we were analysing five response thresholds, we adjusted p values for multiple 
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comparisons using the Bonferroni correction. In Experiment 7a, there were no significant 
differences between recall and recognition predictions (lowest p = .070). As such it seems 
that the criterion placement for recognition and recall predictions was mostly the same across 
response thresholds in Experiment 7a. In Experiment 7b on the other hand, participants 
employed a more liberal criterion for recall predictions when using the 20% (t(25) = 2.93, p = 
.035) and 40% (t(25) = 3.22, p = .020) thresholds with no further significant differences 
(lowest p = .200). In other words, at least for the lower end of the confidence scale, 
participants were more conservative in their recognition as compared to their recall 
predictions. Similar to the results from the binary data, this could account for the lack of a 
difference in average JOL responding. 
 
 
Figure 5.6: Average difference between recall and recognition criterion for each response 
threshold by Experiment. Values above zero indicate a more conservative criterion for recall 
predictions as compared to recognition predictions and values below zero indicate more liberal 
criterion for recall predictions. 		
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5.4 Discussion 
This chapter examined whether delayed JOLs could be characterized as relative in nature 
and/or whether they are sensitive to theories about memory. While such questions have been 
examined with immediate JOLs, they have not been extended to delayed JOLs, which are 
thought to rely on distinct processes (Koriat, 1997). Therefore, in the present study, on half 
the trials participants predicted whether they would recognise the target, and on the other half 
they predicted whether they would recall it. Whereas in Experiment 7a these judgments were 
inter-mixed, encouraging participants to draw direct comparisons, in Experiment 7b they 
were blocked. Lastly, participants gave JOLs as either a confidence or a binary (yes/no) 
judgment. This allowed us to evaluate whether results generalize across JOL response 
formats.  
As predicted, recognition memory performance was significantly better compared to recall 
(MacDougall, 1904). Even though the reasons for this difference remain open to debate it is a 
consistent finding that, in paradigms where the cues used at test match those used at study, 
recognition is superior to recall (see Tulving & Thompson, 1973, for conditions under which 
recall can be superior to recognition). Without specifying the underlying mechanisms, the key 
to the difference likely lies in the amount of available information, cues and features between 
the two test formats. In a recognition setting participant are provided with both the cue and 
the target item (listed among other distractor items), whereas in a recall setting the participant 
only has the cue term, making the task harder (for more detail see for example Gillund & 
Shiffrin, 1984; Haist, Shimamura, & Squire, 1992; Tulving, 1983).  
Despite the clear difference between the two memory test formats, participants were not 
consistently sensitive to what test format they were predicting in their JOL predictions. More 
specifically, participants changed their responses based on whether they were predicting 
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recognition or recall only when the trial-level design of Experiment 7a was employed and not 
in the blocked design of Experiment 7b. This was true for both the confidence and binary 
JOL response formats. In other words, in Experiment 7b participants overall expressed on 
average the same confidence and gave the same percentage of yes JOLs across trials for both 
recognition and recall predictions. In contrast, in Experiment 7a participants expressed higher 
average confidence and gave more yes JOL predictions on recognition as compared to recall 
trials, thus aligning the overall predictions more consistently with the subsequent memory 
performance. This pattern of results shows that delayed JOLs are not truly sensitive to 
theories about memory as has been demonstrated with immediate JOLs (e.g., Kornell & 
Bjork, 2009). Rather, it is consistent with the idea that delayed JOLs are relative in nature and 
might draw on direct comparisons between adjacent trials (as has been already suggested for 
immediate JOLs, see Koriat, 1997).  
The relative nature of metacognitive judgments has been suggested to be characteristic of 
confidence in particular (Hanczakowski et al., 2013). Besides the immediate JOL, similar 
ideas have been explored in the context of perceptual metacognitive judgments. Rahnev et al. 
(2015) demonstrated that a confidence judgment about characteristics of perceptual stimuli 
(e.g., whether there were more red or blue letters in the display) on any given trial was among 
other things influenced by confidence on the trial preceding it. Altogether, these ideas link 
with the suggestion that confidence judgments rank items against each other. In that context it 
makes sense that on any given trial participants do not only consider the amount of evidence 
or signal they have access to on that given trial but also consider how it compares to the trial 
preceding it. The fact that we observed the same pattern of results for confidence and binary 
responses suggests this relative nature might not be specific to confidence but might be a 
general characteristic of metacognitive judgments. 
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That the two response formats were employed in the same way here is not inconsistent with 
the results of Chapter 4. The results of the previous chapter showed that confidence and 
binary responses do not necessarily map onto each other directly, consistent with the idea that 
confidence is not probabilistic (Hanczakowski et al., 2013). However, here we only looked at 
overall, average use of the confidence scale rather than individual responding. Further, it is 
likely that anchoring on the confidence scale (i.e. where the likely divide between yes and no 
predictions is positioned) can change across tasks (see for example Serra & England, 2012). 
In general, how the confidence scale is interpreted and used can change within a task if, for 
example, the make-up of the studied stimuli changes (Zawadzka & Higham, 2016). 
As a side note, being a within-subject design, Experiment 7b could also be viewed as 
comparative in nature. However, the blocks were clearly delineated from each other through 
instructions slides which were presented before each block, reminding participants what 
memory test they were making the prediction for and what JOL response format they should 
employ. As such the design of Experiment 7b did not encourage participants to compare trials 
within any given block against items in the other blocks. Further, it is likely that participants 
only consider trials immediately preceding the trial on which the judgment is being made 
rather than holding in memory all the responses they have given throughout the task. In other 
words, the fact that no change in responding was observed in Experiment 7b demonstrates 
that while delayed JOLs are comparative in nature, this is more in terms of comparisons 
being made in relationship to items immediately preceding the trial at which a judgment is 
being made rather than in the context of the entire task. 
Despite the change in overall responding in Experiment 7a, participants in both experiments 
overestimated their future recall and underestimated their recognition in terms of calibration. 
This was true for both response formats. In other words, the change in responding in 
Experiment 7a did not fully capture the magnitude of difference between recognition and 
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recall performance. This relates to recent findings that confidence reports do not necessarily 
match onto retrieval probabilities and are relative rather than absolute (Hanczakowski et al., 
2013; Zawadzka & Higham, 2015).  However, the fact that this was observed with binary 
responses as well, which are much more clearly separated and defined categories than 
confidence responses, shows that this is not just a result contingent on the employed response 
format.  
Turning to the signal detection analysis, the results showed that whereas in Experiment 7a 
participants adopted the same response bias for recognition and recall JOL predictions, in 
Experiment 7b they adopted a more conservative response bias for recognition as compared 
to recall predictions. Response bias in the signal detection framework represents the amount 
of evidence that participants require to give a positive (yes) judgment, irrespective of 
discrimination accuracy. Clearly, the evidence available for a recognition and a recall 
judgment differs. For example, when presented with the cue, participants might be able to 
remember the first letter of the target. While this could represent sufficient evidence for a 
likely subsequent recognition, it is less compelling evidence for successful future recall if no 
other information is retrieved at time of judgment. In other words, participants are likely to 
access more evidence for recognition as compared to recall on any given trial and this should 
lead to more yes JOLs for recognition as compared to recall trials. That participants employed 
the same response bias for recognition and recall JOLs corresponds to the observation that 
participants gave overall more yes and high confidence JOLs on recognition as compared to 
recall trials. Experiment 7b on the other hand, participants gave the same responses on any 
given trial irrespective of whether they were predicting recognition or recall even though 
recognition is more likely. This is why the results show that participants were more 
conservative in responding on recognition as compared to recall trials. More specifically, in 
the case of recognition participants gave fewer yes predictions (50% of all trials on average) 
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than was warranted given memory performance (80% targets recognised correctly on 
average) whereas in the case of recall they gave more yes predictions (also 50% of all trials 
on average) than their performance (32% of targets recalled correctly on average) warranted.  
In other words, these results are consistent with the overall pattern of responding observed in 
the two experiments. This was seen especially in the binary data but also in the confidence 
results. In Experiment 7b, we saw a shift if response criterion toward more conservative for 
recognition predictions on the lower end of the confidence scale.  
The only difference between the two response formats was observed with relative JOL 
accuracy. While the confidence responses for recognition and recall predictions were equally 
accurate across experiments, the binary responses more accurately predicted recall as 
compared to recognition in both experiments. That recall predictions might be more accurate 
is not surprising given the format of the Judgment Phase more closely resembles the format 
of the memory test for recall than recognition. In both instances only the cue is present. It is 
likely that in the Judgment Phase participants find it harder to fully account for facilitation in 
performance by having the target present (among other distractor items). 
However, that we would observe this difference on one response format and not the other was 
not predicted and is hard to account for. While we expected to observe differences in overall 
responding and calibration across response formats, consistent with other findings in the 
literature (e.g., Hanczakowski et al., 2013), we had no reason to predict differences in 
resolution for the two response formats. The two measures employed are different with d’ 
relying on parametric assumptions about the underlying distributions of signal not true for 
AUC. However, the pattern of results observed for d’ was confirmed when resolution for the 
binary data was also assessed using AUC. As such this does not seem to explain the 
difference in the observed results and at the moment we are unable to account for it. 
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Lastly, we compared recognition and recall JOLs in how accurately they predicted 
recognition performance. If participants were sensitive to memory test format, it follows that 
they should more accurately predict recognition performance when that is what they aimed to 
predict (recognition JOL) as compared to when they were predicting recall performance. In 
Experiment 7a, participants more accurately predicted future recognition when that was what 
they were in fact predicting with binary (yes/no) responses. This was not the case in 
Experiment 7b. This is again consistent with the response data suggesting that in Experiment 
7b participants did not differentiate between whether they were predicting recognition or 
recall, rather both JOLs were made in the same way. However, we did not observe any 
differences in AUC accuracy between experiments and between JOL prediction types, similar 
to lack of resolution differences in the confidence data discussed above. 
Previous chapters have demonstrated, consistent with the literature (e.g., Koriat, 1997) that 
immediate JOLs are sensitive to mnemonic cues. As described earlier, mnemonic cues are 
usually stimulus specifics and describe characteristics that generally change across trials. 
Even without any manipulations, when participants make their JOLs they naturally find some 
cue words more familiar than others and some targets easier to access than others. The ideas 
discussed in this chapter similarly highlight that delayed JOLs are likely primarily sensitive 
to variables that change on a trial level. If metacognitive judgments aim to track relative 
changes in signal then there must be some variability in the signal encountered.  This is why 
variables that remain consistent across a block of trials are less likely to influence the 
judgments made. However, results of Chapter 2 showed that in a between subject design it is 
possible to get differences in JOL responding as participants gave fewer yes JOLs when they 
were presented with pseudo-word cues as compared to real-word cues. Consequently, the 
most likely candidate for variables that might have an effect on JOL responses across a block 
of trials are variables that also influence access to the target. 
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In summary, the current study confirms that delayed JOLs are not sensitive to theories about 
memory. Clearly only one theory of memory was tested in the context of the present chapter 
but the results are consistent with findings from studies using other metacognitive paradigms 
(especially immediate JOLs) that consistently fail to find an effect of explicit theories about 
memory function on judgments (e.g., Koriat et al., 2004; Kornell & Bjork, 2009). Rather, we 
have demonstrated that delayed JOLs are comparative and relative in nature. The 
comparative nature of JOLs has first been discussed in the context of immediate JOLs 
(Koriat, 1997) and here we show that delayed JOLs might share in this characteristic. It is 
significant that this was observed across both confidence and binary responses suggesting this 
might not be specific to confidence judgments but could rather be a general characteristic of 
metacognitive judgments.  
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  CHAPTER 6 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
6.1  Overview 
Cognitive processes are accompanied by states of awareness that guide evaluation of their 
function and content (Fleming et al., 2012; Nelson & Narens, 1990; Overgaard & Sandberg, 
2012). This metacognitive ability is understood as an inferential process, evaluating outputs 
of the cognitive system (Koriat, 2000), that has behavioral consequences (Koriat et al., 2006; 
Metcalfe & Finn, 2008a). As such, understanding how metacognitive judgments are 
constructed is crucial. This thesis focused on metacognitive judgments made just after 
learning and during consolidation, and asked how these judgments relate to the underlying 
memory processes. 
To do this we employed the delayed judgments-of-learning (JOL) paradigm; a prediction of 
whether recently learned information would be successfully retrieved in the future (Nelson & 
Dunlosky, 1991). In a typical delayed JOL paradigm participants study cue-target word pairs 
(Study Phase) following which they are presented with the studied cues and asked to make a 
prediction (either on a confidence scale; e.g., 0%-20-40-60-80-100% or as a binary yes/no 
judgment) about whether they think they would retrieve the target on the subsequent memory 
test (Judgment Phase). In contrast to immediate JOLs, delayed JOLs are only made once all 
items have been studied, rather than on a trial-by-trial basis during study (see Koriat & Bjork, 
2006). The last phase of each experiment was a recognition memory test where participants 
were presented with each of the studied cues and picked the associated target from two or 
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three options (with the exception of Chapter 5 which employed a cued recall test for half of 
the trials).  
The metacognitive literature has employed a range of paradigms to date and one of the key 
questions throughout has been how the different types of judgments are constructed. This has 
in particular been the focus of the feeling-of-knowing (FOK) literature (judgments made for 
temporarily inaccessible items) and the immediate JOL literature (see e.g., Koriat & Levy-
Sadot, 2001; Rhodes & Castel, 2008). However, the literature on the delayed JOL has been 
less rich in this respect (for an exception to this see Metcalfe & Finn, 2008b). The aim of this 
thesis was to fill this gap by asking how delayed JOLs are constructed. 
The focus throughout has been on how delayed JOLs relate to memory. The delayed JOL 
literature has primarily assumed that the judgment is based on access to information stored in 
long-term memory (as opposed to short-term memory thought to drive immediate JOLs; for 
review see Metcalfe & Dunlosky, 2008; Rhodes & Tauber, 2011). In other words, ease of 
access to the target item was assumed the key determinant – the faster a person can recall the 
target at time of judgment, the higher the delayed JOL. More recently it has also been shown 
that at least in the early stages of the judgment process, delayed JOLs can also be influenced 
by familiarity with the cue used to elicit the judgment (Benjamin, 2005; Metcalfe & Finn, 
2008b). The FOK literature has further shown that even access to information that is not 
strictly the target item under evaluation (such as the learning strategy used to link the target to 
the cue at study; Hertzog et al., 2014) can also influence the judgment magnitude. This means 
that, at least in the case of FOK, metacognitive judgments might be a more broad class of 
evidence evaluation mechanisms where evidence could refer to any seemingly relevant 
information that comes to mind at time of judgment. This thesis asked whether similar 
conclusions could be made about the delayed JOL. 
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Chapters 2 and 3 examined how target- and cue-related manipulations influenced both 
memory and metamemory. Chapter 4 on the other hand did not manipulate anything and 
instead asked participants to justify their JOLs. The examination of the content of these 
responses shed light on how the different memory related information (e.g., cue familiarity 
and target accessibility) related to different types of JOL predictions. Altogether, these 
chapters examined the effect of stimulus specific variables (i.e. varied item by item) on 
delayed JOLs. In contrast, Chapter 5 examined whether JOLs are sensitive to theories about 
memory i.e. variables consistent across items. This was through asking participants to predict 
either future recognition or future target recall. Overall, this range of experimental 
approaches allowed us to address a variety of questions related to the underlying nature of the 
delayed JOL.  
6.2  Summary of findings 
Across three experiments, Chapter 2 manipulated the location of the target item on screen and 
in relation to the cue. Participants were asked to (i) remember target location, (ii) indicate 
how confident they were that they remembered it accurately and (iii) give a JOL indicating 
their confidence that they will recognise the target on a subsequent memory test. The results 
indicated that participants’ confidence that they remembered target location was directly 
related to their JOL confidence that they will also recognise it. Further, it was shown that the 
accuracy of memory for target location also influenced JOLs (with higher JOLs if target 
location was remembered accurately) but only when memory for target location was also 
related to memory for the target (i.e. if it was recognised). Firstly, this shows that delayed 
JOLs are related to the quantity of information that is accessible at time of judgment and that 
this information does not need to be specifically about what the target item is (i.e. semantic 
and orthographic information). This relates the delayed JOL to recent similar findings in the 
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FOK literature (Brewer et al., 2010; Hertzog et al., 2014). A question that arises from these 
findings is whether metacognitive judgments are not just sensitive to the amount of 
information that is accessible at time of judgment but whether they might also be sensitive to 
the amount of information that is potentially accessible. If it is indeed quantity of information 
that matters the most in metacognitive judgments then it is possible that judgments for items, 
which have more information associated with them (even if this additional information is not 
relevant to what is being predicted), might receive more confident judgments than items 
which are not accompanied by additional information. This has already been shown to a 
certain degree in TOT experiences and FOKs where target items presented alongside pictures 
at study (as compared to items presented alone or only accompanied by other words) received 
more TOT reports and higher FOKs (Schwartz et al., 2014; Schwartz & Smith, 1997). 
Further, we found that it is not just quantity but also quality of the accessed information (i.e. 
how accurately it has been remembered) that relates to the magnitude of a delayed JOL. This 
is contrary to suggestions in the literature that accuracy of the accessed information does not 
play a role in metacognitive judgments (Koriat, 2000). Thomas et al. (2012) similarly 
observed that accuracy of access to semantic but not perceptual (font colour) features of the 
target influenced FOKs. Based on these results, they suggested that the accuracy of the 
accessed target-related partial features only influences judgments when it is semantic in 
nature and not when it is perceptual. However, the results presented here rather suggest that 
the determining factor in whether the accuracy of the accessed partial features is related to 
metamemory judgments is whether this access is in turn related to target memory. In other 
words, when accurate access to the target-related feature (here spatial position of the target) 
was related to accuracy of recognition memory for the target, then it impacted JOL 
magnitude. It is likely that these kinds of effects are most indicative of the quality of 
encoding of the target item and the binding between its constituent features. One would 
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expect to observe these effects for target-related information that is closely bound to the 
target item i.e. in instances where the memory for that information also relates to memory for 
target identity as that should lead to a richer retrieval experience. When participants can 
clearly remember the target item (including simultaneous accessing what and where it was), 
they are more likely to give a high JOL.  
Chapter 3, in contrast, looked at the role of the cue in delayed JOLs. More specifically we 
investigated two forms of cue familiarity and how they impacted memory and metamemory. 
Firstly, we manipulated pre-experimental cue familiarity across the two experiments with 
Experiment 4a employing pseudo-word cues (unknown to participants) and Experiment 4b 
employing real-word cues (familiar words that participants would have encountered in their 
real-life). Further, both experiments manipulated experimental cue-familiarity by exposing 
participants to half the cues in a rating task preceding the Study Phase. We investigated how 
both types of familiarity impacted memory and metamemory but this time using binary 
(yes/no) JOLs. 
Firstly, we found that both types of familiarity improved target memory and that these effects 
interacted. More specifically, memory for targets paired with real-word (i.e. pre-
experimentally familiar) cues was better than memory for targets paired with pseudo-word 
cues. However, experimentally manipulating familiarity of the pseudo-word cues also 
improved memory. Memory for targets paired with experimentally familiar pseudo-word 
cues was the same as memory for targets paired with real-word cues. As such experimentally 
manipulating familiarity can provide an encoding advantage similar to that offered by pre-
experimental familiarity with the to-be-studied material. 
Further, we found that both types of familiarity influenced JOLs and that these effects also 
interacted. The metamemory results showed that both types of familiarity influenced JOLs 
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and, contrary to the memory results, did so in an additive manner. The effect of experimental 
familiarity on JOLs was bigger with pseudo-word cues as compared to real-word cues, but 
both effects were significant. In other words, even though experimental familiarity did not 
have a significant effect on memory performance in the case of real-word cues, it still 
influenced JOL responding. It is clear that while variables that influence memory also 
influence metamemory, metamemory judgments are also sensitive to influences that do not 
necessarily correspond to changes in memory performance.  
Both Chapter 2 and 3 can be seen as an extension of the classic literature on cue- and target-
related effects in the metamemory literature (e.g., Koriat & Levy-Sadot, 2001; Metcalfe & 
Finn, 2008b). Chapter 4 also adds to this literature but from a different angle. Instead of 
manipulating the nature of the cue or the target, participants completed a standard delayed 
JOL task without any variables being manipulated. On a subset of the JOL trials, participants 
wrote justifications for the response they have given. They were not given any instructions on 
how to write the justifications. The first finding of this experiment was that participants 
referenced both cue familiarity and target accessibility in their justifications. This therefore 
supports other findings in the literature and shows that these effects are not simply a result of 
making certain characteristics of the cue or the target more salient to participants through 
varying their strength across experimental trials. The real strength of this approach is that 
nothing was manipulated and no instructions were given to participants – in that sense their 
justifications were entirely spontaneous.   
Further, in Experiment 5 of Chapter 4, participants gave JOLs on a confidence scale (0%-
20%-40%-60%-80%-100%) whereas in Experiment 6 of Chapter 4 they gave binary (yes/no) 
JOLs followed by three-point confidence about that judgment (sure-maybe-guess). This 
means that in both experiments participants could make six distinct JOLs with accompanying 
confidence. However, only in Experiment 6 was there a clear yes/no distinction between the 6 
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JOLs available to participants. The intuitive assumption is that the confidence scale can be 
split down the middle into an equal number of yes and no responses (see e.g., Mason & 
Rottello, 2009). For example 40% confidence suggests a higher likelihood of failure than 
success in target recognition and so probabilistically could be interpreted as a no prediction. 
Further, some have argued that there is an underlying yes/no distinction in confidence 
judgments with participants first making the binary judgment before assigning confidence 
(e.g., Dunlosky et al., 2005) and that this division should be along the centre of the 
confidence scale intuitively makes sense (see e.g., Hanczakowski et al., 2013). However, the 
pattern of justifications between the two response formats differed and there was not a clear 
one-to-one mapping in the justifications for the two response formats. More specifically, it 
seems that the difference in justifications between the 0% and 20% confidence most closely 
resembled the differences between yes and no justifications. Further, whereas the different 
levels of yes justifications were fairly well defined, there were more similarities than 
differences across the different levels of no JOL predictions.  
At the very least this data shows that we cannot always make assumptions about how a 
specific response format is interpreted beyond what we know has been offered to participants. 
In other words, if participants are given a confidence percentage scale, it is possible that there 
is an underlying yes/no judgment in terms of which the scale can be interpreted but we need 
to confirm this, we cannot just assume it. Even more importantly, we cannot assume where 
such a yes/no distinction might be located on the confidence scale. This is consistent with 
findings that confidence judgments are unlikely to be probabilistic (Hanczakowski et al., 
2013) and that the use of the confidence scale is flexible. More specifically, participants’ use 
of the confidence scale changes if they are asked whether they will ‘remember’ or whether 
they will ‘forget’ the target word (Serra & England, 2012) and even one participant can, 
within one experimental session, adjust their use of the confidence scale and the distance 
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between the separate points on the scale if the make-up of the items changes, such as through 
adding a new set of hard or easy items to those already studied (Zawadzka & Higham, 2016). 
Lastly, we saw that participants’ JOLs were not sensitive to whether they were predicting 
recognition or recall. Both experiments in Chapter 5 (Experiments 7a and 7b) employed a 
within-subject design comparing recognition and recall JOL predictions but whereas in 
Experiment 7a the predictions were interspersed on a trial-level, in Experiment 7b they were 
blocked. Consistent with the literature (e.g., MacDougall, 1904) and our expectations, 
recognition performance was significantly better than recall performance. For participants to 
show sensitivity to memory test predicted, they would need to give fewer yes and lower 
confidence JOLs for recall as compared to recognition predictions. The results showed that 
participants changed their JOLs (both JOL confidence magnitude and percentage of yes 
responses in binary JOLs) with the memory test they were predicting only in the trial-level 
(Experiment 7a) and not the blocked (Experiment 7b) design. This finding has two major 
implications. Firstly, it seems likely that delayed JOLs are not sensitive to theory-based 
processes (as compared to stimulus specific influences as seen in the previous chapters). 
Secondly, it suggests that delayed JOLs are a relative rather than an absolute judgment. In 
other words, participants might be making a judgment on any one trial in comparison with the 
trials immediately preceding it (it is unlikely that any given trial is compared to all other trials 
consistent with the results of Experiment 7b). In other words, the amount of evidence 
accessible on any given trial is likely compared to the evidence accessible on at least the 
preceding trial – if it is higher then the participant is likely to also give higher confidence 
JOL. In the context of the present experiments, if the memory test for which predictions are 
made changes on a trial level (Experiment 7a), such that participants might predict 
recognition on the first trial and recall on the subsequent trial, then participants will 
incorporate that into the value of the final judgment outputted. It is noteworthy that this was 
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observed both with confidence and binary JOLs. This is important because while confidence 
has already been proposed to be relative rather than absolute (e.g., Hanczakowski et al., 
2013) a similar argument has not been made about binary judgments in the metacognitive 
literature. 
This idea is consistent with recent findings relating to other metacognitive paradigms but to 
date has not been explored with delayed JOLs. For example, immediate JOLs have been 
found to be sensitive to a number of influences (e.g., fluency of processing) only in within-
subject as compared to between subject designs (e.g., Susser et al., 2013).  This is further 
related to the finding that confidence (at least in immediate JOL tasks) is relative rather than 
absolute with participants meaningfully ranking the items against each other (in a 
comparative way) rather than attempting to express exact probability of future retrieval 
success (e.g., Hanczakowski et al., 2013). Lastly, a study from the perceptual metacognitive 
literature has found that confidence judgments on any one trial were also influenced (i) by 
unrelated confidence judgments on the same trial and (ii) by confidence expressed on the 
preceding trial (Rahnev et al., 2015). The important finding of this study was that the 
observed relationship between judgments were not just results of differing strength of the 
stimulus and attention, factors which were controlled for across experiments and in the 
regression analyses employed. Rather, the researchers concluded that, at least in 
metacognitive judgments about perception, participants evaluate the stimulus related signal in 
the context of the strength of signal on the previous trials. These confidence leaks are yet 
another example of confidence being relative rather than absolute with the researchers 
stressing that judgments on any given trial are not made in isolation from the context of the 
task and the experiences of the preceding trials. It is possible that the relative nature of 
judgments might be true for metamemory, and indeed metacognitive judgments in general. 
Even cognitive judgments such as those made in recognition memory tasks (i.e. is an item old 
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or new) were shown to be relative with responses on any one trial also influenced by 
responses on preceding trials (Malmberg & Annis, 2012).   
In summary, the delayed JOL can be seen as a general evidence evaluation process. It is the 
quantity of the accessed information at time of judgment that determines the JOL value; 
information here refers to any seemingly relevant accessible information at time of judgment. 
Further, the evidence quality (i.e. its accuracy) can also influence judgments. Participants are 
capable of justifying their judgments and do so with reference to the underlying memory 
processes. JOLs are determined primarily by stimulus specific variables that vary on a trial-
level that together constitute a signal which participants evaluate as either indicative of future 
target retrieval or not. Given the JOL is based on evaluating changes in signal, between 
subject variables are unlikely to influence the judgment unless they also influence access to 
the target. For example, the pre-experimental familiarity manipulation in Chapter 3 
influenced JOLs outputted between experiments because participants in the pseudo-word cue 
condition found it harder to remember the targets which led to overall fewer yes JOLs. 
Otherwise it is primarily a comparative judgment, and so will be influenced not just by the 
quantity and quality of the evidence accessible at time of judgment but also how that 
evidence compares to what was available on preceding trials. It is even possible participants 
might recalibrate their responses throughout the task as the available evidence changes. 
6.3 Methodological implications 
Both Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 used confidence and binary JOLs, allowing for direct 
comparisons. In Chapter 4 we collected justifications for both types of JOL responses 
whereas in Chapter 5 we investigated whether they give the same pattern of results for the 
experimental manipulations under investigation (namely whether participants predicted future 
recognition or recall and whether this was manipulated on a trial-level or in a blocked 
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design). Chapter 5 did not observe any differences between confidence and binary JOLs in 
that they gave overall the same pattern of results as far as the key main effects of interest 
were concerned. Nevertheless, there was a three-way interaction between all factors of 
interest indicating that there were slight variations in how the two response formats were 
employed and in some instances the proportion of yes responses was higher than the average 
JOL confidence expressed. This is consistent with Chapter 4 findings that, if there is a yes/no 
binary split in the confidence scale, it is most likely located lower on the scale than its mid-
point. Chapter 4 overall indicated that there is not necessarily a 1-to-1 mapping between the 
two response formats. It is likely that how participants interpret confidence changes between 
experiments and even participants. It is possible that in some situations participants split the 
confidence scale down the middle into yes and no responses. But the data presented in this 
thesis demonstrate that this interpretation cannot be taken for granted. While the results of 
Chapter 4 are consistent with the notion that there is some underlying split into yes and no 
judgments in the confidence scale (even if most of the confidence scale seems to correspond 
to yes predictions and only the lowest responses could be interpreted as no predictions), that 
assumption also needs to be confirmed with further data.  
The take away message is that researchers need to consider more closely the assumptions 
underlying the paradigm and response format they employ. Binary and confidence judgments 
should not be considered interchangeable. Further, confidence should not be interpreted with 
further meaning than that which is provided to participants unless participants explicitly 
indicate or are instructed to interpret it in that manner (e.g., interpreting a subset of responses 
as corresponding to a yes prediction). Further, results should be confirmed across multiple 
response formats (as suggested by Hanczakowski et al., 2013). In a series of experiments 
independent of this thesis we have found that participants’ likelihood of reporting déjà vu or 
TOT experiences in an experimental setting is influenced by how they are asked about the 
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experience, irrespective of the experimental paradigm adopted (Jersakova et al., 2016). This 
means some studies could falsely conclude they have recreated these subjective experiences 
in the laboratory when in fact the pattern of results they have obtained is rather a direct 
consequence of the format of responding they have employed.  Researchers need to ensure a 
pattern of results is specific to the psychological phenomenon under investigation rather than 
emerging from the response format employed. 
As Zawadzka & Higham (2015) point out, each response format has its benefits. Confidence 
judgments provide more of a range of responses and a corresponding increase in sensitivity. 
It is clear that metacognitive experiences are rarely all or nothing and it is often the medium 
confidence responses (outside of 0% and 100% confidence) that are the most interesting from 
a research perspective. Binary responses on the other hand are easier to interpret, as there is 
less likelihood that participants might use them in ways that is not in line with how the 
researchers assume they are being used.  
Lastly, Chapter 4 introduced a novel approach to the study of metacognition. While the idea 
of asking participants to give written reports in metacognitive tasks is not entirely novel (e.g., 
Koriat, 1980), it has not yet been used in this manner where participants are asked to justify 
their trial-level responses. Further, we combined this approach with natural language 
processing techniques and machine learning analysis of these reports is, which allowed for a 
quantitative approach to otherwise qualitative data. Firstly, this study adds to the few studies 
that have shown that asking participants to report on their strategies and approach to the task 
can be highly informative. Already Eagle (1967) noted that participants’ performance on a 
memory task was more closely related to their reported learning strategies as compared to the 
strategies they were instructed to use by the experimenter. Altogether this helps to highlight 
that asking participants for detailed self-reports can elucidate processes that might otherwise 
be overlooked.  
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6.4 Future directions 
Much of the metamemory literature has separately investigated the extent to which a given 
judgment is sensitive to the manipulation of a specific variable (e.g., cue familiarity). 
Consequently, there is now a growing body of evidence indicating that the type of accessed 
partial information that can impact metamemory predictions is truly varied, ranging from 
semantic and perceptual features of the target (Koriat et al., 2003; Thomas et al., 2012) to 
other elements present at time of encoding (Schwartz et al., 2014) or aspects of encoding 
strategies (Hertzog et al., 2014) as well as spatial information as shown in Chapter 2. An 
obvious next step is to bring these variables together in a comprehensive study and 
investigate whether certain types of information have more of an influence on metamemory 
judgments as compared to others and whether certain influences still have a significant 
impact of metacognition once other variables are taken into account. This should be done in 
the context of first identifying types or categories of influences and manipulations and then 
directly evaluating them against each other. A related but separate point is that we should also 
move toward more complex material than cue-target word pairs.  
The consideration of the level to which metacognitive judgments are relative calls for 
investigation not just as a way to find possible links across metacognitive judgments but also 
on its own merits due to its methodological and theoretical implications. Researchers are used 
to considering responses in isolation and yet the literature on confidence leaks (e.g., Rahnev 
et al., 2015) and some of the results presented here suggest this might not be correct. Linked 
to this is the more general question of how the context in which the judgment is being made 
influences the outcome of that judgment. This is related to findings that metacognitive 
judgments are sensitive to question framing (e.g., Finn, 2008). Overall, this comes back to the 
idea that there are assumptions in the way metacognitive and cognitive tasks are applied and 
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interpreted in the literature that might not be valid. This is a methodological but also a 
theoretical point. Understanding better how the experimental set-up influences responding 
leads to a clearer understanding of the data collected. It also improves our understanding of 
metacognition and the extent to which judgments are context sensitive. Mapping the variables 
related to other stimuli encountered and responses given in an experimental setting allows for 
a fuller understanding of how metacognitive judgments are made.  
Throughout this thesis we have borrowed from some of the literature on FOK and immediate 
JOLs in developing avenues of research for better understanding the basis of delayed JOLs. 
The obvious next step and something still not addressed sufficiently in the literature is the 
direct comparison between these paradigms. Most attention has been given to comparing the 
immediate and delayed JOL paradigms, mainly with the focus on understanding why the 
latter is more accurate than the former (see e.g., Koriat, 1997; Metcalfe & Dunlosky, 2008; 
Nelson & Dunlosky, 1991; Rhodes & Tauber, 2011). This has led to a range of theories, the 
core of which have primarily focused on the idea that in the delayed JOL participants have 
access to cues that are more diagnostic of future memory performance than is the case in the 
immediate JOL. Some work has also been done on comparing the delayed JOL and FOK in 
older adults, suggesting they are not equivalent (Souchay & Insingrini, 2012). Other than 
those efforts, the paradigms have not truly been systematically compared. Clearly each 
judgment relates to a different aspect of the memory process (encoding, consolidation and 
retrieval) and is made under different circumstances, which means there are clear differences 
between them. What is interesting however is to ask what unities them, whether there is such 
a thing as an underlying similarity that could be considered the core of metamemory 
judgments. 
Related to the above, the next question and something entirely missing from the field is a 
comparison of metamemory paradigms to other metacognitive phenomena. Again, it is clear 
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that each metacognitive judgment relates closely to the underlying cognitive process that it is 
monitoring and along these lines there will be clear differences. But it is of interest to explore 
in more detail whether there are underlying similarities as the use of an overarching term 
‘metacognition’ would suggest. For example, metacognition (especially in terms of memory 
judgments) has been related to executive functions and frontal lobe processes (see 
Shimamura, 2000) so that is one possible avenue of research. That said, some research has 
found that memory performance was a better predictor of metamemory accuracy than 
executive function scores in Azheimer’s patients (Souchay et al., 2002). This would suggest 
that the link to executive functions could remain a minor one but this needs to be investigated 
in more detail, especially with reference to other types of metacognitive judgments. 
An alternative to a neuropsychological approach would be a modelling approach. If all 
metacognitive judgments can be generalised as evidence evaluation processes where evidence 
refers to the strength of the signal provided by the cognitive system under consideration then 
it should be possible to come up with a generalized computational model of how that 
evidence evaluation feeds into the metacognitive judgment. It is clear that the evidence 
available in judgments on a memory as compared to a perceptual task will vary widely. Of 
interest here would be to explore whether there are characteristics of the evaluation processes, 
such as their relative nature for example, that would generalise across metacognitive 
domains. It is possible that a general class of influences (e.g., stimulus specific, context 
specific etc.) that could generalise across metacognitive tasks could be identified. Once 
general classes of influences are identified, a general modelling approach (e.g., drawing on 
artificial neural networks) becomes feasible.  
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6.5 Conclusions 
Delayed JOLs have been traditionally treated as a special case of the immediate JOL. 
Consequently, theories outlining the underlying mechanisms of delayed JOLs have focused 
on how the paradigm differs to immediate JOLs, such as positing that the delayed JOL is 
better positioned to assess the strength of access to the target (for reviews see Metcalfe & 
Dunlosky, 2008; Rhodes & Tauber, 2011). Correspondingly, the delayed JOL literature has 
treated the paradigm as an absolute judgment, each trial individually assessing the level of 
access to the target item and based on that evaluation computing the probability of 
subsequent target retrieval on the upcoming memory test. 
That target accessibility is a determinant in delayed JOLs is clearly established in the 
literature and the results reported here support that. However, across seven experiments, this 
thesis demonstrated that delayed JOLs are also subject to a range of influences, beyond the 
level of memory for target identity (i.e. what the target is). Variables that impact memory 
performance as indexed by target recognition (e.g., pre-experimental cue familiarity) also 
impact JOLs. However, in some instances variables which do no impact memory 
performance still influence JOLs. We saw this for example when participants’ confidence 
that they remembered target location significantly influenced their JOLs, even in instances 
when access to this information did not relate to memory for the target (Experiment 3, 
Chapter 2). 
When groups differ in memory performance, this can lead to absolute changes in JOL 
responding between the two groups (at least in binary JOLs, see Chapter 3). Nevertheless, 
another novel contribution of this thesis is the demonstration that the delayed JOL is 
primarily a relative judgment sensitive to variables that vary on a trial-level basis (see 
Chapter 5). Rather than being an absolute assessment of retrieval probability, the delayed 
167		
JOL can be characterised an evaluation of signal strength in relation to other experimental 
trials and to the experimental context. It is possible that target accessibility accounts for 
primary, substantial, coarse changes in responding while the trial-level, relative fluctuations 
might lead to judgment fine-tuning. 
Another contribution of this thesis is methodological. The interest in metacognition stems 
from its vital role in elucidating the nature of healthy cognitive development as well as 
improving our understanding of cognitive impairment. To do so, we need to have a good 
grasp of the strengths and limitations of the paradigms we employ. This is especially true 
when it comes to interpretation of results. That a judgment might change with what it is 
predicting (e.g., recognition vs. recall) when manipulated on a trial-level does not necessarily 
imply that that judgment is sensitive to theory-based processes (Chapter 5). Similarly, that a 
participant gives a below 50% level of confidence on a given trial does not necessarily mean 
that they are predicting they will not retrieve the target (Chapter 4). Rather it means 
participants are indicating uncertainty, which is vastly different. Such, often implicit, 
assumptions in how data is collected and analysed can lead to incorrect conclusions about the 
processes under investigation. As such it is important to understand the underlying 
assumptions of the paradigms we employ and to check for their validity. 
Future metacognitive research needs to investigate fundamental methodological questions in 
more detail. Further, the metacognitive literature needs to start asking bigger, overarching 
questions. This should also be linked to a concentrated replication effort of key findings in 
the literature. As in so many fields in psychology today, it is time to start identifying core 
themes and theories and ultimately to try to develop a comprehensive account of 
metacognition. 
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